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The present thesis addresses the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the complex 
act of constructing mental events and its role in decision-making. A specific form of mental event 
construction, namely the imagination of future events (or episodic future thinking), has been a topic 
of intense inquiry, due to its purported adaptive role. Episodic future thinking shares underlying 
cognitive and neural mechanisms with episodic remembering, which has fuelled the discussion on 
its core component processes, and those of mental event construction in general. To this aim, 
different theories have been advanced, focussing on the reconstructive nature of past memories, 
which can be flexibly recombined into novel experiences, the self-projection into alternative 
situations that underlies most forms of mental simulations, or the mental construction of scenes, 
seen as the backbones of either past, future and atemporal experiences. The first chapter of this 
thesis delves into the relation between episodic memory and episodic future thinking, investigating 
multiple facets of future thinking in a patient with focal retrograde amnesia, and reveals that 
episodic remembering is crucial for episodic future thinking, less so for other forms of mental 
simulation for which semantic memory suffices, or for future-oriented decision making. The second 
chapter begins to explore the neural bases of mental future event construction in patients with 
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and confirms a deficit in episodic future 
thinking in vmPFC patients, while excluding that this deficit depends on impairments in working 
memory or narrative abilities. The third chapter investigates whether a deficit in constructing 
(single) scenes may underly vmPFC patients' event construction impairment, studying scene 
construction and processing in vmPFC patients and comparing them to hippocampal patients, to 
investigate the different roles that vmPFC and hippocampus play in the construction of scenes. The 
chapter ends with a proposed model of the interaction of vmPFC and the hippocampus in which 
vmPFC initiates scene and event construction, and the hippocampus help build cohesive scenes. 
Lastly, the fourth chapter explores the adaptive role of episodic future thinking, showing that 
externally cueing episodic future thinking in vmPFC patients reduces their steep discounting of 
future rewards, which further elucidates the role of vmPFC in mental event construction and in 
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1. Relationship between episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
Episodic memory is part of the long-term, declarative memory system (Squire, 1992) and it 
has been originally defined as memory for personally experienced, autobiographical, past events 
(Tulving, 1972). Episodic memory is quasi-experiential, because its memories have all of the 
features of the ongoing experience, namely spatiotemporal structure, perspectivity and modality-
specific sensory information, and event specific, because it contains information about what 
happened, when, and where (so-called “WWW information”), related to a single spatiotemporal 
context (Conway, 2009; Mahr & Csibra, 2018). The re-experience of past events enables 
individuals to “travel in time”, namely to travel back to personal past experiences and to 
consciously recollect what happened in the past from a first-hand perspective (Tulving, 1999; Mahr 
& Csibra, 2018). This is possible because episodic memory is the only type of memory having 
access to the autonoetic consciousness (i.e., self-knowing), defined as “the kind of consciousness 
that mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence and identity in subjective time 
extending from the personal past through the present to the personal future” (Tulving, 1985).  
A autonoetic consciousness is the crucial feature that distinguishes episodic memory from 
other forms of memory. Semantic memory, the abstract knowledge of the world stored in the long-
term, declarative memory system, has access to the noetic consciousness (i.e., knowing) of 
retrieving general information from memory, in the absence of a feeling of personally re-
experiencing the past (Tulving, 1972; Tulving, 1985). Procedural memory, implicit information 
stored in the long-term, non-declarative memory system, is characterized by anoetic consciousness 
(i.e., non-knowing), because stored information is retrieved without explicit awareness (Tulving, 
1985). According to this view, any form of knowledge or skill stored in semantic or procedural 
memory, when is used, is oriented to the present and aims to improve individual’s interaction with 
the current environment, without the need of retrieving how the knowledge/skill was acquired; on 
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the contrary, event-related information stored in episodic memory, when is used, is oriented to the 
past and the awareness of how the information was acquired on a specific occasion allows not only 
the conscious retrieval of the event itself, but also a re-experience of it (Tulving, 1999). The mental 
re-experience of past events enables the recollection of the qualitative, contextual information 
associated to them with the same vividness, richness and specificity experienced during the event 
itself (Tulving, 2002).   
In the last decade, it has been suggested that episodic memory allows to mentally travel 
through subjective time toward both the past and the future (Tulving, 1985, 1999). Mentally 
projecting the self into the future to pre-experience an event by simulating it in one’s own mind has 
been conceptualized as “episodic future thinking” (EFT; Atance & O’Neill, 2001) or “prospection” 
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). The simulation of personal future episodes allows individuals to envision 
contextual information associated to scenarios never experienced before and to predict their 
consequences (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). These simulated scenarios can 
have high vividness, richness and specificity, which make them characterized by a strong feeling of 
pre-experience of the future event, similar to that associated to the re-experience of a real past event 
(Tulving, 1985, 1999; Atance & O’Neill, 2001). Importantly, the act of imagining personal future 
experiences has been conceptualized as inextricably built upon that of consciously remembering 
personal past experiences, as I will highlight below. The ability to mentally travel in time and 
consciously simulate past and future scenarios enables individuals to anticipate and plan for future 
contingencies, transcending current needs and motivational states (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), 
and has been claimed to distinguish humans from other species (Tulving, 1999; Atance & O’Neill, 
2001; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007).  
From this first conceptualization of the relationship between episodic memory and episodic 
future thinking, it emerges that two core elements are shared by both abilities, namely the self and 
the subjective time (Tulving, 1999, 2002; Klein, 2013). Successive investigations have agreed with 
the idea that the projection of the self in time distinguishes episodic future thinking from other 
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forms of future simulation (Atance & O’Neill, 2001, 2005), and that self-consciousness, the 
capacity to think about the one’s own mental states and focus the attention on one’s own inner 
experience (Scheier & Carver, 1985), may have a role in accessing autobiographical information 
and transforming it into the subjective experience of “travelling through time” to pre-experience a 
particular future episode (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2010).  
Although this traditional view has associated future-oriented mental time travel almost 
exclusively with episodic memory (Tulving, 1985, 1999, 2002), more recent approaches have 
acknowledged the role that also semantic memory plays for the simulation of the future (reviewed 
in Klein, 2013). Atance & O’Neill (2001) have suggested that a semantic knowledge regarding the 
future, called “semantic future thinking” (Atance & O’Neill, 2001) runs in parallel to episodic 
future thinking, and that the level of novelty of the simulated event influences and determines the 
type of component – more semantic or more episodic – that will be used during the simulation of 
the future (Atance & O’Neill, 2005). According to this view, a semantic, script-based knowledge of 
the future is more likely to be used to simulate familiar, routine, events; whereas, an episodic 
representation of the future is required to anticipate events that are more novel and uncertain 
(Atance & O’Neill, 2005). The idea that the type of information used and, consequently, the type of 
simulation experienced, episodic or semantic, is related to the nature of the future events itself and 
to task demands (Klein, 2002, 2013), has been widely accepted and has led some authors to 
conclude that the contribution of episodic and semantic elements to future simulation invariably 
depends upon the accessibility of information that is relevant to the event of interest (Szpunar, 
2010), in line with the heuristic principle that the content of any future simulation reflects the 
information that is most readily accessible (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Recent experimental investigations have specified the role of semantic memory during the 
simulation of the future, showing that during the construction of EFT, both episodic, detailed 
elements, and semantic, more abstract, information are accessed and used to create mental events. 
In particular, when individuals construct specific future (as well as past) events, they firstly access 
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and activate general, abstract personal knowledge (i.e., personal semantic information and/or 
general events), and then they produce episodic details relevant for a specific event. Thinking about 
personal goals especially facilitates the access to episodic information and the generation of the 
specific event (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). Therefore, the imagination of future events can be 
seen as a protracted generative process entailing different levels of specificity, where abstract 
knowledge, drawn from semantic memory, provide a context to guide the retrieval, integration and 
interpretation of specific episodic details, drawn from episodic memory (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 
2011). Both episodic and semantic memory are necessary to engage in EFT and, in general, to 
travel in time (Klein, 2013), and abstract, conceptual knowledge offered by semantic memory 
works as a “scaffold” which enables the (re)construction of both past and future events, by 
providing appropriate schemas or abstract representation to melt together episodic details and give 
them the personal significance of an extended mental event (Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; 
Irish & Piguet, 2013). 
A considerable number of studies in the last decades has been focused on the important 
similarities between episodic memory and episodic future thinking, highlighting their cognitive and 
neural overlap, which will be explained in the next paragraphs. 
1.1 Cognitive overlap between episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
The emerging insights about the profound tie between episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking have been proved by a growing evidence of a striking cognitive similarity during the act of 
remembering past experiences and that of imagining future episodes (see Schacter et al., 2012 for a 
review). Experimental manipulations of psychological factors, such as the emotional content or the 
temporal distance, have been shown to affect the recollection of the past and the imagination of the 
future in a comparable way. Positive events elicit greater subjective re-experiencing for past events 
and pre-experiencing for future events than negative events; temporally close events in either the 
past or the future contain more sensory and contextual details and enhance greater feeling of re-
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experiencing or pre-experiencing than temporally distant events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004). Furthermore, individual differences in visual imagery ability and emotion regulation 
strategies have similar effects on both past and future events. Individuals with better visual imagery 
abilities experience more sensory details during both the recollection of past events and the 
imagination of future events; similarly, individuals used to suppress emotions as a regulation 
strategy recollect past events and imagine future events with fewer sensory, contextual and 
emotional details (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). On the contrary, individuals with high 
self-efficacy, who believe that they can cope effectively with events, remember past events and 
imagine future events with more episodic details than do individuals with low self-efficacy (Brown, 
Dorfman, Marmar, & Bryant, 2012). Also, individual differences in the generation of self-defining 
memories are mirrored by those in self-defining future projections (D’Argembeau, Lardi, & Van 
der Linden, 2012), and cognitive functions outside the memory domain similarly affect the 
generation of past and future events. For instance, measures of executive functioning are correlated 
with the number of episodic details provided during the recollection of past events and the 
imagination of future events, suggesting that executive processes, such as the organization, access 
and monitoring of retrieved autobiographical information, play a similar role during the generation 
of events in both temporal directions (D’Argembeau et al, 2010).  
Commonalties between past and future thinking also emerge across the life span. Children 
develop the ability to report and make judgments about personal past and future events at a similar 
age, between three and five years (Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; 
Hayne & Imuta, 2011), even though episodic future thinking (compared to remembering) has a 
protracted developmental trajectory (Ghetti & Coughlin, 2018). Older adults, on the other hand, 
produce fewer internal – episodic details and more external – semantic details than younger adults 
both when they remember the past and when they imagine the future (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2008; Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011). 
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However, cognitive differences also exist between remembering the past and imagining the 
future. For instance, remembered events are associated with increased retrieval of sensory-
perceptual details compared to imagined future events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Berntsen & Bohn, 2010) or imagined events in general (Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988), 
and contain more specific information or more episodic details than imagined future experiences 
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010). Furthermore, some 
cognitive functions differently affect the generation of past and future events. For instance, 
imagining future events compared to remembering past events, relies more on executive functions 
(Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Visuospatial 
constructive abilities, self-consciousness and future orientation are correlated with the number of 
sensory details reported during the imagination of future events, but not during the recollection of 
past events (D’Argembeau et al, 2010). These findings are consistent with the idea that imagining a 
specific future event engages more intensive constructive activity than remembering past event, 
necessary to flexibly recombine multiple past details into a novel episode (Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
I will come back to this point later. 
1.2 Neural overlap between episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
The cognitive commonalities between remembering the past and imagining the future are 
reflected in their neural substrates, as shown by findings coming from functional neuroimaging 
(fMRI) and neuropsychology.  
Evidence from neuroimaging 
fMRI evidence has showed that episodic memory is supported by a distributed network of 
brain regions, which includes areas consistently activated across episodic – autobiographical 
memory imaging studies and therefore referred to as the “core” of the autobiographical memory 
network, namely, the medial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices, the medial and lateral temporal 
cortices, the lateral parietal cortex, the retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortex, and the 
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cerebellum. The network also includes areas less consistently activated and referred to as 
“secondary” to the core of the autobiographical memory network, comprising the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, superior medial and superior lateral cortex, anterior cingulate, medial 
orbitofrontal, temporopolar and occipital cortices, and the thalamus and amygdala (Maguire, 2001; 
Maguire & Frith, 2003; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006; Cabeza & Jacques, 2007; Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007). Importantly, fMRI studies show that imagining personal future events 
activates areas that overlap substantially with the episodic – autobiographical memory network, 
including medial temporal and prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, and 
lateral parietal and temporal areas (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Szpunar, 
Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). 
This set of brain areas active during the generation of both past and future events also overlaps with 
the “default mode network” (Raichle et al., 2001), a set of areas mainly active during passive 
cognitive states (i.e., resting quietly with closed or open eyes), when individuals shift their attention 
inward, without engaging in any specific goal-directed behaviour (Raichle et al., 2001). Coherently, 
the brain default network is activated by active cognitive tasks that encourage internal mentation, 
like episodic memory and episodic future thinking (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). 
The functional anatomy of the default mode network has been further investigated to show 
that it comprises a core system hub, namely, the posterior cingulate cortex and anterior medial 
prefrontal cortex, as well as two subsystems that interact with the core: a “dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex (dMPFC) subsystem”, including dMPFC, temporoparietal junction, lateral temporal cortex, 
and temporal pole, and a “medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem”, comprising ventral MPFC, 
posterior inferior parietal lobule, retrosplenial cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and hippocampal 
formation (Andrews-hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010). These two subsystems are 
functionally dissociated, such that the dMPFC subsystem is preferentially activated when 
individuals are focussed on their present mental states and make self-relevant, affective decisions, 
whereas, the MTL subsystem is preferentially engaged when individuals are focussed on their 
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future mental states and make decisions involving the construction of a mental scene based on 
memory (Andrews-hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010). Importantly, aspects of 
both subsystems are recruited by autobiographical memory and spontaneous cognition (Andrews-
Hanna, Saxe, & Yarkoni, 2014). 
Despite important similarities in the neural bases of past and future event simulation, 
neuroimaging findings have shown some discrepancies between remembering the past and 
imagining the future, reflecting the differences observed at cognitive level. The imagination of 
future events is associated to greater neural activity in frontopolar regions and hippocampus 
compared to the recollection of past events (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; 
Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007), and this greater activity for future events is mainly evident 
during the initial construction phase of the event (e.g. the generation of the event in response to a 
cue). Importantly, while the initial construction of future events uniquely engages the right 
hippocampus, possibly as a response to the novelty, the subsequent elaboration of future events is 
characterized by a remarkable overlap of activity in regions of the autobiographical memory 
retrieval network (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). Furthermore, imagining events activates the 
anterior hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus, whereas remembering 
past events rich in contextual and visuospatial details preferentially engages posterior hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus and regions of posterior visual cortex (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 
2009). The increased activity found associated to future relative to past events is in line with the 
idea that the imagination of future events requires more demanding constructive processes, needed 
to extract details from memory and to recombine them into novel scenarios. This explanation fits 
with theoretical accounts suggested to elucidate the relationship between episodic memory and 
episodic future thinking, as described next.  
Evidence from neuropsychology 
These neuroimaging findings have been confirmed by neuropsychological evidence, 
showing that nodes of the core brain network are not only associated to, but also necessary for 
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simulating both past and future experiences. Although early neuropsychological investigations of 
the famous case H.M. (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Corkin, 2002), who became amnesic as a result of 
a surgical treatment of epilepsy, had clearly shown that a damage to the medial temporal lobes 
(MTLs) cause a serious impairment in the ability to form new lasting autobiographical memories, 
only almost three decades later neuropsychology has begun to study the relationship between 
amnesia and future thinking. Endel Tulving (1985) showed that the patient K.C., suffering from a 
severe retrograde and anterograde amnesia as a result of a widespread damage to the MTLs due to a 
car accident, was unable to recollect any personal event of his past as well as to imagine any 
personal episode in his future, even in the near one (e.g., tomorrow). K.C.’s past and future episodic 
impairment was dissociated from his intact semantic knowledge of the world and about himself 
(Tulving, 1985; Rosenbaum, Kohler, et al., 2005; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & 
Moscovitch, 2009). Another amnesic case, patient D.B. (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002), showed 
that the dissociation between (impaired) episodic and (spared) semantic memory evident in the 
recollection of the past is extended to the simulation of the future, with the patient unable to 
imagine personal future events, but capable to imagine non-personal – public – future events (Klein 
et al., 2002). Further investigations have confirmed that the severity of episodic, but not semantic, 
autobiographical memory loss is accounted for by the degree of hippocampal damage in patients 
with MTL amnesia (Rosenbaum et al., 2008). The inability of amnesic patients with MTL lesions to 
provide richly detailed episodes during the simulation of personal past and future events is not due 
to a narrative deficit, being them able to describe the ongoing (perceptual) reality or events depicted 
in pictures, but truly mediated by a paucity of perceptual and contextual episodic details (Race, 
Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013; Kurczek et al., 2015; St-Laurent, 
Moscovitch, & McAndrews, 2016). Therefore, MTLs and, specifically, the hippocampus, are a 
necessary underpinning of both episodic memory and episodic future thinking (reviewed in 
McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2018).  
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MTLs are not the only structure found active during past and future simulation by 
neuroimaging studies, and, in the last decade, a growing number of neuropsychological studies have 
begun to investigate the contribution to episodic memory and episodic future thinking of other areas 
within the default mode network, mainly frontal and parietal regions. One the earliest 
neuropsychological studies of patients with frontal lesions is the famous case of Phineas Gage, who 
reported a huge damage of the prefrontal cortex, including its ventromedial portion (vmPFC), due to 
a work accident; the lesion caused him striking behavioural changes, mainly related to decision 
making and emotional regulation ability, with apparently no effects on memory (Harlow, 1848). 
Curiously, Harlow reported that Gage might have suffered from confabulation. Later, it has been 
found that bilateral prefrontal lesions, which include the vmPFC, frequently result in serious 
difficulties at recollecting autobiographical memories (Della Sala, Laiacona, Spinnler, & Trivelli, 
1993; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999). Importantly, while patients with MTLs and 
hippocampus lesions tend to remember past events with less episodic specificity and fewer details 
(Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; 
Kurczek et al., 2015), patients with prefrontal lesions tend to retrieve fewer autobiographical 
memories than healthy controls, and this deficit is correlated to poor executive functions (Della Sala 
et al., 1993). Moreover, they tend to displace their memories along a time-line more than MTL and 
hippocampal patients do (Tranel & Jones, 2006). This memory profile led to infer that a damage to 
the vmPFC may alter retrieval strategies (Moscovitch, 1995; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997) or 
knowledge structures, called schema, involved in the organization of episodic memories (Gilboa 
and Marlatte, 2017). The episodic memory deficit in prefrontal patients is extended to the future 
domain. In fact, vmPFC patients are impaired at imagining personal recent and remote future 
events, providing fewer episodic and contextual details than matched controls (Bertossi, Aleo, 
Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016). Importantly, 
unlike MTL patients (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013), vmPFC patients have also poor narrative 
skills, providing fewer episodic details also during the description of pictures; however, controlling 
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for performance in the description condition do not eliminate their deficit in the simulation of future 
events (Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017). Therefore, the prefrontal cortex, and more 
specifically, the vmPFC, have a necessary role in both episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking (reviewed in McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2018). 
Furthermore, a striking dissociation has been observed between spared and impaired 
autobiographical memory retrieval in vmPFC and MTL patients. vmPFC patients have been found 
impaired at recalling autobiographical memories of extended events lasting from hours to 1 day 
(Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016). However, in a study requiring to describe only 
selected moments extracted from extended past or future events, vmPFC patients performed 
normally (Kurczek et al., 2015). By contrast, MTL patients have been found impaired at describing 
even single moments extracted from extended past events (Kurczek et al., 2015). Although this 
dissociation needs to be taken with caution because it is gathered from two different studies, it 
suggests that patients with MTL damage may find difficult to evoke even one scene in their mind’s 
eye, while those with vmPFC damage might be impaired in visualizing how extended events 
unfold. 
It is worth noting that the posterior parietal lobe (PPC) also contributes to episodic memory 
and episodic future thinking, although its role has been less explored than that of MTLs and 
vmPFC. Early neuropsychological investigations of patients with PPC lesions considered the 
memory impairment exclusively in terms of impaired spatial imagery (Critchley, 1953), and, 
indeed, the concomitant presence in these patients of perceptual and spatial deficits, like hemispatial 
neglect, has limited a precise examination of the episodic memory domain (reviewed in Berryhill, 
2012). However, more recently, single cases of damage to right PPC, patient D.H. (Hunkin, Parkin, 
Bradley, & Burdon-Cooper, 1995), and left PPC, patient S.M. (Davidson et al., 2008), have 
revealed an impaired autobiographical memory and recollection in these patients, along with a lack 
of sense of re-experience of the event itself. A poor subjective re-experience of the contextual 
elements of the recollected memories has, in fact, been associated to the PPC lesions (Drowos, 
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Berryhill, André, & Olson, 2010; Ciaramelli et al., 2017). This autobiographical memory 
impairment has been further studied in two patients with PPC damage, who reported impoverished 
memories during free recall of personal past events, but normally detailed memories following 
specific probe questions, showing a dissociation between spontaneous and guided autobiographical 
memory retrieval (Berryhill, Phuong, Picasso, Cabeza, & Olson, 2007). Again, the episodic 
memory impairment was mirrored by a future thinking deficit, since patients with bilateral PPC 
lesions have been found unable to envision richly detailed future events, and their imagined future 
scenarios specifically lacked of spatial integration (Berryhill, Picasso, Arnold, Drowos, & Olson, 
2010). Therefore, the posterior parietal cortex, along with MTLs and vmPFC, seems to have a 
necessary role in both episodic memory and episodic future thinking. 
As the commonalities between episodic memory and episodic future thinking are significant 
at both cognitive and neural level, different theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain this 
striking overlap, as discussed in the next paragraph. 
1.3 Hypotheses on the component processes of episodic memory, future thinking, and 
other forms of mental event construction 
The similarities between episodic memory and episodic future thinking reviewed in the 
previous section gave rise to a number of interpretations of the possible underlying process common 
to both domains. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007a; Schacter & Addis, 2007b; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), past and future events draw 
on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes, and episodic memory has the 
critical function of supporting future simulation by allowing individuals to retrieve and flexibly 
recombine elements of past episodes into novel representations of events that might occur in the 
future. Based on this view, the retrieval of information from episodic memory is not seen as a mere 
reproduction of past experiences, but as an active re-construction process of binding together bits of 
information, extremely adaptive in order to simulate future scenarios (Schacter & Addis, 2007a; 
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Schacter & Addis, 2007b). The re-constructive nature of episodic memory can explain why it is 
susceptible to memory errors, like source misattribution and false recognition, which are the by-
product of wrongly combining elements of distinct past experiences. This approach does not 
emphasize much temporal aspects such as mental time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 
2007; Tulving, 2002), but focuses more on processes involved in linking together distinct elements 
of an episode, like relational processing related to hippocampal function (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 
2001), that may contribute to the construction of simulated events. 
An alternative account suggests that remembering personal past experiences and thinking 
about the future share the common process of self-projection, the act of mentally project the self 
into an alternative situation, be this a past or future event (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Indeed, there 
is evidence showing that different ways of decoupling from the present, like remembering the past, 
envisioning the future, conceiving the viewpoint of others (theory of mind) and some forms of 
spatial navigation, all activate the same core brain network of frontal, temporal and parietal regions 
overlapping with the default mode network (Raichle et al., 2001). In line with this view, it has been 
suggested that this core brain network or regions can be seen as the fundamental correlate of any 
form of mental detachment from the immediate environment to internal modes of cognition 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Therefore, according to this view, mental time travel is just one form of 
disengaging from the immediate environment (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). 
In sharp contrast with the idea of the self-projection into alternative perspectives (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007), Maguire and colleagues have argued that it is the process of scene construction, the 
act of mentally generating and maintaining a complex and coherent scene (Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007), that links together episodic memory and episodic future thinking. Indeed, both these abilities 
are invariably based on the construction and visualization of multiple spatial scenes, conceived as 
the backbones of past, future and even atemporal experiences (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). 
Importantly, these authors found evidence that even the imagination of fictitious experiences, not 
explicitly connected to either the self or to a subjective sense of time, is reliant on the same brain 
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network involved in the recollection of past episodes and the imagination of future events 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). Therefore, the act of mentally generating and maintaining a 
complex and coherent scene, fulfilled by the retrieval and integration of perceptual, semantic and 
contextual information integrated in a coherent spatial context, is seen as the core process 
underlying episodic memory and episodic future thinking, as well as many other cognitive abilities 
involving the visualization of scenes in one’s own mind eye (e.g. navigation, vivid dreaming). This 
hypothesis does not consider the concept of time as of primary importance in explaining the 
common activity related to different forms of event simulation, and the temporal direction (past or 
future) of an event is seen just as the result of a content or goal difference, rather than a change in 
the basic processes involved (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Instead, 
much emphasis is placed on constructive processes needed to bind together disparate types of 
information into a coherent scene (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Since that the subsequent 
experimental investigations reported in this thesis are aimed to show the contribution of specific 
cortical structures to the process of scene construction, this theory will be explained in more detail 
in the next section.  
2. Scene construction  
The scene construction theory (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007) has been proposed to explain the 
common cognitive and neural bases of episodic memory and episodic future thinking, as well as 
other mental capabilities that involve the generation, visualization and maintenance of complex and 
coherent spatial scenes. This constructive process stems from the reactivation, retrieval and 
integration of relevant semantic, contextual and sensory information, stored in their modality 
specific cortical areas (Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000), and the product of this process is a 
coherent spatial context (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007), which can be manipulated and 
visualized. Complex and coherent spatial scenes can be considered the backbones of any simulated 
experience, because when we remember personal past episodes, we envision events that might 
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happen in the future or fictitious scenarios without any temporal constraints, when we mentally 
navigate in different environments, and even when we daydream, we, first of all, automatically 
create and see scenes in our own’s mind eye. A scene is “a naturalistic three-dimensional space 
which one could potentially step into and operate within, viewed from a first person perspective and 
populated by objects” (Dalton & Maguire, 2017). In this respect, the construction of a scene differs 
from “simple” visual imagery, such as that for single objects (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001), 
and could, instead, be considered a form of “associative construction”, because it requires not only 
visual imagery, but also the flexible association, binding and integration of different multimodal 
elements to (re)create an event as a whole (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). 
Considering how much important and pervasive the act of constructing scenes is for the 
human cognition, it seems of particular interest to understand its cognitive mechanisms and neural 
underpinnings. In the next paragraphs, the neural circuits and structures deputed to the scene 
construction process will be addressed, along with their cognitive role. 
2.1 Neural bases of scene construction 
Evidence from neuroimaging 
The main evidence of a common underlying scene construction process to episodic memory 
and episodic future thinking comes from a fMRI study showing that the imagination of fictitious, 
atemporal scenarios (e.g., commonplace, ordinary settings, like “Imagine you are lying on a sandy 
beach in a tropical bay”), not requiring to travel in the subjective time and not strictly related to the 
self, activates the same network of regions involved in the (re)construction of past and future 
experiences, and comprising hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, retrospenial cortex, posterior 
parietal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). A conjunction 
analysis revealed, in particular, that a subset of brain regions is activated by both the recall of real 
experiences and the construction of novel, fictitious experiences. This network of brain regions 
could be referred to as the “construction system” (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009), because presumably 
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involved in scene or event generation, the primary process that all those cognitive functions share, 
and includes the hippocampus bilaterally, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortex, posterior 
parietal cortex, middle temporal cortices and medial prefrontal cortex (Hassabis, Kumaran, & 
Maguire, 2007). Of note, the construction network does not overlap with the network of areas 
involved in object representations and manipulations, namely lateral occipital complex and 
intraparietal sulcus bilaterally (Sugiura, Shah, Zilles, & Fink, 2005), suggesting that the 
construction of complex scenes is a process distinct from the “simple” visual imagery of single 
objects and it requires a segregate and more extended neural network. Furthermore, two areas 
within the construction system, hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex, have been found 
involved even in the initial automatic extrapolation of single scenes beyond their physical borders 
after a brief observation of scene pictures, and this effect seems to be driven by the hippocampus, 
which exerts top-down influence on parahippocampal cortex and early visual cortex (Chadwick, 
Mullally, & Maguire, 2013). Hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex are also active during the 
detection of spatial incoherency and coherency, respectively, while observing spatial impossibilities 
in Escher-like scenes, suggesting a role of these regions in binding distinct features into coherent 
representations (Douglas et al., 2016).  
Evidence from neuropsychology 
Evidence coming from neuropsychological studies has confirmed that the key nodes within 
the construction system are necessarily involved in the construction of scenes. A first study revealed 
that amnesic patients, with lesions restricted to the hippocampus, unable to vividly remember their 
past and envision their future, were also incapable to imagine fictitious scenarios without any 
requirement for mental time travel or self-projection, and that their simulated experience was 
lacking in spatial coherence and mainly consisted of fragments of images not bound to an holistic 
representation of the environmental context (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007a). 
Similarly, amnesic patients with scene construction deficit are unable to automatically extrapolate 
beyond scene boundaries after a brief observation of scene pictures, showing an attenuated 
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boundary extension effect (Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012), and are impaired at detecting 
constructive violations during the observation of spatial impossibilities in Escher-like scenes 
(McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2017) (see Chapter 3 for more details).  
Performance of patients with damage to the vmPFC highly mimics that of hippocampal 
patients. vmPFC patients, who show deficit at simulating personal past and future events, are also 
impaired at imagining fictitious, atemporal scenarios (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 
2016), even if differences also emerge in the scene construction performance of patients with 
vmPFC vs. hippocampal damage, as we will show in Chapter 3. Finally, patients with damage to 
the posterior parietal cortex, who show deficit at simulating personal past and future events, are also 
impaired at imagining fictitious scenarios; in the “constructed experiences task” (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007), indeed, they simulate atemporal experiences with fewer entities 
presence, thoughts/emotions/actions, sensory descriptions and spatial references, and poorer in 
spatial coherence than their matched controls (Berryhill, Picasso, Arnold, Drowos, & Olson, 2010). 
Further evidence found that patients with parietal damage due to posterior cortical atrophy are 
incapable at constructing fictitious scenarios, and their simulated experiences are specifically 
impoverished and spatially fragmented, suggesting that visual imagery has a fundamental role in the 
construction of mental scenes (Ramanan et al., 2018). Therefore, key nodes of the construction 
system, namely hippocampus, vmPFC and posterior parietal cortex, are necessary to generate, 
visualize and maintain single and multiple complex scenes. Their peculiarities will be further 
explained in the next paragraph. 
2.2 Role of key neural nodes of the construction system 
Within the construction network, different regions seem to contribute in distinct ways to the 
generation of complex scenes. One key node of this network, as explained, is the posterior parietal 
lobe (PPC). The PPC has strong connections with visual areas (Colby, Gattass, Olson, & Gross, 
1988; Blatt, Andersen, & Stoner, 1990), being part of the occipito-parietal dorsal stream involved in 
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visuospatial processing (Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & 
Goodale, 2008). In the dorsal PPC, the precuneus is directly connected with medial (RSC and PCC) 
and lateral (IPL, SPL) portions of the parietal lobe (Leichnetz, 2001), areas all implicated in 
visuospatial processing (Sakata & Kusunoki, 1992; Vann, Aggleton, & Maguire, 2009; Auger & 
Maguire, 2018). Importantly, the precuneus is not directly connected with primary sensory regions 
(Leichnetz, 2001), leading to assume that its activity influences an extensive network of cortical and 
subcortical structures deputed to elaborate highly integrated and associative information, rather than 
directly processing external stimuli (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Indeed, the inferior precuneus is 
active during the imagination of complex scenes in three-dimensional space, without any visual cue 
(Dalton, Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2018).  
In the ventral PPC, the IPL, along with PCC and RSC, areas implicated in visuospatial 
processing and contextual associations (Sakata & Kusunoki, 1992; Bar, Aminoff, & Schacter, 2008; 
Vann, Aggleton, & Maguire, 2009; Mullally & Maguire, 2011; Auger, Zeidman, & Maguire, 2015), 
sends direct projections to the pre/parasubiculum, the medial-most portion of the hippocampus, 
giving it privileged access to this high-order and integrated visuospatial information (Kravitz, 
Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011). For this reason, the pre/parasubiculum is considered the 
hippocampal hub of a broader scene processing network (Dalton & Maguire, 2017; Dalton, 
Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2018). 
 By virtue of these connections with high-order visuospatial processing areas and of the 
presence of cell populations involved in spatial processing (i.e., place, grid and border cells, 
O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971; Fyhn, Molden, Witter, Moser, & Moser, 2004; Boccara et al., 2010), 
the hippocampus, mainly in its anterior portion (Zeidman & Maguire, 2016; Dalton & Maguire, 
2017; Dalton, Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2018), is deemed to play a crucial role in the 
construction system, and be responsible of the building of a visuospatial scaffold of mental scenes 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Andrews-
hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012; 
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McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2018). In particular, the anterior portion of the 
hippocampus is deemed critical to engage in “offline” processes, as the construction of a spatially 
coherent scene representation during imagination and recall, but it also active in “online” processes, 
as the representation of perceived scenes, whereas the posterior hippocampus is more exclusively 
involved in “online” processes of visual perception, although it has been suggested that differences 
along the hippocampal axis can be understood as a gradient in level of detail, from coarse 
representations in anterior hippocampus to fine detail in the posterior (Poppenk, Evensmoen, 
Moscovitch, & Nadel, 2013; see Zeidman & Maguire, 2016 for a review). 
The anterior hippocampus is known to be particularly well connected with the ventromedial 
portion of PFC (vmPFC; Adnan et al., 2015; Catani et al., 2012; Catani, Dell’Acqua, & Thiebaut de 
Schotten, 2013), and, indeed, many similarities in the functional properties of these two regions of 
the construction system have been found, which we recently reviewed (McCormick, Ciaramelli, De 
Luca, & Maguire, 2018). Our review, however, helped us realize that even though the vmPFC and 
hippocampus are both necessary to construct complex mental scenes in a variety of tasks, these 
regions seem to contribute differently and in a complementary way to the construction process, and 
this is apparent in several domains. As anticipated, vmPFC patients fail to generate as many 
autobiographical event memories as healthy controls (Della Sala et al., 1993; Kopelman, Stanhope, 
& Kingsley, 1999), and they construct both past and future events poor in episodic detail (Bertossi, 
Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017), but they are 
capable to describe in detail single snapshot scenes taken from their memories and imagined events 
(Kurczek et al., 2015), whereas, hippocampal patients are incapable to construct in detail even 
single snapshot scenes from these memories and imagined events (Kurczek et al., 2015). During the 
construction of fictitious scenarios, vmPFC patients simulate experiences generally lacking of 
content and spatial coherence (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016), whereas  
hippocampal patients simulate experiences specifically lacking of spatial coherence (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Differences are also apparent during mind-wandering, when 
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individuals shift attention away from the external environment toward inner self-generated thoughts 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). vmPFC patients seem to be unable to initiate internal reflections, 
and their off-task thoughts are more related to the present than to the future (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 
2016), whereas hippocampal patients seem able to initiate these internal reflections, but their 
thoughts are devoid of vivid visual representations of scenes (McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & 
Maguire, 2018). Lastly, difficulties in scene construction can also affect spatial navigation. The 
amnesic patient K.C. was unable to produce a detailed description of his neighborhood, despite 
having lived there for most of his life (Rosenbaum et al., 2000; Rosenbaum, Gao, Richards, Black, 
& Moscovitch, 2005); and a hippocampal patient, who was a former London taxi driver, was unable 
to reach a goal location if the route required to take small roads, though he could compensate using 
main artery (overlearned) A-routes (Maguire, Nannery, & Spiers, 2006). The only one vmPFC 
patient examined in an ecological navigation task, showed difficulties in wayfinding in his home 
town. Notably, he proved to have intact knowledge for landmarks and routes, but to lose his goal 
destination while navigating, being attracted by familiar landmarks and previously attended 
locations along the route (Ciaramelli, 2008). These findings suggest that hippocampal damage 
might impair the ability to visualize a mental scene necessary to navigate the environment, whereas 
a vmPFC damage may impair the ability to initiate mental reminders at critical points in the route 
planning. 
All these findings converge on the idea the vmPFC and hippocampus co-operate in a 
hierarchical manner during the construction of mental complex scenes, where the hippocampus 
plays a subordinate role. In particular, it has been suggested (McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & 
Maguire, 2018) that vmPFC might act as a supervisor that initiates endogenous processes like scene 
construction. According to this view, the vmPFC would coordinate the collection of relevant 
elements from neocortical areas and then would funnel them into the hippocampus to build the 
spatial structure of the scene. Then the vmPFC would engage in iterative re-initiation via feedback 
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loops with neocortex and hippocampus to facilitate the flow of multiple scenes, to form the coherent 
unfolding of an extended mental event (McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018). 
This proposal finds support from data showing that during the formation of new memories, 
electrophysiological power changes can be seen almost immediately after stimulus onset in the 
vmPFC and remain there until the end of the stimulus, whereas power changes in the hippocampus 
occur much later, around 500-2000 ms after stimulus onset (Sederberg et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
vmPFC influences match-mismatch novelty responses in the hippocampus (Garrido, Barnes, 
Kumaran, Maguire, & Dolan, 2015), and drives activity in the hippocampus during the imagination 
of novel scenes (Barry, Barnes, Clark, & Maguire, preprint). The vmPFC is also involved in the 
storage and retrieval of semantic knowledge (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Assaf et al., 2006; Binder, 
Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009) and in the instantiation of “schemas”, superordinate knowledge 
structures that reflect abstracted commonalities across multiple experiences (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; 
Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017), around which imagined events can be constructed. In contrast, the 
involvement of the hippocampus seems to be specifically driven by the construction of a spatially 
coherent mental scene into which details can be bound to be re- or pre-experienced (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Mullally et al., 2012; McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & 
Maguire, 2017).  
Since vmPFC and hippocampus assume such a crucial and well characterized role in the 
scene construction process, the remaining part of this section will be focussed on specifying in 
detail their anatomical structure and connectivity and their different contribution to scene 
construction. 
2.2.1 Anatomy and connectivity of the hippocampus and vmPFC 
The hippocampus is situated in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) of each hemisphere and has 
a distinct, curved shape, whose appearance resembles that of a seahorse (Amaral & Witter, 1989). It 
consists of two layers rolled up inside each other. The first of these, the dentate gyrus, is wrapped 
22 
 
around the second layer, forming a semicircle in cross-sectional views. The second layer consists of 
a series of Cornu Ammonis (CA) areas that define the subfields of the hippocampus, namely, CA1, 
CA2, CA3, and CA4 (Sloviter & Lømo, 2012). Other parts of the hippocampus include the 
subiculum, presubiculum, parasubiculum, prosubiculum and the uncus. Because of limitations in 
the spatial resolution of most neuroimaging techniques, it is common to refer to the “CA2/3”, 
“pre/parasubiculum” and “prosubiculum/CA1” as unitary subfields (Dalton, Zeidman, Barry, 
Williams, & Maguire, 2017; Dalton & Maguire, 2017). The hippocampus and the adjacent 
entorhinal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices constitute the MTL. In the MTL system, the 
entorhinal cortex is the main gateway between most neocortical brain regions and the hippocampus.  
The vmPFC is a part of the prefrontal cortex in mammals, comprising its bottom (ventral) 
and central (medial) portions (Ongur, Ferry, & Price, 2003; Mackey & Petrides, 2010). There are no 
clear anatomical landmarks for this area, thence it is generally defined as the subgenual region, 
beneath the genu of the corpus callosum. The vmPFC includes Brodmann areas 25 and 32 (the 
subgenual portion), as well as 10 (the most rostral part), 11, 12 and 47 (the orbital part). It is 
surrounded by other parts of the prefrontal cortex that are commonly described based on their 
locations as ventrolateral, dorsomedial and dorsolateral PFC, and all these portions are connected 
via short frontal pathways (Catani et al., 2012). 
In humans, the hippocampus and vmPFC are anatomically connected via three main 
reciprocal connections - the uncinate fasciculus, the fornix and the cingulum bundle (Concha, 
Gross, & Beaulieu, 2005; Malykhin, Concha, Seres, Beaulieu, & Coupland, 2008; Catani, 
Dell’Acqua, & Thiebaut de Schotten, 2013). The uncinate fasciculus connects the anterior part of 
the temporal lobe, including hippocampus, to the ventral and polar areas of the frontal cortex. 
Fornix fibers arise mainly from the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex and connect the two 
hippocampi to each other and to the mammillary bodies. Also, fornix fibers reach the most posterior 
part of the vmPFC going forward beneath the corpus callosum. The cingulum bundle is a large 
pathway containing fibers of different lengths, with the longest fibers connecting the anterior 
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hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus to the vmPFC. These fibers run above the corpus 
callosum, with shorter fibers joining and leaving the cingulum bundle along its length. A fourth 
indirect pathway connects the vmPFC to the hippocampus via the mammillothalamic tract and 
anterior thalamic projections. 
The anterior hippocampus has particularly strong connections with the vmPFC, as 
confirmed by findings from diffusion-weighted imaging and functional connectivity of resting state 
fMRI data (Andrews-hanna et al., 2010; Adnan et al., 2015). Lesions to either the hippocampus or 
vmPFC likely impact their connectivity and, as these disconnections are mostly messy (e.g., 
following a ruptured aneurysm), they can be partial or total, and might only affect one, two or all 
three of the main pathways connecting these two regions (Liao et al., 2011; Hepdurgun et al., 2016), 
making problematic to isolate the independent functions of both regions. Furthermore, anatomical 
routes connecting the hippocampus and vmPFC to other parts of the brain can also be disrupted. 
These other brain areas (e.g. the thalamus) are potentially transfer stations, serving as indirect 
anatomical connections between hippocampus and vmPFC (Catani et al., 2013). 
2.2.2 Connectivity between the hippocampus and other regions within the construction 
system  
The pre/parasubiculum, in the anterior medial portion of the hippocampus (Zeidman & 
Maguire, 2016; Hodgetts et al., 2017), is a primary hippocampal target of the parieto-medial 
temporal pathway (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011), which stems from the caudal portion 
of the inferior parietal lobule, part of the dorsal occipito-parietal stream. The inferior parietal lobule 
sends direct projections to the posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex and parahippocampal 
cortex, and, in turn, inferior parietal lobule, posterior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial cortex each 
send direct projections to pre/parasubiculum and prosubiculum/CA1 (Kravitz et al., 2011). 
Importantly, the occipito-parietal stream is deemed to integrate information from both foveal and 
peripheral visual fields equally (Boussaoud, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 1990; Kravitz, Saleem, 
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Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013); therefore, the downstream parieto-medial temporal pathway 
sends integrated visual input to target regions, such as posterior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial 
cortex, which then in turn send integrated visual information to the pre/parasubiculum, which has, 
indeed, privileged access to holistic representations of the environment (Dalton & Maguire, 2017).  
2.2.3 Connectivity between the vmPFC and other regions within the construction 
system 
The frontal pole has two main intralobar tracts: the fronto-orbitopolar tract, which gets 
through the ventral aspect of the frontal lobe and connects the posterior orbital gyrus to the anterior 
orbital gyrus and ventromedial region of the frontal pole; and the fronto-marginal tract, which runs 
beneath the fronto-marginal sulcus and connects medial and lateral regions of the frontopolar cortex 
(Catani et al., 2012). As for the fronto-orbital part of the frontal pole, different patterns of 
connectivity are distinguishable in its anterior and posterior portions. The anterior orbitofrontal 
cortex receives sensorial information (e.g., visual and auditory inputs) from posterior occipital and 
temporal cortex through the inferior fronto-occipital and uncinate fasciculus (Price, 2007; Thiebaut 
de Schotten et al., 2011; Thiebaut de Schotten, Dell’Acqua, Valabregue, & Catani, 2012), whereas, 
the posterior orbital cortex receives sensorial (e.g., olfactory and gustatory inputs) and emotional 
information from the limbic regions (i.e., amygdala, hippocampus, nucleus basalis of Meynert, 
olfactory cortex and insula) (Price, 2007). Due to these diversified connections, the fronto-orbital 
pole can be considered a transmodal network for binding memories and emotions with olfactory, 
taste, visual and auditory information (Catani et al., 2012). Importantly, the visual information 
conveyed by the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus may have a potential role in the generation of a 
basic template during the construction of visual complex scenes. Indeed, an increased functional 
connectivity between vmPFC and object-sensitive lateral occipital cortex (LOC) has been found 
during the visual search of specific objects within a complex natural scene (Pantazatos, Yanagihara, 
Zhang, Meitzler, & Hirsch, 2012). 
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As shown, the intricate pattern of connectivity between the hippocampus and vmPFC and 
between them and other regions within the construction system, put these two nodes in the ideal 
position to exercise a vital role in the construction process of complex mental scenes. In the 
following section, we will come back to one expression of event construction, the episodic future 
thinking, and focus on its adaptive functions and role in decision making. 
3. Functions of episodic future thinking 
As explained in the first section, episodic future thinking has been conceived as the act of 
mentally project oneself into the future, to pre-experience situations never experienced before 
(Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). The simulation of future scenarios is a 
pervasive mental activity, so much so that individuals spontaneously engage in future event 
representations without any preceding search attempt (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008), experiencing – 
it has been noted – up to one future oriented thought every 16 minutes during the day 
(D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van Der Linden, 2011), and spending much more time thinking about 
their future than their past (Jason, Schade, Louise, Reichler, & Brickman, 1989). The high 
frequency of future-oriented thoughts must say something about their role in human cognition.  
It has been proposed, indeed, that simulations, in particular, episodic future thoughts, are 
highly adaptive and subserve a range of cognitive functions (see Schacter et al., 2012; Schacter, 
Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017 for reviews). EFT can enhance prospective memory, contributing to the 
effectiveness of implementation intentions, because imagining to perform an upcoming intention 
makes it more likely that this intention will be actually conducted (Papies, Aarts, & de Vries, 2009; 
Neroni, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2014). It also enhances retrospective memory, because future-
oriented encoding produces superior recall of word-list than past-oriented encoding (Klein, 
Robertson, & Delton, 2010; Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2011). EFT has been found to improve 
psychological well-being and emotional regulation (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Brown, 
Macleod, Tata, & Goddard, 2002; Macleod, 2016). In particular, an episodic specificity induction, 
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namely, a brief training in recollecting details of past experiences (Madore & Schacter, 2014), 
carried out before simulating possible solutions to personally worrisome future events, makes 
individuals better able to reappraise the event and improves the subjective well-being (Jing, 
Madore, & Schacter, 2017).  
The positive effect of EFT on emotional regulation may be due to the positivity bias that 
frequently characterizes future thinking (Sharot, 2011; Barsics, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 
2015) and the vivid recollection of (rosy) simulated future scenarios (Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 
2012). This may be related to the fact that positive future thoughts contain more visual images than 
negative thoughts (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van Der 
Linden, 2011), and the visualization of desired future events may aid in goal attainment, by 
enhancing expectation of success, boosting motivation and helping to set concrete plans and 
problem-solving activities (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Conway, Meares, & Standart, 
2004). EFT also benefits goal-directed cognition, supporting planning and problem solving, because 
it provides access to all the specific information necessary to generate problem solutions and it has a 
causal structure similar to that of an actual situation (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; 
Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011); in turn, thinking about personal goals facilitate the 
access to personal episodic details, improving EFT (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). The 
relationship between EFT and goal-directed cognition calls into question the act of making choices 
about the future; this will be explained in the next paragraph. 
3.1 Episodic future thinking and future-based decision-making 
In the context of goal-directed cognition, EFT can also have beneficial consequences on 
decisions about the future, such as intertemporal choices, when individuals are faced with decisions 
regarding two reward options that differ in magnitude and delay until delivery, and tend to show the 
phenomenon of delay discounting, devaluing larger but more distant rewards and preferring smaller 
but more proximal rewards (Green & Myerson, 2004). Delay discounting is related to impulsivity 
27 
 
(Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996; Green & Myerson, 2004), and it has been 
suggested that the simulation of the future may help individuals to represent distant future rewards 
more vividly, allowing individuals to show less impulsive and more farsighted decisions, thus 
reducing delay discounting (Boyer, 2008). Indeed, several attempts to link EFT to decision-making 
have confirmed Boyer’s insight and proved the ability of future simulation to reduce impulsive 
decisions. Researchers have modified the classic temporal discounting paradigm and found that 
when people imagine specific future episodes before choosing between the two rewards options, 
they are more likely to prefer rewards that produce greater long-term payoffs, thus diminishing the 
normal impulsive tendency to devalue delayed rewards and making more patient choices (Peters & 
Büchel, 2010; Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; O’Donnell, Daniel, & Epstein, 2017). Importantly, 
the strength of the episodic effect on intertemporal choices is mediated by the degree of 
spontaneous episodic imagery during decision making and is associated to increased functional 
coupling between medial prefrontal regions and hippocampus (Peters & Büchel, 2010; Benoit, 
Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011). Since both these regions are involved in reward processing (McClure et 
al., 2004; Kable & Glimcher, 2007) and future thinking (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, 
Denkova, & Manning, 2008), and since both prefrontal regions and hippocampus are necessary to 
construct scenes (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & 
Ciaramelli, 2016), these regions may have contributed to modulate decision making through their 
role in the vivid representations of future events, allowing the actual projection of the self into 
simulated events (Peters & Büchel, 2010).  
This important finding on healthy people has been then applied to populations of individuals 
suffering from different forms of impulsivity and maladaptive behaviours, like addicts or 
adolescents. People suffering from different forms of addiction, like alcohol (Snider, LaConte, & 
Bickel, 2016), food (Daniel et al., 2013; O’Neill, Daniel, & Epstein, 2016) or drugs (Dennhardt et 
al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016) abuse, or young healthy people, like adolescents (Bromberg, 
Lobatcheva, & Peters, 2017), have shown a reduction of delay discounting following the episodic 
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simulation of future scenarios associated to future rewards. This high effectiveness of episodic 
future thinking in reducing impulsive behaviours gave rise to hopes about possible clinical 
applications of EFT and to interesting questions about the underlying mechanisms of the EFT-
induced impulsivity reduction.  
It has been suggested that the episodic simulation of the future may act as a brake on 
impulsiveness or a boost on patience during decision making process by triggering emotional 
circuitry that reflect the emotional impact of the hypothetical future situations, thus serving as an 
immediate reward, but also as a representation of the future scenarios, leading to reconsider more 
distant options and to reduce their devaluation (Boyer, 2008). This positive effect of episodic 
simulation on decision making may be related to the fact that imagining episodic details and 
specifics of a distant future scenario, confers to it more concrete and idiosyncratic features, making 
the distant future scenario closer and reducing its psychological distance from oneself’ direct 
experience. This is a crucial concept of the “construal level theory” (Trope & Liberman, 2003; 
Troper & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014), which posits that events that extend beyond 
the “here and now”, like future events, require individuals to construct mental representations of 
them to be conceived. Thus, individuals engage in high-level construal to represent distant future 
events, when they can only extract their abstract and essential features; whereas, they use low-level 
construal to represent near future events, when their specific details are available and can be 
combined to create concrete and idiosyncratic representations of the event itself (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Troper & Liberman, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2014). This latter low-level 
construal process seems to correspond to what episodic simulation does during future-based 
decision making, rendering distant future scenarios closer, more concrete, more accessible and, 
hence, more valuable, leading to an increased self-control and more patient choices (but see Fujita 
et al., 2006). The effect of episodic simulation on future-based decision making will be further 
explored in the last chapter of this thesis, in a population of patients, with damage to the vmPFC, 
known to be impaired in episodic future thinking (Bertossi, Aleo et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini et al., 
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2016) and showing steep temporal discounting in intertemporal choice (Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di 
Pellegrino, 2010). In the last chapter, vmPFC patients will be compared with patients with damage 
to the MTLs, similarly impaired in episodic future thinking (Race et al., 2011, Race et al., 2013), 
but showing normal temporal discounting rates (Kwan et al., 2012). The cognitive mechanisms 
mediating the effect of episodic simulation on temporal discounting of future rewards will be 
discussed, along with the different roles played by vmPFC and MTLs.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will present a study highlighting the relation between 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking, investigating several forms of future thinking in a 
patient with focal retrograde amnesia. This study will help clarify the role played by episodic 
memory in episodic future thinking, and reveal the different contribution of episodic and semantic 
memory to the construction of future and fictitious experiences, as well as future-oriented decision 
making and cognition. In the second chapter, I will begin to explore the neural bases of mental 
(future) event construction, investigating episodic future thinking in patients with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). This study will confirm a deficit in episodic future 
thinking in vmPFC patients, and explore whether this deficit may relate, to some extent, to possible 
problems in working memory or narrative abilities in vmPFC patients. In the third chapter, I will 
further explore the role of vmPFC in event construction, this time narrowing the focus on the 
construction of single scenes, the core process of different forms of mental event construction. I will 
compare patients with damage to the vmPFC and to the hippocampus. This chapter comprises two 
experiments, the first investigating the implicit, automatic construction of single scenes allowing 
'boundary extension', the second exploring constructive and semantic components of the scene 
construction process. These studies will provide important information about the different roles that 
vmPFC and hippocampus may play in the construction of scenes. Lastly, in the fourth chapter, I 
will come back to one specific form of mental event construction, episodic future thinking, and 
study its relation and possible contribution to decision making. I will investigate whether promoting 
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episodic future thinking in vmPFC patients reduces their temporal discounting rates, and suggest a 
role for vmPFC in guiding future-oriented choice.  
Chapter 1. 
Remembering the past to imagine the future.  
In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking, investigating several forms of future thinking in a patient with focal retrograde amnesia. 
This study will help clarify the role played by episodic memory in episodic future thinking and 
reveal the different contribution that episodic and semantic memory provide to the construction of 
future and fictitious experiences, as well as future-oriented decision-making and cognition.  
Study 1. Episodic future thinking and future-based decision-making in a case of 
retrograde amnesia.   
Co-authored with Francesca Benuzzi, Elena Bertossi, Davide Braghittoni, Giuseppe di Pellegrino 
and Elisa Ciaramelli. 
(De Luca F, Benuzzi F, Bertossi E, Braghittoni D, di Pellegrino G, Ciaramelli E. 2018. 110:92-103. Neuropsychologia) 
Introduction  
 Humans have the capability, and the inclination, to represent specific events that may 
happen to them in the future, also known as episodic future thinking (EFT; Atance and O’Neill, 
2001; Szpunar, 2010). EFT is adaptive, because the simulation of future scenarios may inform 
decision-making (Boyer, 2008) and improve problem-solving (Taylor and Schneider, 1989; Sheldon 
et al., 2011). Moreover, EFT may oppose the tendency to prefer immediate over delayed 
gratification (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011). 
 How do we construct future experiences and use them for decision-making? Research in 
cognitive neuroscience has highlighted a profound tie between EFT and episodic (autobiographical) 
remembering. Both capabilities are associated with activity in a core network of brain regions, 
including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex, the parietal 
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cortex, and the medial temporal lobes (MLTs) (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et 
al., 2007; St. Jacques et al., 2017). This overlap may relate to the fact that imagining a novel event 
depends, in part, on retrieving information from episodic memories of similar experiences as source 
of details to create the novel experience (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 
2009; Moscovitch, 2008; Schacter and Addis, 2007). In addition, both EFT and episodic 
remembering require constructive processes needed to assemble the individual elements composing 
the remembered/imagined event (i.e. episodic simulation;  Schacter et al., 2012) and its spatial 
context (i.e scene construction, Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Coherently, patients with lesions in key 
nodes of the core network, such as the MTLs (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; 
Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009; Race et al., 2011), vmPFC (Bertossi, 
Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016) and the parietal cortex (Berryhill et al., 2007; 
Berryhill et al., 2010) are impaired in both episodic remembering and future thinking.  
 Other research has highlighted dissociations between episodic remembering and future 
thinking, which reveal additional component processes of EFT (Gilmore et al., 2017);  for example, 
EFT is more heavily reliant on semantic memory than is episodic remembering, consistent with 
high levels of activity in the lateral temporal cortex for EFT (Addis et al., 2007). It has been 
proposed that during EFT semantic knowledge provides a "scaffold" from which relevant episodic 
details can be searched (Irish & Piguet, 2013). For example, knowledge about semantic life scripts 
(i.e. culturally expected events at particular time in the life span) (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008) and 
personal goals drive construction of plausible future events (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). 
Patients with semantic dementia, indeed, have impaired EFT in the face of preserved episodic 
remembering (Duval et al., 2012; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & 
Piguet, 2012b). Not only semantic memory is necessary for EFT; it may be sufficient. Cooper et al. 
(2011) have found that children with developmental amnesia have impaired episodic remembering 
but are able to imagine novel experience (but see Kwan et al., 2010). The authors have argued that 
these patients may have developed semantically-based forms of event construction to circumvent 
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their episodic amnesia, consistent with their preserved semantic knowledge base (Cooper et al., 
2011). The same pattern of results was noted in P01, a patient with amnesia acquired in adulthood 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007). P01 had retained semantic learning abilities and intact 
personal and general semantics (Maguire et al., 2010), and residual hippocampal tissue (Mullally et 
al., 2014), which may underlie his successful construction performance. EFT also loads on 
executive functions to a greater extent than does episodic remembering, because it requires the 
flexible recombination of details from multiple episodes into a novel event (Schacter et al., 2012). 
Indeed, patients with lesions in the lateral prefrontal cortex (Berryhill et al., 2010), or in the medial 
dorsal thalamus (Weiler et al., 2011), which is densely connected with prefrontal cortex, have 
impaired EFT in the face of preserved episodic remembering.  
 EFT is also dissociable from other ways of conceiving the future. First, although amnesic 
patients cannot imagine personal future experiences, they generally maintain the ability to imagine 
future public events or facts that might be true at a future time (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011; Race et al., 2011), unless they are required to generate 
specific details relating to those events (Race et al., 2013). Moreover, patients with amnesia 
typically understand the concept of time, can orient themselves with respect to their personal past 
and future (Arzy et al., 2009; Craver et al., 2014; Kwan et al., 2013), and have normal delay 
discounting of future rewards (Kwan et al., 2012, 2013), suggesting that EFT is just one of several 
mechanisms mediating future-oriented cognition and choice.  
 In the current study, we explore the relation between autobiographical remembering, EFT, 
and future-oriented decision-making in SG, a case of focal retrograde amnesia (FRA). FRA (Kapur, 
1993, Evans et al., 1996; Carlesimo et al., 1998a, 1998b; Kopelman, 2000) also known as 'isolated 
retrograde amnesia' (Levine et al., 1998; Fast and Fujiwara, 2001), or 'pure retrograde amnesia' (De 
Renzi et al., 1997; Lucchelli and Spinnler, 2002) refers to a state of grossly impaired memory for 
information acquired prior the onset of brain damage contrasted with normal, or minimally 
impaired, learning of new information. FRA most commonly entails a profound loss of 
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autobiographical episodic memory, with relatively preserved (public, personal, and general) 
semantic knowledge, even though several cases of uniformly compromised episodic and semantic 
memory have been reported as well (see Wheeler and McMillan, 2001, for a review). FRA is most 
commonly precipitated by traumatic brain injury (Markowitsch et al., 1993; Hunkin et al., 1995; 
Kapur, 1999), herpes simplex encephalitis (O’Connor et al., 1992; Yoneda et al., 1994;  Hokkanen 
et al., 1995), hypoxia (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1993; Reed et al., 1999), and Korsakoff syndrome 
(Kopelman, 1989; Parkin et al., 1990), and is typically associated with multifocal lesions. FRA, 
however, may also characterize cases of memory loss in which psychological factors co-occur with 
a (minor) physical injury (Schacter et al., 1982; Dalla Barba et al., 1997; Stracciari et al., 2005), or 
functional deficits with no apparent organic or psychogenic cause (Ennio De Renzi et al., 1997). 
 As anticipated, one crucial feature of FRA is the severe loss of retrograde memory, 
combined with a largely preserved anterograde memory. Studying EFT and future-based decision 
making in a case of disproportionate retrograde amnesia will help explore further the relation 
between autobiographical memory and EFT, in a way that will complement extant studies on 
amnesia due to MTLs lesions, in which anterograde amnesia is typically severe. For example, 
although previous research shows that episodic (autobiographical) memory and EFT are linked, it is 
not clear to what extent this relates to the fact that episodic memory supplies information retrieved 
from long-term memory that will be used to construct the novel event, or to the fact that both EFT 
and episodic memory require associative processes to collate the individual elements of 
remembered/imagined events. If episodic memories are the building blocks of EFT, then SG should 
be impaired at imagining personal future events, despite retained anterograde memory abilities, 
because retrograde amnesia should reduce markedly the number and the variety, of past events from 
which to draw individual details for event construction. Second, previous research suggests that 
semantic memory may be sufficient to mediate some forms of event construction. We hypothesize 
that relatively preserved anterograde memory and semantic knowledge may be sufficient to mediate 
construction of fictitious experiences with no personal relevance and not located in subjective time. 
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Finally, we investigated whether impaired EFT in FRA is associated with abnormal attitudes about 
the future time or steep temporal discounting of future rewards. 
Case report 
 SG is a 49 years old, right-handed man with 10 years of education, who worked as a painter. 
He was recruited at the Centro studi e ricerche di Neuroscienze Cognitive, Cesena, Italy, in July 
2011. In June 2010, at the age of 43, he reported myocardial infarction, followed by cardiac arrest 
and loss of consciousness. He was still unconscious when admitted at the hospital (Glasgow Coma 
Scale = 4) and was put in medically induced coma for two days. When drugs were discontinued, he 
stayed in a state of vigil coma for an additional fifteen days. SG's medical history revealed that he 
had (untreated) hypertension, and a family history of myocardial infarction. His heart condition and 
blood pressure are now under control with beta-blockers and aspirin. Brain computed tomography 
showed a right emicerebellar hypodense area. Structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
revealed a perisylvian ventricular expansion, but no signal changes in the brain parenchyma and the 
structures of the posterior fossa.  
 The brain insult left SG with a dense retrograde amnesia. He was unable to recall any 
personal event from his entire life, from childhood to the present days. SG's wife confirmed that he 
was also unable to recall highly relevant events, such as the birth of their daughters. SG had lost 
personal semantic information as well. He was unable to report on what his work was, where he 
lived, what he used to do in his spare time. He could recognize people, as well streets of his 
hometown, but he did not know why they were familiar, what he had to do with them. He quickly 
re-learned several aspects of his personal history, and information about his close relatives. It is 
important to note, however, that re-learning was mainly of facts characterizing relevant lifetime 
periods (e.g., that he has two daughters, that he is married, that he used to live in another city). SG 
did not generally re-learn complex, detailed events. Once his wife had recounted to him the details 
of their first encounter. He could list some of these details to us, but he was clearly not re-
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experiencing that event; the story seemed someone else's. SG was quickly able to resume his work 
as painter: he remembered most of the painting procedures he had practiced for years, and had no 
problem re-leaning the few he had forgotten. Because of his heart disease, however, SG was 
forbidden to make excessive physical effort, and therefore his work was (and still is) part-time, and 
mainly consisting in assisting his colleagues in their activities.  
 The brain insult made SG a completely different person. According to his wife, SG used to 
be energetic, lively, at times hyperactive. He wanted to be involved in every family decision and 
was resolute. He had always faced family problems actively, with a strong sense of responsibility. 
After the brain insult SG became apathetic, aloof and quiet, with a loss of interest for things he used 
to enjoy before, such as basketball, his lifelong passion. When questioned about basketball and its 
rules, indeed, SG showed full knowledge, but no sign of emotion or personal involvement. Apathy 
is the word that SG's wife uses the most while describing SG: he would spend the whole day 
watching TV if she did not encourage him to do other activities. He assists his daughters in practical 
things if he has to, but he does not appear emotionally involved in their lives. He goes to work 
regularly and actually does work, but he does not seem interested in what he does. 
 SG is, to some extent, aware of his condition. Soon after the infarction, he would often say 
that it would have been better for him to die. Shortly after, however, he resigned himself to the 
situation, treating it simply as a matter of fact. He describes it as "being born again... a new me". At 
times SG marvels at the extent of his memory loss, but he is unconcerned about his deficit. 
Occasionally we have seen him irritated by not being able to remember important aspects of his life, 
but never sorry or regretful.  
 Given that FRA can be psychogenic in nature, we evaluated circumstances that could have 
potentially acted as precipitants of amnesia (Ennio De Renzi et al., 1997). An interview with SG's 
wife revealed that, two years before the infarction, SG's mum had been diagnosed with an 
aggressive form of cancer, an event that had caused an intense stress to SG. By the time of the 
infarction, he was still fully involved in assisting her, and often felt overwhelmed by the situation. 
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This situation caused occasional family conflicts. Besides his mum's illness, SG was generally 
satisfied with his family and work situation. SG's has no personal history of psychiatric 
abnormalities, psychopathological traits or alcohol abuse, as confirmed by medical records, and his 
wife claims he has no family history of psychiatric disease either. After the brain insult, he was seen 
by a psychiatrist, who noted mild depression and emotional blunting. SG even underwent a few 
psychotherapy sessions, but these were soon discontinued due to SG's memory problems, which 
revealed enduring, and impossible to circumvent.  
 We find it extremely unlikely that SG was feigning amnesia. SG's behavior has always been 
very consistent. For example, across sessions, he consistently remembers a few episodes from his 
past, while he consistently fails to access others. When he narrates the events he remembers, he is 
genuinely proud to be able to share them. SG's wife said she never had the impression that he was 
pretending to not remember, and that he never "contradicted" himself. On the contrary, at times he 
would protest vigorously that something he does not remember in fact has not happened, and that 
she is misremembering things. We do not see evidence for secondary gains from being amnesic in 
SG. His work activities have been reduced because of his heart problems, but he has always gone to 
work and has never asked to quit. Also, he does take part in family activities and duties, though 
with scant personal initiative.   
Lesion analysis 
 We used Voxel Based Morphometry (VBM), a whole brain technique for characterizing 
regional volume and tissue concentration differences in structural MRI (Ashburner and Friston, 
2000, 2001; Good et al., 2001; Mechelli, 2005). SG and fifty healthy control participants (all males; 
mean age = 40.8 years) underwent the acquisition of high-resolution structural T1-weighted 
anatomical images with a Philips 3T Intera system (TR = 9.9 ms; TE = 4.6 ms; 170 sagittal slices; 
voxel size = 1x1x1). Data were analyzed with SPM12 and DARTEL suite (Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The following procedures were applied: 
37 
 
spatial segmentation, template creation, normalization to MNI space and smoothing the resulting 
modulated GM segments with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8x8x8 mm. We accounted for age 
and global brain volume (total intra-cranial volume) by including these parameters in our 2-sample t 
test model. At the FWE-corrected threshold of p < 0.05, significant areas of reduced grey matter 
volume were found bilaterally in the fusiform gyrus, thalamus, and cerebellum (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1). We note, however, that at the threshold of p < 0.001, uncorrected, reduced grey matter 
volume was also detected bilaterally in the hippocampus, the anterior thalamus, and several regions 
of the autobiographical memory network (Svoboda et al., 2006) (see Supplementary Table and 
Supplementary Figures). No significant difference was found between patient and controls in white 
matter volume. 
Table 1. Regions of gray matter volume decreased in patient SG (p < 0.05 FWE corrected). 
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R Thalamus (Ventral Posterior 
Medial Nucleus and Pulvinar) 
385 5.06 16 -28 5 16 -27 6 
L Thalamus (Ventral Posterior 
Medial Nucleus and Pulvinar) 
89 4.82 -17 -30 4 -17 -39 5 
Notes: L = Left; R = Right; BA = Brodmann Area; k = number of voxels. 
 
Figure 1. Regions of decreased gray matter volume in patient SG (p < 0.05, FWE-corrected). Clusters are superimposed 





Neuropsychological assessment  
 Tables 2-5 show SG's neuropsychological profile. As is apparent from Table 2, SG showed 
generally preserved intellectual skills, as revealed by normal performance on the Mini Mental State 
Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(Wechsler, 1981) the Raven Progressive Matrices, and the Verbal Judgment test (for normative 
data, see (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987) SG had preserved attentional skills. He attained normal 
scores on the “Alertness” and the "Divided attention" subtests from the Test battery for Attentional 
Performance (for normative data, see Zimmermann and Fimm, 2002), and on the Attentional 
matrices test (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). Executive functions were generally preserved, as 
revealed by the normal scores he obtained in the Stroop test (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), the 
Tower of London test (Culbertson and Zillmer, 2000), verbal fluency measures (Spinnler and 
Tognoni, 1987), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, Heaton et al.,  2000), though he 
showed a slightly inflated number of non-perseverative errors. SG also showed a preserved 
performance in the "Go-NoGo", the "Cognitive flexibility", and the "Spatial incompatibility" 
subtests of the Test battery for Attentional Performance, which all involve cognitive control and set-
shifting abilities (Zimmermann and Fimm, 2002). SG could accurately evoke perceptual details 
from mental imagery in four out of five tests from Policardi et al. (1996). For example, he could 
indicate whether animals have a long/short tail, whether letters are mainly made of curved/straight 
lines, etc., though he was poor at comparing the size of pairs of animals. Short-term memory for 
both verbal and nonverbal material was within the normal range (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), as 
was working memory, as assessed with the "Working Memory" subtest of Test battery for 
Attentional Performance (Zimmerman and Fimm, 2002). As for long-term memory, SG had a 
normal score at the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1988). Spatial long-term memory, as 
assessed with the Corsi supra-span test and recall of the Rey figure (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), 
was unimpaired. As for verbal long-term memory, SG was unimpaired in prose recall (Spinnler and 
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Tognoni, 1987), but reported a pathological performance on the Buschke-Fuld Test (Buschke & 
Fuld, 1974), a standardized selective-reminding list learning task.  
Table 2. SG’s scores on standardized neuropsychological tests. 
 Cut-off RS CS ES 





















Raven Progressive Matrices 14.75 36 28.50 3 
Verbal Judgement test 32 46 42.50 2 
Attentional Matrices 30 58 49.25 4 
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WMS 85 62.5 106 N 
Digit span 3.50 6 5.50 4 
Corsi tapping test 3.50 5 5 3 
Prose recall 7.50 9.10 8.10 2 
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t = 0.30, p = 0.77 





• Animal tails task 
• High/wide object task 










t = -1.39, p =0.19 
t = 0.95, p 0.36 
t = 0.39, p = 0.70 
Notes: RS = raw score; CS = corrected score; ES = equivalent score. The ES ranges from 0-4, with 0 = pathological 
performance, 1 = borderline performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance.  N = normal score; P = pathological score; B = 
borderline score. / = data not available. MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination; WAIS-R = Weschler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised; WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; WMS = Wechsler Memory Scale. §SG's 
performance at the Visual Imagery Test (Policardi et al., 1996) was compared to that of 10 healthy controls matched in 
age and education (using Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002). We report healthy controls' means and standard deviations in 
the table. Impaired performance is highlighted by a (*). 
 
 
The formal assessment of retrograde memory confirmed an important retrograde amnesia. 
The Autobiographical Interview was used to probe autobiographical memories established at 
different times (e.g., Levine et al., 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2008). The interview requires providing 
details of a significant one-time episode that was personally experienced at a specific time and place 
from each of five life periods (childhood, to age 11; adolescence, ages 11–17; early adult life, ages 
18–34; middle adult life, ages 35-last year; and the past year). When a specific event was not 
generated independently, an extensive list of event topics was presented to assist in retrieval. We 
administered three retrieval conditions: recall, general probe, and specific probe (see Levine et al., 
2002). At recall, SG spoke about the event without any interruption from the examiner until he 
reached a natural ending point. General probes were then used to encourage greater recall of details. 
At the specific probe phase, a structured interview was administered designed to elicit additional 
contextual details. SG's reports were recorded, transcribed, and verified by his wife. Author EB, 
who was blind to the aim of the study, segmented SG's reports into details (unique bits of 
information), and classified them as internal (episodic) if they related directly to the main event 
described, were specific to time and place, and conveyed a sense of episodic re-experiencing, or as 
external (semantic) if they were semantic facts, repetitions, meta-cognitive statements, or unrelated 
to the main event (Levine et al., 2002). The sum of details in each category was calculated in a 
cumulative manner for each level of cueing. SG was completely unable to recall any event from the 
11-17, 18-34, 35-last year life periods, despite encouraged to use the list of example events (see 
Table 3). He reported only two salient (negative) past events, one for the childhood decade (when 
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his brother was born dead) and one for the last year (when he had a car accident). To assess the 
quality of SG's reports of these events, we compared them to those produced by 10 healthy 
individuals matched to SG for age and education (all males; mean age = 46.20 years, SD = 6.14, t = 
0.12, p = 0.90; mean education = 15.20, SD = 2.49, t = -1.99, p = 0.07), tested in the laboratories of 
Brian Levine and Shayna Rosenbaum with the same procedure we used. Statistical significance was 
assessed using individual modified t-tests based on Crawford and Garthwaite’s method for 
comparing single cases with small control samples (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). For the 
childhood event, SG reported fewer internal details than controls, and this difference reached 
statistical significance at the general (t = -1.91, p = 0.04, one-tailed) and specific probe level (t = -
2.01, p = 0.04, one-tailed), though not at free recall (t = -0.97, p = 0.17). The number of external 
details SG produced was not significantly different from the controls across conditions (p > 0.06 in 
all cases). The number of internal and external details SG produced for the event from last year was 
lower than that of the controls, though not significantly so (p > 0.057 in both cases).   
Table 3. Number of internal and external details produced at the Autobiographical Interview by SG and controls. 
 
 
Notes: HC = healthy controls. The values in parentheses are standard errors of the mean. Asterisks highlight statistically 
significant differences between GS and controls. Note that SG was unable to produce any event for the 11-17 years, 18-
34 years, and 35-second to last year time periods.  
 
Several tests were used to assess memory for famous remote events and people. The Italian 
Questionnaire for Remote Events (Budriesi et al., 2002) probes knowledge for events extensively 
covered by the media in each of four 4-year periods: from 1994-1997 (Q1, the most recent 4-year 
period) to 1966-1969 (Q8, the most remote 4-year period), for a total of 64 items. In each item, the 
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patient is required to indicate the correct response among four alternatives (e.g. “Where did the 
1996 Olympic games take place: Atlanta, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, or San Francisco?”). The test 
demands participants to be at least 16 years old at the time events occurred, and therefore SG was 
administered periods Q1 to Q3. SG reported a pathological overall score (see Table 4), with a 
significantly impaired performance on facts from 1990 to 1993. The Media Mediated Memory Test 
(Bizzozero, Lucchelli, Prigione, Saetti, & Spinnler, 2004) consists of 65 items concerning famous 
public events occurred from 1976 to 2000. The test is first administered following a free recall 
procedure ("What happened to John Lennon?"). If the participant fails to recall any information 
about a famous event spontaneously, one or two cues relating to some key aspects of the to-be-
recalled event are provided (e.g. “He was a member of a famous pop band”, “He was killed in New 
York”). SG's score was below the normal range (see Table 4). The Famous Face and Name Test 
(Rizzo, Venneri, & Papagno, 2002) requires recognizing famous people from their face or name. In 
each of 100 (50 famous, 50 non-famous) face and 100 (50 famous, 50 non-famous) name trials, the 
patient has to provide a fame judgment and semantic information about famous people. SG could 
normally recognize famous faces and names (see Table 4). The General Knowledge of the World 
Test (Mariani, Sacco, Spinnler, & Venneri, 2002) assesses two domains of semantic memory: 
incidental knowledge, comprising 8 domains (e.g., famous past events, famous people, structural 
and functional knowledge about natural and artificial elements, crafts, popular culture, e.g., “What 
does a farmer do?”), and encyclopedic knowledge, including 6 domains (history, geography, 
science, politics, arts, mathematics, e.g., “What do you know about Dante Alighieri?”). There were 
12 items for each domain, for a total of 168 items. SG's encyclopedic knowledge was impaired, but 
incidental knowledge was normal (see Table 4). We found no evidence of malingering at the Digit 







Table 4. SG's scores on retrograde memory tests. 
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DMT 36 71 / N 
 
Notes: RS = raw score; CS = corrected score; ES = equivalent score. The ES ranges from 0-4, with 0 = pathological 
performance, 1 = borderline performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance.  N = normal score; P = pathological score; B = 
borderline score. / = data not available. MEF = Italian Questionnaire for Remote Events; MMMT = Media Mediated 
Memory Test; FFT = Famous Face Test; GKW = General Knowledge of the World Test; DMT = Digit Memory Test 
for malingering. Impaired performance is highlighted by a (*). 
 
 We also assessed SG's mood and affective state (see Table 5). SG showed borderline levels 
of depression at the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), but absence of 
depression in two additional scales: the Hamilton rating scale for Depression (HAM-D; Hamilton, 
1960), and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). Both 
state and trait anxiety were normal at the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 
1983). SG also showed normal levels of positive and negative emotions in the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Zevon and Tellegen, 1982; Watson et al., 1988),  a measure of 
general affective states comprising a list of 20 emotions, and requiring to rate the extent to which 








Table 5. Assessment of SG's mood and affective responses. 
 Cut-off RS CS ES 
BDI-II 5 5 / B 
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Notes: RS = raw score; CS = corrected score; ES = equivalent score. The ES ranges from 0-4, with 0 = pathological 
performance, 1 = borderline performance, 2 – 4 = normal performance.  N = normal score; P = pathological score; B = 
borderline score. / = data not available. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory; HAM-D = Hamilton rating scale for 
Depression; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; PANAS = 
Positive and Negative Affective Scale. Impaired performance is highlighted by a (*). 
 
Experimental investigation 
 SG was administered a series of tasks/questionnaires aimed at probing different aspects of 
future thinking, attitudes about the future, and future-based decision-making. Note that participants 
in the control sample were not completely overlapping across tasks, and therefore will be described 
for each task separately. Participants gave informed consent, according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee of 
the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna. To compare SG's performance to that of 
healthy controls, we used individual modified t-tests based on Crawford and Garthwaite’s 
(Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002) method for comparing single cases with small control samples. 
Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
Construction of future and fictitious experiences 
 Participants. SG and 10 healthy individuals (all males) matched for age and education 
(mean age = 46.00 years, SD = 3.83; mean education = 12.00 years, SD = 1.76) underwent a scene 
construction task modified from Hassabis et al. (2007b) (see also Bertossi et al., 2016a).  
 Task. Participants constructed novel experiences in as much detail as possible in response to 
short cue descriptions (read by the experimenter), referring to eight scenarios. Five scenarios 
45 
 
require constructing fictitious experiences, with no requirement for mental time travel and not 
explicitly self-relevant (“fictitious scenarios”, e.g., “Imagine you’re standing in the middle of a 
bustling street market. I want you to describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail 
as possible using all your senses including what you can see, hear and feel”). Fictitious scenarios 
were the ‘market’, ‘port’, ‘museum’, ‘pub’ and ‘forest’ scenarios used in Hassabis et al. (2007b). 
Differently, three scenarios required constructing plausible personal future experiences (future 
scenarios; e.g., “Imagine the next time you’ll meet a friend. I want you to describe the experience 
and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses including what you can see, 
hear and feel”). These corresponded to the ‘next meeting with a friend’, ‘next weekend’ and ‘next 
Christmas’ scenarios from Hassabis et al. (2007b; see also Bertossi et al., 2016a). Participants 
described the imagined experiences until they came to a natural end. The examiner was allowed to 
use general probes aimed at encouraging further description and make sure participants felt like 
anything else could be added (e.g., “can you see anything else in the scene?”), but could not 
introduce any concept not mentioned by the subject. For all scenarios, participants were explicitly 
told not to recount a memory but to create something new. After each scenario, participants rated 
the constructed experiences across a number of different categories, including sense of presence 
(from 1 = 'I did not feel like I was there at all' to 5 = 'I felt strongly like I was really there'), 
perceived salience (from 1 = 'I couldn't really see anything' to 5 = 'extremely salient'), perceived 
detailedness (from 1 = 'not detailed at all' to 5 = 'very detailed'), task difficulty (from 1 = 'very easy' 
to 5 = 'very difficult'), and similarity to a memory (from to 1 = 'exactly like a memory' to 5 = 'not at 
all like a memory'). Finally, participants were presented with a list of twelve sentences and had to 
state whether each sentence described or not their image of the scenario (e.g., I could see it as one 
whole scene in my mind's eye). These probe questions were designed to estimate the spatial 
integrity of the scene. Testing sessions were digitally recorded to enable transcription and later 
scoring of participants’ reports.  
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 Scoring. Participants’ records were scored as in Hassabis et al. (2007b). For each trial, we 
calculated an 'experiential index' (EI) indicating the overall richness of the constructed experience. 
The EI ranges between 0 and 60, as it is calculated as the sum of four subcomponents: content 
(score ranges between 0 and 28), participant ratings (sum score from two scales, perceived salience 
and sense of presence, ranges between 0 and 8), spatial coherence index (score ranges between 0 
and 6) and quality judgment (score ranges between 0 and 18). For the content score, each scenario 
description was segmented into a set of statements. Every statement was classified as belonging to 
one of four categories: entities present (EP, objects, people, animals present in the scenarios), 
sensory descriptions (SD, statements describing the properties of an entity, e.g., 'the chair is made 
of wood'), spatial references (SPA, statements regarding the relative position of entities within the 
environment, directions or explicit measurements, e.g., 'behind the bar', 'to my left') and 
thoughts/emotions/actions (TEA, e.g., 'I left', 'I was lonely'). For each subcategory, details were 
summed and the score was capped at a maximum of 7 (as in Hassabis et al., 2007b) (but we obtain 
similar results if we use the uncapped data). Therefore, the total possible content score for each 
experience was 28. The 'spatial coherence index', a measure of the spatial integrity of the imagined 
scene, was derived from the responses to 12 questions requiring participants to describe the “spatial 
quality” of the experiences they had constructed: 8 statements indicated that aspects of the scene 
were integrated (e.g. 'I could see it as one whole scene in my mind's eye'), and 4 statements 
indicated that aspects of the scene were fragmented (e.g. 'It was not so much a scene as a collection 
of separate images'). One point was assigned for each integrated statement selected and one point 
was subtracted for each fragmented statement selected. These values were summed but rescaled 
(normalized around zero) to range between -6 (spatially fragmented) to 6 (spatially coherent). Only 
positive values, however, were included in the EI so as not to over penalize fragmented descriptions 
(as in Hassabis et al., 2007b). Participants' ratings of sense of presence and perceived salience, each 
originally ranging from 1 to 5, were rescaled to range from 0 to 4 before being included in the EI. 
The quality judgment is the scorer's assessment of the overall quality of the constructed experience. 
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The scorer was requested to rate how well she felt the description induced a detailed “picture” of 
the scenario in her own mind's eye. Originally ranging from 0 (no picture at all) to 10 (extremely 
rich picture) to avoid a complicated rating, the quality judgment was rescaled between 0 and 18 to 
be included in the EI. We calculated the EI separately for fictitious and future scenarios.  Author EB, 
who was blind to the aim of the study and to participants' identity (SG vs. controls), scored all the 
scenarios. 
 Results. Figure 2 shows the EI by type of scenario in SG and the controls, and Table 6 
details the scores attained in the subcomponents of the EI (see Supplementary Materials for 
examples of constructed future and fictitious experiences in SG and a healthy control subject). As is 
apparent from Figure 2, SG reported a significantly lower EI than healthy controls for future 
scenarios (t = -2.62, p = 0.03), but not for fictitious scenarios (t = -0.20, p = 0.85). To investigate 
the origin of SG's scene construction deficit and of the apparent discrepancy in his performance 
with future vs. fictitious scenarios, we analyzed all the subcomponents of the EI separately (see 
Table 4). As for the content score, SG reported significantly fewer thought/emotion/action details 
(TEA) than controls for future (t = -2.59, p = 0.03), but not for fictitious scenarios (t = -0.93, p = 
0.38). In contrast, the number of sensory details (SD), entities present (EP) and spatial references 
(SPA) was comparable between SG and the controls, for both future (p > 0.07 in both cases) and 
fictitious scenarios (p > 0.8 in both cases). As for subjective ratings, SG reported a lower perceived 
salience than controls for future (t = -4.46, p = 0.002), but not for fictitious scenarios (t = 1.31, p = 
0.22). In contrast, SG's sense of presence was lower than controls for both future (t = -5.57, p < 
0.001) and fictitious scenarios (t = -4.99, p = 0.001). The spatial coherence index (p > 0.08 in both 
cases) and the quality judgment (p > 0.38 in both cases) were not significantly different between SG 
and the controls, for both future and fictitious scenarios. We also looked at task measures not 
involved in the EI. SG found future (t = 2.50, p = 0.03) but not fictitious (t = 0.34, p = 0.74) 
scenarios more difficult than did controls, and rated future (t = -3.91, p = 0.004) but not fictitious (t 
= -0.61, p = 0.56) scenarios to be less detailed than those of the controls. Self-ratings of similarity to 
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memory for future (p = 0.06) and fictitious scenarios (p = 0.77) were not significantly different 
between SG and the controls. To compare directly the differences in imagining fictitious and future 
experiences across participants, we calculated Δ scores for the EI and all its subcomponents as the 
difference in performance for fictitious vs. future scenarios. The ΔEI was significantly higher in SG 
than in controls (16.39 vs. 4.51, t = 2.51, p = 0.03), as were the Δ scores for the spatial coherence 
index (2.07 vs. -0.07, t = 3.46, p = 0.007), and for perceived salience (2.53 vs. -0.19, t = 5.89, p < 
0.001). Differences between SG and controls in Δ scores for the other subcomponents of the 
experiential index, or variables not included in the EI, did not reach statistical significance (p > 
0.054 in all cases).   
 Future vs. fictitious cues. Although future and fictitious cues were generally matched in 
difficulty (t = 0.79, p = 0.45), we note that some of the fictitious cues contained information that 
may have been useful to prime associations in SG (e.g., a bustling market) (see also Bertossi et al., 
2016a). Indeed, in general, healthy controls produced more details (i.e., total content score) for 
fictitious compared to future scenarios (t = 2.64, p = 0.03). We therefore focused on a subset of 
future (N = 2) and fictitious scenarios (N = 3) for which controls produced a similar number of 
details (t = 0.28, p = 0.79), and had a similar EI (t = 0.50, p = 0.63). Even when we restricted our 
analyses to these scenarios, we confirmed that SG, compared to controls, had a reduced EI for 
future (t = -2.40, p = 0.04) but not fictitious scenarios (t = - 0.48, p = 0.64), and a higher ΔEI (t = 
4.55, p = 0.001). This finding suggests that SG's worse performance with future vs. fictitious 










Figure 2.  Experiential index for future and fictitious experiences in SG and healthy controls. * = p < 0.05. 
 
 
Table 6. SG's constructed experience performance. 
 
 Future scenarios Fictitious scenarios 
SG HC SG HC 
Experiential Index 20.33* 33.82 (1.55) 36.72 38.33 (2.44) 
Contents:  
  Entities Present (EP) 
  Spatial References (SPA) 
  Thoughts/Emotions/Actions (TEA)  


















  Sense of presence 













Spatial Coherence Index 0.33 2.73 (0.41) 2.40 
 
2.66 (0.46) 
Quality Judgment 6.00 8.22 (0.72) 11.52 10.73 (0.75) 
Ratings not involved in the EI:  
  Detailedness 
  Difficulty 














Notes. HC = healthy controls. The values in parentheses are standard errors of the mean. Significant differences 
between SG and the controls are highlighted by a (*). 
 
Attitudes about future time  
 Participants. SG and 10 healthy individuals (all males) matched to SG in age and education 
(mean age = 49.40 years, SD = 6.26; mean education = 11.60 years, SD = 3.20) underwent the 
Consideration of Future Consequences scale (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) 
and the Future Time Perspective scale (Carstensen and Lang, 1996). 
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 Task. The Consideration of Future Consequences scale is a measure of the extent to which 
individuals consider (and are influenced by) the distant outcomes of current behavior. Individuals 
high in consideration of future consequences focus more on the future implications of their behavior 
and use these to inform choices (e.g., 'I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness in order to 
achieve future outcomes'), whereas individuals low in consideration of future consequences focus 
more on immediate needs and concerns (e.g., 'I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that 
I will take care of future problems that may occur at a later date'). The Consideration of Future 
Consequences scale consists of 12 items measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely 
uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me), to range from 12 to 60. High scores 
indicate high consideration of future consequences. The Future Time Perspective scale measures the 
tendency to think in terms of the future. Individuals high in future time perspective focus on future 
opportunities and perceive a distant end (e.g., 'I expect that I will set many new goals in the future'), 
whereas individuals low in future time perspective focus on future limitations and perceive a near 
end (e.g., 'I have the sense time is running out') (Cate & John, 2007). The Future Time Perspective 
scale includes 10 items measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic 
of me) to 7 (extremely characteristic of me), to range from 10 to 70. High scores indicate an 
extended future time perspective.  
 Results. Table 7 shows the scores attained at the Consideration of Future Consequences 
scale (t = -1.06, p = 0.31) and the Future Time Perspective scale (t = 0.80, p = 0.44) by SG and the 
controls, which were not significantly different.  
Delay discounting  
 Participants. SG and 12 healthy individuals (all males) matched to SG for age and education 
(mean age = 44.25 years, SD = 4.20; mean education = 11.50 years, SD = 2.02) were administered a 
computerized delay discounting task. 
 Task. The delay discounting task required participants to choose between an amount of 
(hypothetical) money that could be received immediately and an amount of money that could be 
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received after some specified delay (Myerson et al., 2001; Sellitto et al., 2010). Participants made 
five choices at each of six delays: 2 days, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year. The order 
of blocks of choices pertaining to different delays was randomly determined across participants. 
Within each block of five choices, the first choice was between a delayed amount of 40 units and an 
immediate amount of 20 units. The delayed amount was always 40 euros, whereas the amount of 
the immediate reward was adjusted based on the participant’s choices, using a staircase procedure 
that converged on the amount of the immediate reward that was equal, in subjective value, to the 
delayed reward. To estimate the rate at which the subjective value of a reward decays with time, we 
calculated two indices: the delay discounting parameter k and the area under the empirical 
discounting curve (AUC) (Myerson et al., 2001). To estimate k, the hyperbolic function SV = 
1⁄(1+kD), where SV = subjective value (expressed as a fraction of the delayed amount), and D = 
delay (in days), was fit to the data to determine the k constant of the best fitting delay discounting 
function, using a nonlinear least-squares algorithm. The larger the value of k, the steeper delay 
discounting, the more participants were inclined to choose small-immediate rewards over larger-
delayed rewards. To calculate AUC, delays were expressed as a proportion of the maximum delay 
(360 days), and subjective values were expressed as a proportion of the delayed amount (40 euros). 
Delays and subjective values were then plotted as x and y coordinates, respectively, to construct a 
discounting curve. Vertical lines were drawn from each x value to the curve, subdividing the area 
under the curve into a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid was calculated as (x2-
x1)(y1+y2)/2, where x1 and x2 are successive delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective values 
associated with these delays. The AUC is the sum of the areas of all the trapezoids and varies 
between 0 and 1. The smaller the AUC, the steeper delay discounting.  
 Results. The hyperbolic model described the discounting behavior of SG and the controls 
equally well, as revealed by comparable R2 scores (0.71 vs 0.55, t = 0.38, p = 0.71). There was no 
difference in delay discounting rates between SG and the controls, either in (log-transformed) k 
values (t = 0.20, p = 0.84) or the AUC (t = -0.33, p = 0.75) (see Table 7). These results held, for 
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both k (t = 0.44, p = 0.67) and AUC (t = -0.31, p = 0.76), even when we removed a significant 
outlier from the controls sample, who showed extremely steep delay discounting. 
Table 7. Attitudes about future time and future based decision-making. 
 
Notes: HC = healthy controls, CFC = Consideration of future consequences scale, FTP = Future time perspective scale. 
AUC = Area under the discounting curve. The values in parentheses are standard errors of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
 This study investigated episodic future thinking (EFT) and future-based cognition and 
decision-making in a patient, SG, who developed FRA following hypoxia due to a cardiac arrest. 
SG became unable to recall personal experiences from his entire lifetime, with virtually no evidence 
of a temporal gradient. At the Autobiographical Interview, SG could only think of two extremely 
salient negative events (one from childhood and one from the last year) and recalled them with few 
details. SG had a mixed semantic memory profile, with impaired personal semantic knowledge (that 
he could, however, re-acquire), preserved memory for famous people but not famous events, and a 
generally spared semantic knowledge base, except for some instances of encyclopedic knowledge 
(e.g., history, mathematics). A severe loss of pre-traumatic episodic recollection, combined with a 
"patchy" profile of reduced and preserved ability to semantically know about events, people, and 
facts from the pre-traumatic past is one of the most frequent presentations of FRA (Wheeler and 
McMillan, 2001). Here we show that, in addition to the inability to recollect pre-traumatic events, 
SG was unable to imagine personal future events. SG, however, did not have a pervasive inability to 
imagine experiences, as he could imagine fictitious events not located in subjective time and not 
self-relevant. Moreover, SG's impaired EFT did not translate into an overall inability to conceive 
the future time: SG showed normal time perspective, consideration of future options, and delay 
discounting rates for future rewards. 
 CFC Scale FTP Scale k (log) AUC 
Patient SG 35 50 -1.48 0.37 
HC 42.00 (1.98) 42.10 (3.01) -1.80 (0.44) 0.48 (0.09) 
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 One first issue to discuss is the origin of SG's FRA. Voxel-based morphometry revealed 
multifocal reductions of gray matter volume, most pronounced in the fusiform gyrus, the 
cerebellum, and the posterior thalamus bilaterally, suggesting an organically based amnesia. This is, 
however, not a typical location of neuropathology for FRA. Most cases of FRA with more severe 
episodic than semantic deficits, as is SG, have damage to the anterior temporal and frontal cortices 
(Kapur et al., 1992; Markowitsch et al., 1993; Calabrese et al., 1996; Kroll et al., 1997; Levine et 
al., 1998), and, less often, the MTLs (Kapur et al., 1996; Fujii et al., 1999; Tanaka et al., 1999; 
Grilli et al., 2017). FRA has been occasionally observed following posterior lesions confined to the 
temporo-occipital, occipital, and parietal cortex (O’Connor et al., 1992; Ogden, 1993; Schnider et 
al., 1994; Hunkin et al., 1995), often in association with visual imagery deficits. The fusiform 
gyrus, reduced in volume in SG, connects the striate cortex to the inferior temporal cortex, which 
has been considered a possible long-term store site for visual information (Mishkin, 1982). It has 
been suggested that autobiographical memory primarily requires retrieval of detailed visual features 
of the event, which would then in turn reactivate also non-visual details, conceptual knowledge, and 
emotions related to the event (Rubin and Greenberg, 1998). One possibility, then, is that the 
reduction of fusiform gyrus volume hindered the reinstatement or re-visualization, of old memories. 
The fusiform gyrus, indeed, is activated during autobiographical memory retrieval (Gilboa et al., 
2004; Svoboda et al., 2006) and patients with (psychogenic) FRA may show temporo-occipital 
hypometabolism (Thomas-Antérion et al., 2010, 2014; Hennig-Fast et al., 2008). The evidence that 
SG performs well on most tests of visual imagery, and that he can imagine complex fictitious 
experiences, however, makes it unlikely that his FRA was fully explained by the lesion in the 
fusiform gyrus. Moreover, SG has also lost knowledge about public past events, which depends less 
on visualization than autobiographical memory, while he has preserved famous face recognition, 
and the fusiform gyrus is deemed critical for face processing (Kanwisher et al., 1997).  
 The cerebellum, another region reduced in volume in SG, is considered a component of the 
autobiographical memory network (Maguire, 2001; Svoboda et al., 2006), possibly due to its 
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connections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex via the cerebello-thalamocortical pathway 
(Middleton and Strick, 1994). The cerebellum is also activated during EFT (Addis, Wong, & 
Schacter, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). The most common neuropsychological 
deficits following cerebellar lesions, however, include impairments of attention, executive 
functions, and working memory (see Schmahmann and Sherman, 1998; Vokaer et al., 2002; 
Ravizza et al., 2006; Chiricozzi et al., 2008), which SG does not show. Moreover, although 
anterograde memory deficits are a common consequence of cerebellar damage (Nakamoto et al., 
2014), we are not aware of cases of retrograde amnesia. We suspect, therefore, that although the 
reduction in volume of the cerebellum may have contributed to SG's mild anterograde amnesia, it is 
not responsible for his important retrograde amnesia, especially in the context of preserved 
executive functions. Damage to the thalamus has also been associated with amnesia (Gentilini et 
al.,1987; Stuss et al., 1988). The (anterior) thalamus, indeed, receives both direct (via the fornix) 
and indirect (via the mammillary bodies and mamillo-thalamic tract) projections from the 
hippocampus (Aggleton & Brown, 1999). Unlike SG, however, most patients with thalamic 
amnesia have a prevalent deficit of anterograde memory (see Carlesimo et al., 2011, for a review), 
although cases of retrograde autobiographical amnesia have been described (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 
1983; Stuss et al., 1988; Hodges and McCarthy, 1993; Markowitsch et al., 1993). Moreover, 
thalamic amnesia is strongly predicted by the involvement of the anterior and the medio-dorsal 
nuclei (Carlesimo et al., 2011), while SG has reduced volume in the posterior nucleus. Thus, 
although the volumetric reduction of the fusiform gyrus, cerebellum, and thalamus may explain 
some aspects of SG's mnemonic profile, it is unlikely that it fully explains his FRA. We note that (at 
a lower threshold) SG has additional volume reductions in several regions of the autobiographical 
memory network, including the hippocampus and the posterior cingulate and temporal cortex. 
These regions have been consistently associated with autobiographical memory (Svoboda et al., 
2006; Philippi et al., 2015), and their damage with FRA (Wheeler and McMillan, 2001; Fast and 
Fujiwara, 2001). This extended neuropathology likely underlies SG's FRA.  
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 Considering some circumstances of SG's clinical history, and the fact that SG's brain 
abnormalities are not typically associated with retrograde amnesia, we considered the possibility 
that his FRA was psychogenic in nature. SG's mother illness was an emotionally loaded event that 
SG was barely able to bear, and could have acted as a precipitating event, though psychogenic 
amnesia is most typically triggered by adverse life conditions of recurrent nature, with onset in 
childhood/early adulthood, and a stronger impact on identity (Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2009; 
Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012). Personality changes as those observed in SG are also very 
frequently associated with psychogenic amnesia, as are the relative lack of concern for one's deficits 
and the loss of interest for premorbid activities (Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012). The diagnosis of 
psychogenic amnesia, however, additionally requires the presence of a past history of psychiatric 
disorders, or at least a hint that the patient had a tendency to escape life difficulties by refuging into 
psychosomatic complaints (De Renzi et al., 1997; Kopelman et al., 1994; Kihlstrom and Schacter, 
2000). SG had no psychiatric history and used to be a very responsible and stable man. His apathy 
and lack of initiative may derive from amnesia itself: from not remembering what he used to do and 
is supposed to initiate, from not being able to conceive his future. Most probably, SG's clinical 
presentation is the result of an organic factor (an important brain insult, with protracted loss of 
consciousness) superimposed on a background of already increased stress responses, magnifying 
the behavioral consequences (see also Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012).  
 An interesting finding of the present study is the intricate pattern of SG's preserved and 
impaired imaginative and prospection abilities. First of all, SG's loss of autobiographical memory 
came along with an impairment in imagining personal future experiences, consistent with the 
hypothesis that (fragments of) episodic memories serve as the building blocks of EFT (Buckner and 
Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2012). We found, indeed, that SG's constructed 
experience contained few actions, emotions, and thoughts compared to the controls. SG himself 
found EFT difficult and rated his constructed future experience as poor in salience and detailedness. 
In general, individuals tend to rely on past experiences as source of detail during EFT, especially 
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when they find EFT effortful. Having lost most of his autobiographical memories, SG now relies on 
a heavily reduced source of details to construct EFT. An important question is how SG managed to 
construct complex fictitious experiences, a task that amnesic patients cannot do (Hassabis et al., 
2007). We suggest that relatively preserved semantic memory and anterograde memory may be 
critical in SG's execution of this form of event construction. SG may use his preserved semantic and 
world knowledge to conceive how events may logically unfold in commonplace scenarios (e.g., a 
market, a port), without the need to resort to autobiographical memory. Note that SG's anterograde 
memory, though weak, was sufficient for him to re-learn several aspects of his past and therefore 
clearly functional. This warranted the successful assembly of details (retrieved primarily from 
semantic memory) into the novel fictitious experiences (Mullally et al., 2014). At odds with 
amnesic patients, indeed, SG has a normal spatial coherent index, which suggests he may succeed at 
creating an initial, sketchy scene, as expected considering that his hippocampus is not damaged, but 
only slightly reduced in volume (i.e., at a lower threshold). He is then able to fill that initial scene 
with (mostly semantic) information to construct fictitious scenarios, but falls short of details while 
constructing EFT, which is more dependent on access to autobiographical memory than is 
construction of fictitious events. Vivid and plausible personal future events, indeed, are frequently 
set in familiar places (Arnold et al., 2011; de Vito et al., 2012; Robin and Moscovitch, 2014; Robin 
et al., 2015) and informed by knowledge about oneself and close others (D'Argembeau and Mathy, 
2011). SG's comments during scene construction were telling with respect to the (semantic) strategy 
he used to construct fictitious experiences, and its insufficiency for EFT. While constructing a 
fictitious experience he said: “We are in a forest, beside a river, so there must be a lot of green 
around”. While trying to imagine his next Christmas day, however, he said, literally: “Sure, there 
must be relatives, gifts ... but I cannot visualize it, because I do not know how to remember it”. That 
he resorted to a semantic strategy while constructing experiences is also consistent with the fact that 
he self-reported a low sense of presence not only for future but also for fictitious experience, as if 
he could not actually project himself even into experiences he could conceive.  
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 SG shares a number of similarities with amnesic patient P01 from Hassabis et al. (2007), but 
he is also different from P01. Both suffer from a profound impairment of episodic memory with 
relatively spared semantic memory, and both can count on some residual anterograde memory 
abilities. Despite both patients can construct fictitious experiences, they differ in their ability to 
construct future experiences, which is normal in P01, and impaired in SG. This difference may 
relate to the fact that P01 had intact personal semantics, whereas SG had initially lost personal 
semantic information as well, though he could re-learn several aspects of it. We have never had the 
impression that, even after such massive re-learning, SG actually rescued his personal history. He 
recites it much like a student does with the biography of a famous person. Personal knowledge is 
crucial to drive autobiographical remembering and EFT (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011), and may 
be not sufficiently functional in SG.  
 Interestingly, SG's FRA and impaired EFT did not make him stuck in the present time. 
Similarly to amnesic patients with MTLs damage (Kwan et al., 2012, 2013; Craver et al., 2014), he 
proved able to think in terms of the future, and consider the distant outcomes of his behavior. 
Moreover, SG showed normal delay discounting rates during intertemporal choice, indicating he 
was not abnormally biased toward smaller-immediate over larger-delayed rewards. This finding is 
additional evidence that, although decision-making often involves EFT (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007), and EFT can reduce delay discounting (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011), EFT is 
just one of several mechanisms to conceive the future. As such, EFT is not necessary to achieve 
future-oriented decision-making, which can be based on alternative, semantically-based, 
mechanisms to orient in time.  
 To conclude, the study of case SG confirms the close relation between autobiographical 
memory and EFT, while revealing that some forms of event construction and some forms of 
prospection can withstand severely impaired retrograde memory abilities. Together, these findings 
enrich our understanding of the component processes of mental time travel and of the fractionation 




Episodic future thinking following vmPFC 
damage.   
In this chapter, I begin to explore the neural basis of the mental construction of future 
events. As neuroimaging studies have extensively demonstrated that the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) is part of a network of regions involved in episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking (EFT), here I will investigate whether vmPFC is necessary for EFT, by comparing EFT in 
vmPFC patients and healthy controls. To begin to clarify the role of vmPFC in EFT, I will explore 
whether nonepisodic mechanisms, namely, narrative and working memory abilities, have an impact 
on vmPFC patients' event construction deficits.  
Study 2. Episodic future thinking following vmPFC damage: impaired event 
construction, maintenance, or narration? 
Co-authored with Elena Bertossi, Vanessa Candela, and Elisa Ciaramelli. 
(Bertossi E, Candela V, De Luca F, Ciaramelli E. 2017. 31(3):337-348. Neuropsychology) 
Introduction  
Humans have the ability to conceive events that differ from those unfolding in the present, 
and a particular propensity to imagine events that may happen to them in the future (D’Argembeau, 
Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011). Functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that EFT engages a 
“core network” of brain regions that are also activated by episodic memory, including the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PPC), angular gyrus and 
medial temporal lobes (MTLs; Okuda et al., 2003; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Szpunar, 
Watson, & McDermott, 2007). Coherently, patients with lesions in key nodes of this network, such 
as the MTLs (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Romero & Moscovitch, 2012; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, 
Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009), vmPFC (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et 
al., 2016; but see Kurczek et al., 2015), and parietal cortex (Berryhill et al., 2007; Berryhill et al., 
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2010), may show a deficit in EFT that parallels that shown in episodic remembering. The overlap in 
the neural bases of EFT and episodic remembering may relate to the common component processes 
of the two activities, which both require constructive processes needed to recover and integrate the 
individual elements composing the remembered/imagined event (i.e., episodic simulation; Schacter 
and Addis, 2007) or to generate, maintain and visualize its spatial context (i.e., scene construction; 
Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Differences in brain activity between remembering and imagining have 
also emerged, which contribute to reveal additional component processes of EFT. For example, the 
frontopolar, dorsolateral, and lateral temporal cortices are more active during construction of future 
compared with past events (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003). EFT requires recombining 
flexibly details from multiple episodes as well as semantic memory into an event not experienced 
before (Schacter et al., 2012). These operations likely depend on executive functions, in line with 
the engagement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Addis et al., 2007). Studies involving patients 
with brain damage affecting either the integrity or the function of the prefrontal cortex provide 
support to this hypothesis. Patients with Parkinson’s disease, for example, show preserved episodic 
remembering but impaired future thinking, and the degree of impairment correlated with executive 
functioning (de Vito et al., 2012). EFT is related to executive functioning also in healthy individuals 
(D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 2010). The frontopolar cortex, has long 
been implicated in forming and maintaining intentions (Burgess, Quayle, & Frith, 2001), and its 
activity correlated with the number of references to intentions (Okuda et al., 2003). Moreover, this 
region processes information about personal goals (D’Argembeau et al., 2010), and therefore may 
be crucial to drive construction of one’s personal future (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). 
Interestingly, although frontotemporal dementia causes a similar impairment in episodic 
remembering and future thinking, patients’ EFT deficits are mainly associated with atrophy in the 
frontopolar cortex, whereas retrieval deficits correlated with atrophy in medial prefrontal regions 
(Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013). EFT is also more heavily reliant on semantic memory than is 
episodic remembering, consistent with high levels of activity in the lateral temporal cortex for EFT 
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(Addis et al., 2007). During EFT, semantic knowledge may provide a “scaffold” from which 
episodic details can be searched and integrated (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Irish, Addis, 
Hodges, & Piguet, 2012a). Patients with semantic dementia, indeed, have impaired EFT in the face 
of preserved episodic remembering (Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012a, 2012b), and the EFT 
impairment relates to atrophy in the left inferior temporal gyrus and bilateral temporal poles, and 
with performance in semantic memory tests (Irish et al., 2012a). EFT, however, also requires 
cognitive abilities that go beyond episodic memory, semantic memory, and executive functions 
(Ward, 2016). First, EFT is typically communicated through language, and therefore requires 
narrative abilities (Gaesser et al., 2011; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
Narrative abilities may be altered following MTL damage (Rosenbaum et al., 2009; Race, Keane, & 
Verfaellie, 2015; Zeman, Beschin, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2012), or in healthy aging (James, Burke, 
Austin, & Hulme, 1998). Yet, Race and colleagues have shown that, in amnesic patients with MTL 
lesions, impaired EFT can withstand a preserved ability to describe (visually presented) scenes 
(Race et al., 2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013; but see Zeman et al., 2013), suggesting that 
MTL patients’ EFT deficits are unlikely to be due to problems narrating constructed events.  
Patients with lesions to the vmPFC may also show a deficit in episodic remembering and 
future thinking. Previous studies have shown that vmPFC patients produced past and future events 
characterized by few internal (episodic) details and reduced richness and spatial coherence than 
healthy and brain-damaged controls when they simulate extended mental events (Bertossi, Aleo, et 
al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016; but see Kurczek et al., 2015). Interestingly, vmPFC patients’ 
event construction deficit extends to atemporal, fictitious events (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016) and to 
events happening to other people (Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016), suggesting that vmPFC critically 
supports core constructive processes needed to simulate any complex event, regardless of temporal 




The present study 
In the present study, we investigated whether vmPFC patients have impaired EFT, and the 
nature of their impairment. In particular, we explored whether nonepisodic mechanisms, namely, 
narrative and working memory abilities, played a role in previous findings of event construction 
deficits in vmPFC patients (Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; but see 
Kurczek et al., 2015). Previous studies have shown that vmPFC patients have normal discourse 
cohesion and coherence (Kurczek & Duff, 2011), and are normally able to recount fairy tales and 
Bible stories (Gilboa et al., 2006), suggesting preserved narrative abilities. As such, one would 
expect to find EFT problems in vmPFC patients even while controlling for narrative construction 
abilities. However, so far none has assessed EFT and event description in vmPFC patients within 
the same experimental paradigm, and, therefore, the relation between EFT and narrative 
construction in vmPFC patients is still unclear.  
In addition to narrative abilities, EFT requires to maintain active the constructed event in 
working memory while describing it. EFT and working memory are related in healthy individuals. 
For example, the number of internal details in EFT has been found to correlate with individuals’ 
digit span backward (Addis et al., 2008), and with performance in the listening span test, a task 
requiring to listen to a list of sentences and recall the last word of each sentence in the list 
(Zavagnin, De Beni, Borella, & Carretti, 2015). Using four different working memory measures, 
(Hill & Emery, 2013) have shown that EFT specificity relates to working memory abilities. It is 
long known that the prefrontal cortex is involved in working memory (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; 
for a review, see Esposito & Postle, 2015), and regions in the medial prefrontal cortex are 
particularly active when the material to be held in working memory is social in nature (Meyer & 
Lieberman, 2012), as typically is the content of EFT (D’Argembeau et al., 2011). It is possible, 
therefore, that problems in working memory play a role in vmPFC patients’ EFT impairment. 
Interestingly, in the study by Bertossi, Tesini, et al. (2016), five of the seven vmPFC patients had at 
least one aspect of working memory impaired, though the group average fell within the normal 
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limits. In contrast, patients tested by Kurczek et al. (2015) had relatively intact cognitive 
functioning. Thus, discrepancies between previous studies with regard to vmPFC patients’ EFT 
impairment may relate to differences in patients’ cognitive profile. Here, vmPFC patients and 
healthy participants imagined future events using pictures as cues (EFT condition), described 
pictures (description condition), or described pictures while maintaining them in working memory 
after an observation phase (working memory condition). If vmPFC patients’ deficits in EFT could 
be attributed mainly to impairment of the episodic memory system, as we hypothesize, the 
reduction in episodic detail and specificity should be present in the EFT condition but not, or in a 
reduced form, in the description and working memory condition. Alternatively, if mechanisms other 
than memory contribute to EFT performance, we would expect parallel patterns across tasks. 
Method   
Participants  
Participants included six patients with vmPFC damage (vmPFC patients) and 11 healthy 
controls (Table 8 displays demographic and clinical information). Patients were tested at the Centre 
for studies and research in Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of Bologna, Italy, in the 
context of a periodic clinical assessment. Healthy participants were recruited among patients’ 
relatives or other volunteers. All participants were native Italian speakers. Patients and controls 
were matched in terms of age, t = 0.49, p = .63 and education, t = -0.02, p = .98. The vmPFC 
patients’ lesions were the results of the rupture of an aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery 
in all cases. Lesions were bilateral, though often asymmetrically so (i.e., in 2 patients the lesion was 
larger in the left hemisphere, and in 4 patients in the right hemisphere; Figure 3). Included patients 
were in the stable phase of recovery (at least 3 year postmorbid), were not receiving psychoactive 
drugs, and had no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or interfere with the participation in the 
study (e.g., significant psychiatric disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular disease). As 
well, the healthy individuals were not taking psychoactive drugs, and were free of current or past 
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psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. Participants gave informed consent to 
take part in the study, according to the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors, 1991) and the departmental ethical committee.  
Lesion analysis 
Patients’ individual lesions, derived from the most recent MRI or computerized tomography 
images, were manually drawn by a neurologist, or by a trained psychologist and then verified by the 
same neurologist (both were not involved in the present study and blind to task performance), 
directly on each slice of the normalized T1- weighted template MRI scan from the Montreal 
Neurological Institute provided with the MRIcro software (Rorden & Brett, 2000) (see also 
Karnath, Fruhmann Berger, Küker, & Rorden, 2004; Moro et al., 2008; Tsuchida & Fellows, 2012). 
This template is approximately oriented to match Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) 
and is distributed with MRIcro. This manual procedure combines segmentation (identification of 
lesion boundaries) and registration (to a standard template) into a single step, with no additional 
transformation required (Kimberg, Coslett, & Schwartz, 2007). MRIcro software was used to 
estimate lesion volumes (in cubic centimeters [cc]) and to generate lesion overlap images. Figure 3 
shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in vmPFC patients. Brodmann’s areas (BAs) mainly 
affected in the vmPFC group were areas BA 10 (including, in some cases, the frontal pole), BA 11, 
BA 24, BA 25, BA 32, with region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 22.55 cc, SD = 
8.80), BA 10 (M = 14.14 cc, SD = 4.36), and BA 32 (M = 9.25 cc, SD = 2.76). Two patients also 
had minimal damage in BA 46 and BA 47, accounting for about 6% and 3% of patients’ total lesion 
size, respectively. Excluding these patients from the analyses did not alter the pattern of results.  
Neuropsychological assessment 
Patients’ general cognitive functioning was preserved, as indicated by the scores they 
obtained in the Raven standard matrices (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), which were within the normal 
range in all cases (equivalent score [ES] = 2.83; note that the ES ranges from 0 = impaired 
performance, and 1 = borderline performance, to 2-4 indicating normal performance; Capitani & 
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Laiacona, 1988), and comparable between vmPFC patients and healthy controls, t = -1.63, p = .12. 
The vmPFC patients also received a more extensive neuropsychological evaluation, aimed at 
specifying their cognitive profile further. 
Table 9 portrays individual vmPFC patients’ scores in standardized neuropsychological 
tests. The vmPFC patients reported normal scores in tests of verbal short-term memory (STM; Digit 
Span Forward subscale: ES = 3; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), spatial STM (Corsi test span: ES = 
2.83, supra span test: ES = 3.17), and working memory (2-back task; false alarms: t = 37.5, 
omissions: t = 45.8, RTs: t = 42.8, cut-off = 30; Zimmermann & Fimm, 2002; Zoccolotti, 
Pizzamiglio, Pittau, & Galati, 1994). Long-term memory, as assessed with the Buschke–Fuld list-
learning test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974; long term retrieval ES = 1.17) and a prose-passage recall test 
(ES = 1.5; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), was weak, but within the normal limits. Additionally, 
patients did not show spontaneous confabulation, based on clinical evidence, their behaviour in real 
life, and interviews with family members (Schnider, 2008). Many aspects of executive functioning 
were also preserved, including planning, as assessed with the Tower of London test (t = 44.67, cut-
off = 30) (Culbertson & Zillmer, 2000), inhibition, as assessed with the Stroop test (mean number 
of errors = 0.91, cut-off  > 7.5; Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), and cognitive flexibility, as assessed 
with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (t for perseverative responses = 30.5, cut-off = 30; Heaton, 
Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtis, 2000). Verbal fluency was within the normal limits as well 
(phonemic fluency: ES = 2.17; semantic fluency: ES = 2.83).   
Stimuli 
Eleven coloured pictures (size: 640 x 480 pixels) were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). All pictures were positive in valence 
(M = 6.31, SD = 1.12), and depicted people engaged in activities to which both patients and 
controls could easily relate (see also Gaesser et al., 2011; e.g., enjoying a picnic, playing football, 
playing with kittens, taking a stroll, eating dinner, answering the phone, taking the sun, fishing, 
etc.). Nine pictures served as the experimental trials, and two were used during the explanation of 
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the task and the practice phases, respectively. For each participant, the assignment of the nine 
pictures to the three experimental conditions was randomized, as was the order of presentation of 
each picture within each condition.   
Table 8. Participants’ Demographic and Clinical Information. 
 
Task 
We used a task adapted from Gaesser et al. (2011). For each trial, participants either 
imagined an event using the picture as the general setting (3 trials; EFT condition), described details 
about the picture (3 trials; description condition), or described details about the picture after it had 
been removed from view following an observation phase (3 trials; working memory condition). In 
the EFT condition, participants imagined events that may happen to them in the next 2-3 years 
using the picture as the general setting. The picture remained on the screen until the end of the trial. 
Imagined experiences did not need to strictly involve the elements presented in the picture, so that 
participants would successfully generate an event. Imagined experiences had to be specific in time 
and place, novel (not been previously experienced by the participant), plausible (consistent with the 
participant’s plans for the future), and last several minutes to hours, but not more than a day (see 
also Gaesser et al., 2011). In the description condition, participants had to describe the content of 
the picture, that is, the different people, objects, and environment in the picture (e.g., What are the 
people doing? What do they look like? Where are they?; see also Gaesser et al., 2011). Participants 
were instructed to report only what was depicted in the picture, without embellishing. In the 
working memory condition, participants first observed a picture. When they indicated that they had 
explored it satisfactorily, it was removed from view, and participants had to describe its content, 
with the same instructions as in the description condition. Observation was self-paced, but generally 
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lasted less than a minute across groups (see below). We are aware that, given that the capacity of 
visual working memory is about three to four objects (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001), and we 
used relatively complex pictures as stimuli, performance in the working memory condition is, at 
least in some cases, likely reflective of anterograde memory (in addition to working memory) 
abilities. Despite not being process-pure, our working memory condition mirrors closely the 
naturalistic requirement of EFT in terms of having to describe a complex event one has in mind. 
Trials were blocked by condition to facilitate compliance with task instructions, and the order of the 
three conditions was counterbalanced across participants. In all conditions, participants recounted as 
many details as possible for 5 min, and a tag reminding them of the ongoing task was always 
displayed at the bottom of the screen. The examiner (author V.C.), who was blind to the hypotheses 
of the study, used general prompts when necessary to clarify the instructions, solicit further detail, 
or make sure participants felt like anything else could be added, but could not introduce any concept 
not mentioned by the participant. Across conditions, after participants had recounted the scenario 
they were imagining/perceiving, they additionally rated: (a) how detailed was the future event 
imagined/the picture seen (detailedness: 1 = Not detailed at all; 4 = Very detailed), (b) the intensity 
of the emotion felt while imagining the future event/seeing the picture (emotionality: 1 = low 
emotion; 4 = high emotion), and (c) how difficult was the task (difficulty: 1 = Very easy; 4 = Very 
difficult). Participants’ reports were recorded and transcribed for later scoring.  
Figure 3. extent and overlap of brain lesions. The figure represents vmPFC patients’ lesions projected on the same 
seven axial slices and on sagittal view of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines 
on the sagittal view are the positions of the axial slices, and the white numbers under the axial views are the z 
coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurs in BAs 






The majority of testing took place at the Centre for studies and research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience of the University of Bologna. In some instances, participants were tested in their 
homes due to transportation difficulties. In such instances, a quiet area free from distractions or 
interruptions was used for testing. In all cases, the participant and the experimenter were the two 
only people present. The experimental task took about an hour to complete. The neuropsychological 
assessment took place in separate sessions.  
Table 9. Neuropsychological Test Scores for vmPFC Patients. 
 
Scoring 
Participants’ records were scored using the Autobiographical Interview protocol developed 
by Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch (2002) and adapted following Gaesser et al. 
(2011). For each trial, the central event was identified and, if more than one event was mentioned, 
the event described in more detail was considered the main event. Each event was divided into 
distinct details (unique bits of information), and these details were classified as internal (episodic 
details) or external (semantic information, repetitions, and information not specific to the main 
event). Verbatim descriptions of the items part of the picture were scored as external details for the 
EFT condition, so that only truly imagined events counted as internal details in EFT trials. In 
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contrast, such verbatim descriptions scored as internal details for both the description and working 
memory condition. Inferences about the picture (e.g., speculations, interpretations of peoples’ 
actions) were scored as external details in both the description and working memory condition. For 
the working memory condition, elements that were not present in the picture, or were reported in 
the wrong position, counted as external details. Two raters scored the transcripts independently. A 
main rater (blind to the hypotheses of the study) scored all reports, and a second rater scored 62% of 
the reports. Interrater reliability for internal and external details between the two raters was assessed 
with intraclass correlation (McGraw & Wong, 1996), which indicated high agreement between the 
two scorers (Cronbach’s alpha = .98 and 0.89 for internal and external details, respectively).  
Statistical analyses 
For each event/description, internal and external details were tallied. For each condition, the 
details were averaged across the three imagined/descripted events, separately for internal and 
external categories. Statistical analyses on the number of details generated were run using a 2 
(group: healthy controls, vmPFC patients) x 3 (condition: EFT, description, working memory) x 2 
(detail: internal, external) analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Fisher tests as post hoc comparisons. 
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to investigate, and control for, the effect of 
description and working memory performance on EFT. Given the small sample size, the main 
results were confirmed using more robust, nonparametric Mann–Whitney tests. Subjective ratings, 
which were nonnormally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov d > 0.37, p < .05), were analyzed using 
Mann–Whitney tests as well. In addition to group analyses, we performed individual modified t 
tests based on Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) method for comparing single cases with small 
control samples, to analyze individual patients’ EFT performance and relate it to their cognitive 
profile. Unless noted otherwise, the level of significance was set at p < .05, two-tailed. We report 





The results obtained by vmPFC patients with lesions mainly in the left hemisphere were 
comparable to those obtained by vmPFC patients with lesions mainly in right hemisphere (see the 
Lesion Analysis section; Mann–Whitney tests: z > -1.39, p > .16 in all cases). Therefore, for clarity, 
we present the results collapsed across the whole group of vmPFC patients. 
Ratings 
Subjective ratings of detail, emotionality, and difficulty were not significantly different 
between vmPFC patients and healthy controls (z > -1.66, p > .07 in all cases). 
Details  
Figure 4 shows the number of internal and external details generated by vmPFC patients and 
controls in the EFT, description, and working memory conditions, and Table 10 shows 
representative excerpts of participants’ reports across the different conditions. An ANOVA on the 
number of details generated with group, condition, and detail as factors showed a significant main 
effect of group (F(1,15) = 11.25, p = .004, partial ƞ2 = 0.43) and a significant main effect of detail 
(F(1,15) = 10.60, p = .005, partial ƞ2 =0.41), which were qualified by a significant Group x Detail 
interaction (F(1, 15) = 4.68, p = .04, partial ƞ2 =0.24). Post hoc tests showed that vmPFC patients 
produced fewer internal details than controls across conditions (p = .0004, d = 1.50), whereas the 
number of external details did not differ significantly between groups (p = .24, d = 1.37). Group 
differences in internal details were confirmed using nonparametric Mann–Whitney tests (EFT 
condition: z=-3.17, p = .001; description condition: z=-2.01, p = .04; working memory condition: z 
=-3.01, p = .003). A main effect of Condition also emerged (F(2,30) = 4.12, p = .02, partial ƞ2 
=0.21), qualified by a Condition x Detail interaction (F(2,30) = 19.41, p = .000004, partial ƞ2 
=0.56): both groups provided more internal details in the description (29.02, p < .000001, d = 1.08) 
and working memory condition (24.68, p = .00005, d = 1.00) than in the EFT condition (13.88), and 
more external details in the EFT than in the working memory condition (15.33 vs. 7.86, p = .002, d 
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= 1.06). No other significant post hoc comparison emerged (p > .06, d < 0.82). No other main 
effects or interactions in the ANOVA were significant (all p values >0.53, partial ƞ2 <0.05).  
These findings show that vmPFC patients show an impairment not only in imagining events, 
but also in describing events, be these perceived or held in working memory (see Figure 4). It is 
important to note here that vmPFC patients spent as much time as controls examining the pictures 
to be held in working memory (0.71 vs. 0.85 min, t = -0.52, p = .61, d = 0.26), to describe pictures 
(description condition: 2.25 vs. 3.11 min, t=-1.64, p = .12, d = 0.83; working memory condition: 
1.43 vs. 2.24 min, t = -1.59, p = .13, d = 0.81), and to recount imagined future events (3.54 vs. 3.29 
min, t = 0.44, p = .66, d = 0.22), suggesting they were normally engaged in the tasks, and not 
superficial or hurried. We then investigated whether group differences in EFT were fully explained 
by participants’ performance in the description and working memory conditions, by adding the 
number of internal and external details produced in the description and working memory conditions 
as covariates in an ANCOVA on the number of details generated during EFT with group, condition, 
and detail as factors. We examined the collinearity statistics of the predictor variables and found 
that tolerance was >0.25 and the variance inflation factor (VIF) was <3.90 in all cases, indicating no 
evidence of a multicollinearity problem. The ANCOVA still showed a significant Detail x Group 
interaction (F(1,11) = 6.44, p = .02, partial ƞ2 = 0.37), with vmPFC patients providing fewer internal 
details (4.28 vs. 19.12, p = .0004, d = 1.50) but a similar number of external details than healthy 
controls (p = .47, d = 1.37). Thus, even though vmPFC patients had problems describing events, be 
those present or held in working memory, these problems did not account fully for their EFT 
impairment. 
We also calculated the proportion of internal to total (internal + external) details as an 
additional index of EFT performance, independent of verbosity (Figure 5). An ANOVA on the 
proportion of internal-to-total details with group and condition as factors revealed a main effect of 
condition (F(2,30) = 46.05, p < .000001, partial ƞ2 =0.75), qualified by a Group x Condition 
interaction (F(2,30) = 10.52, p = .0003, partial ƞ2 =0.41). Fisher post hoc tests showed that the 
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proportion of internal-to-total details was lower in vmPFC patients than in healthy controls in the 
EFT condition (0.23 vs. 0.53, p = .00002, d = 2.10), but not in the description (0.72 vs. 0.67, p = 
.37, d = 0.36) or working memory condition (0.74 vs. 0.74, p = .98, d = 0). Mann–Whitney tests 
confirmed that the proportion of internal to total details was lower in vmPFC patients than in 
healthy controls in the EFT condition (z = -2.61, p = .009), but not in the description and WM 
conditions (p > .42 in both cases). Thus, vmPFC damage reduced the specificity of imagined future 
events, not of all events described.  
Figure 4. Mean number of internal and external details by participant, group, and condition. EFT episodic future 
thinking. Bars represent standard errors of the mean. Circles indicate performance of individual participants, and P1, P2, 
. . ., P6 denote individual patients. * p < .05. 
 
 
EFT and neuropsychological profile 
We explored whether EFT performance was related to vmPFC patients’ neuropsychological 
profile. First, individual Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) t tests on the proportion of internal-
tototal details generated during EFT revealed that patient P3 (t = -3.83, p = .003), patient P4 (t = -
2.71, p = .02), and patient P5 (t = -4.23, p = .002) generated significantly less specific future events 
compared to healthy controls, whereas performance of the other three vmPFC patients fell within 
the normal limits (p > .18 in all cases), despite being generally lower than healthy controls’ mean 
performance (see Figure 5). In light of the role of episodic memory, semantic memory, and 
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executive functions in EFT, we expected that the three vmPFC patients with more severely 
impaired EFT would be more compromised in these functions than the three vmPFC patients with 
EFT within the normal limits. Mann–Whitney tests revealed that vmPFC patients who generated an 
abnormally low proportion of internal-to-total details had lower scores in tests of long-term memory 
(prose recall, spatial supra span test), STM (digit span forward, Corsi test), and semantic fluency 
than vmPFC patients who generated a proportion of internal-to-total details within the normal limits 
(z > 1.96, p < .049, one-tailed, in all cases; see Table 8). Group differences in other 
neuropsychological tests were not significant (p > .26 in all cases).  
Figure 5. Mean proportion of internal-to-total details by participant group and condition. EFT = episodic future 
thinking. Bars represent standard errors of the mean. Circles indicate performance of individual participants, and P1, P2, 




















Table 10. Example reports generated in the EFT, Description, and Description from Working Memory conditions by a 







We investigated the role that nonepisodic abilities, such as narrative construction and 
working memory maintenance, play on vmPFC patients’ ability to imagine specific future events, 
by having vmPFC patients and healthy controls imagine specific personal future events (EFT) or 
describe pictures they were perceiving or holding in working memory. The results indicate that 
vmPFC patients generated fewer internal details during EFT but a normal number of external 
details. In the present study, unlike previous ones (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et 
al., 2016; Kurczek et al., 2015), we used pictures (instead of words) as cues for EFT, in order to 
match the nature of the cues between the EFT and the description conditions. Pictorial (compared 
with verbal) cues have been found more effective at eliciting specific autobiographical memories 
(Ridout, Dritschel, Matthews, & O’Carroll, 2016), which could have facilitated EFT in our patients. 
Yet, we confirmed that vmPFC patients are impaired in the episodic simulation of future events (see 
also Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016). The vmPFC patients’ EFT deficit 
aligns with extensive fMRI evidence of vmPFC engagement during EFT (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis 
et al., 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2010). 
Our findings, however, also highlight a deficit in nonepisodic abilities that likely contribute 
to, though do not completely explain, vmPFC patients’ EFT deficit. The vmPFC patients, indeed, 
produced less detailed descriptions of pictures compared to healthy controls, be these in view or 
held in working memory, often conveying only the general sense of what the pictures portrayed, not 
the fine details. It is worth noting that a deficit in describing pictures is not present in patients with 
hippocampal amnesia (Race et al., 2011, Race et al., 2013), but may occur in the presence of extra-
MTL damage (Zeman et al., 2013). As Zeman et al. (2013) noted, this deficit may be due to 
problems in executive functions, which were weak in our patients. Prefrontal cortex is an important 
source of top-down modulation of visual processing (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In particular, 
vmPFC is active during visual search (Pantazatos, Yanagihara, Zhang, Meitzler, & Hirsch, 2012), 
and vmPFC patients have impaired visual scanning strategies (Wolf, Philippi, Motzkin, Baskaya, & 
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Koenigs, 2014). Thus, vmPFC patients may fail to detect all of the objects in a scene. Indeed, 
vmPFC is active, along with the hippocampus, during perception (not only construction) of scenes 
(Zeidman, Mullally, & Maguire, 2015). The vmPFC patients also have problems integrating 
elementary features into global percepts, especially when perceptual integration relies heavily on 
the top-down activation of a search template (Ciaramelli, Leo, Del Viva, Burr, & Ladavas, 2007). 
Setting up a global representation of a scene (i.e., schema; Biederman, 1981) supports, in turn, the 
detection of additional individual objects (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Thus, vmPFC damage may 
have deprived patients from top-down guidance of perception, further hindering the identification of 
picture details  (Barceló, Suwazono, & Knight, 2000). 
Whether due to poor search/detection of perceptual details, or merely vmPFC patients’ 
narrative style (which may not be entirely captured by the number of internal and external details 
produced), impaired descriptive abilities do not fully account for vmPFC patients’ EFT impairment. 
As well, vmPFC patients’ EFT impairment does not seem to be the reflection of a general problem 
in fluency. When we control EFT performance for individuals’ verbosity by focusing on the 
proportion of internal-to-total details, indeed, vmPFC patients still evinced lower EFT scores than 
controls, whereas group differences in description and working memory vanished. Thus, while 
differences in descriptive abilities between vmPFC patients and healthy controls likely reflect 
differences in the overall amount of information reported, group differences in EFT highlight 
qualitative differences in event construction between vmPFC patients and controls, with the former 
disproportionately impaired in the generation of episodic details.  
One possibility is that vmPFC patients had problems accessing personal future events 
specific in time and place. The frontopolar cortex, which was damaged in our patients, is related to 
prospective thinking (Burgess et al., 2001; D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van der 
Linden, Feyers, et al., 2010), and is preferentially engaged by construction of future (compared with 
past) events (Addis et al., 2007). Alternatively, vmPFC may mediate integrative processes needed 
to elaborate specific future (as well as past) events (see also Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, 
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Tesini, et al., 2016). The vmPFC is known to be critical for appropriate processing of schema-
related information (Ghosh, Moscovitch, Melo Colella, & Gilboa, 2014), and represents abstract 
summaries of frequent events (Krueger, Barbey, & Grafman, 2009). During event construction, this 
region may help maintain a stable schematic knowledge of relevant events (e.g., the typical picnic) 
around which to construct a rich and contextualized event, using past experiences as a source of 
details (Benoit, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2014). Consistent with this hypothesis, performance in 
semantic, but not phonemic, fluency was lower in a subset of vmPFC patients who reported a 
particularly low proportion of internal-to-total details during EFT compared with patients whose 
performance fell within the normal range. These findings, again, argue against the idea that vmPFC 
patients’ EFT problems reflect a general problem in fluency, and reinforce the hypothesis that 
patients may have problems activating and using semantic structures crucial for EFT (D’Argembeau 
& Mathy, 2011; Irish et al., 2012a). 
The vmPFC patients with more severe EFT specificity problems were also those that scored 
poorly in short- and long-term memory tests. The “constructive simulation hypothesis” emphasizes 
the role of episodic memory in EFT (Schacter et al., 2012). Indeed, the same associative processes 
binding information in a laboratory prose-recall task may be necessary to collate individual episodic 
details into novel events. In fact, the discrepancy between impaired (Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016) 
and preserved (Kurczek et al., 2015) EFT in different groups of vmPFC patients may reflect, at least 
in part, differences in patients’ mnestic abilities. Patients tested by Bertossi, Tesini, et al. (2016), 
who had impaired EFT, were also impaired in list-learning tasks, whereas patients tested by 
Kurczek et al. (2015) had preserved EFT as well as anterograde and retrograde memory. STM, too, 
has been found to support episodic binding (Bridge & Voss, 2015). The crucial question, now, 
concerns the nature of the memory processes mediated by vmPFC that serve both anterograde 
learning and EFT. Of relevance, although vmPFC patients may have weak working memory 
abilities (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016), we have no evidence that 
vmPFC patients’ EFT impairment depended on working memory deficits. Indeed, vmPFC patients 
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with versus without a severe EFT impairment did not differ in working memory performance. 
Moreover, vmPFC patients were not disproportionately impaired at describing pictures held in 
working memory versus in view, compared with healthy controls.  
In summary, our results confirm that vmPFC have a deficit in EFT. Although vmPFC 
patients’ event description performance appears to indicate that mechanisms other than episodic 
memory are also relevant to understanding their EFT impairment, such as narrative construction and 
working memory, these proved not to be the root of their impairment. Our work, therefore, 
encourages further inquiry of the specific subcomponents of the episodic memory system involved 




















The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 
hippocampus in scene construction. 
The previous study has left many questions open. First, study 2 shows that vmPFC patients 
are impaired not only in the construction of future events, but also in description of event pictures. 
Although we have demonstrated that the poor narrative skills do not completely explain vmPFC 
patients' EFT impairment, this finding leads to interrogate about the nature of the task used to assess 
event simulation and suggests the importance of investigating this ability using tasks that do not 
require narrative skills. In this chapter, studies 3 and 4 have this specific aim, to assess a core 
component of event simulation, namely the construction of single scenes, through tasks based on 
the use of scene pictures, and not requiring to verbally describe the constructed scenes.  
Second, study 2 replicates previous findings that vmPFC patients are impaired at simulating 
mental events (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016), an ability that requires 
explicit scene construction mechanisms. However, there is no evidence, so far, about the role of 
vmPFC in implicit, automatic, scene construction. Therefore, this issue will be directly investigated 
in study 3 of this chapter, while study 4 will examine the ability to process-as opposed to create- the 
constructive and semantic aspects of scenes.  
Third, study 2 found that vmPFC patients are impaired at simulating future extended events. 
However, as anticipated, in a different study (Kurczek et al., 2015), vmPFC patients have been 
found capable to describe in detail single snapshots of scenes taken from pre-selected events, and 
their performance strikingly differed from that of MTL patients, who were instead impaired even in 
the simulation of these single snapshots (Kurczek et al., 2015). This finding leads to think that a 
crucial difference between these patient populations lies in the distinct roles that vmPFC and 
hippocampus play in the scene construction process, with vmPFC involved in constructing extended 
events, and the hippocampus implicated in building even single scenes. In the following studies 
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focused on scene construction and processing, therefore, we will compare the performance of 
vmPFC patients and hippocampal patients, to begin to shed light on the different contribution 
played by these brain regions during scene construction.  
 
Study 3. Boundary extension is attenuated in patients with ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex damage. 
Co-authored with Cornelia McCormick, Sinead L. Mullally, Helene Intraub, Eleanor A. Maguire, 
Elisa Ciaramelli. 
(De Luca F, McCormick C, Mullally SL, Intraub H, Maguire EA, Ciaramelli E. 2018. 108:1-12. Cortex) 
Introduction  
 For most of us, if we close our eyes we can construct vivid mental scenes and events that 
help us to remember the past, envision the future and create fictitious scenarios. Neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological evidence has pinpointed several key brain regions that seem to support these 
functions, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and hippocampus (Svoboda, 
McKinnon, & Levine, 2006; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & 
Maguire, 2007; Lah & Miller, 2008; Race, Keane, & Mieke Verfaellie, 2011; Bertossi, Aleo, 
Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016). However, the 
separate contributions of vmPFC and hippocampus are not well understood. One way to try and 
dissociate the roles of these two brain regions is to administer tasks that have been associated with 
one brain structure to patients with damage to the other brain structure. Emerging evidence suggests 
that the hippocampus is necessary for constructing mental models of spatially-coherent scenes in 
which details can be bound in order to be re- or pre-experienced (Maguire & Mullally, 2013; Clark 
& Maguire, 2016; Zeidman & Maguire, 2016; McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2017). 
In this regard, an especially intriguing scene construction phenomenon is “boundary 
extension” (BE) (Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Intraub, 2012). BE occurs when individuals who are 
viewing scenes automatically imagine what might be beyond the view, and consequently later 
misremember having seen a greater expanse of the scene. BE is a powerful psychological 
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phenomenon that has been replicated in many healthy populations, including adults (Intraub & 
Richardson, 1989; Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998; 
Chadwick, Mullally, & Maguire, 2013), children (Seamon, Schlegel, Hiester, Landau, & 
Blumenthal, 2002; Kreindel & Intraub, 2017), babies (Quinn & Intraub, 2007), and also cohorts 
with developmental disorders (Spanò, Intraub, & Edgin, 2017). What makes BE so intriguing is that 
healthy participants tend to make robust and confident memory errors despite seeing the original 
scenes just a few milliseconds beforehand. Therefore, BE provides a unique window into the 
implicit, automatic and fast process of internal scene construction.  
Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage, who have impaired scene construction ability, 
show attenuated BE, leading to paradoxically better memory performance compared to control 
participants despite their amnesia (Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012). This is because when 
processing the scenes, the patients do so without using scene construction to extrapolate beyond the 
scene boundaries. When BE was examined using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
the importance of the hippocampus was further underlined (Chadwick et al., 2013; see also Park, 
Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007). Interestingly, effective connectivity analyses during BE 
showed that the hippocampus influenced activity in the visual-perceptual cortices rather than vice 
versa. This finding highlights one of the pathways underpinning this top-down process.  
Whereas the previous fMRI study did not reveal any prefrontal cortex activation, the vmPFC 
has recently been implicated in top-down initiation of hippocampal processes (Garrido, Barnes, 
Kumaran, Maguire, & Dolan, 2015; for a review see (McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018); 
Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016). In addition, vmPFC-damaged patients are impaired 
at imagining future and fictitious events compared to control groups, and rate their constructed 
experiences as lacking spatial coherence (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016). 
Together, these findings suggest that the vmPFC plays a role in mental scene construction, at least 
for tasks that are explicit and involve introspection.   
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The question we address here is whether vmPFC is equally involved in the fast, implicit and 
automatic process of BE. We investigated BE in patients with vmPFC lesions and also control 
patients with cortical lesions that did not involve the vmPFC. In addition, we contrasted their 
performance with the hippocampal patients described by Mullally et al. (2012). If vmPFC is 
necessary for scene construction, patients with vmPFC damage should show reduced BE compared 
to healthy and brain-damaged controls, similar to hippocampal-damaged patients. This would 
confirm the role of vmPFC in scene construction using a paradigm that probes construction 
implicitly, and in relation to single scenes. Importantly, the BE task allows to assess scene 
construction without relying on language and narrative skills, which are known to be poor in 
vmPFC patients, as shown in the study 2 (Bertossi et al., 2017). Therefore, a BE reduction would 
further confirm that the role of vmPFC in scene construction is independent from other 
mechanisms, as narrative construction. An additional 'scene probe' task allowed us to interrogate 
scene construction further in terms of perceptual, emotional, and spatial details, providing insight 
into the nature of the impairment associated with damage to the vmPFC or the hippocampus.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Twenty-five patients took part in the experiment. Eight patients had vmPFC damage 
(vmPFC patients; all males, mean age = 59.25 years, range = 46-72; see Table 11 for demographic 
and clinical information), and ten 'control' patients had brain damage that did not involve vmPFC or 
the hippocampus (control patients; seven males, mean age = 59.30 years, range = 45–67 years; 
Table 11).  We also considered data from seven patients who had hippocampal damage 
(hippocampal patients; four males, mean age = 41.43 years, range = 32–63 years). vmPFC and 
control patients were Italian and were recruited at the Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. Hippocampal patients were British, and were tested at the Wellcome 
Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK. The background details of the 
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hippocampal patients and their scores on the BE tasks have already been reported in Mullally et al. 
(2012) (for convenience, background details are summarized in Supplementary Materials Table S1). 
Our main interest here was in the new data relating to performance of the vmPFC and control 
patients. We reprise relevant data from the hippocampal patients to afford direct comparisons with 
the vmPFC and control patients as an interesting secondary analysis.  
Brain damage in vmPFC patients was bilateral in all cases, and the result of the rupture of an 
aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery (ACoA). In control patients, brain damage (left 
hemisphere: five cases; right hemisphere: five cases) was due to stroke (six cases), arteriovenous 
malformations (two cases), or tumor (two cases). Lesion sites in control patients included the 
occipital cortex and occipital-temporal area, and lateral aspects of the temporal and prefrontal 
cortex (see Supplementary Figure S1). The hippocampal-damaged patients’ lesions were focal and 
also bilateral (Supplementary Materials Table S1; Figure S2; full details in Mullally et al., 2012). 
All patients were in a stable phase of recovery (at least 3 months post-lesion) and had no other 
diagnoses likely to affect cognition or interfere with participation in the study (e.g., significant 
psychiatric disease, alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular disease).  
Ten Italian healthy individuals (vmPFC healthy controls; all males; mean age = 56.50 years, 
range = 44-63; see Table 11) were matched to the vmPFC and control patients on age (F(2,25) = 0.41, 
p = 0.67), education (F(2,25) = 0.22, p = 0.80), and gender balance (vmPFC: χ² = 0.00, p = 1.00; 
control patients: χ² = 1.09, p = 0.30). The hippocampal patients were generally younger than the 
vmPFC and control patients (F(2,22) = 9.77, p = 0.001), and so were matched with twelve British 
healthy individuals (eight males, mean age = 42.67 years, range = 32–63; Supplementary Materials 
Table S1; see Mullally et al., 2012) on age (U = 34, Z = -0.68, p = 0.496), gender balance (χ² = 
0.17, p = 0.68), and IQ (U = 22.5, Z = -1.66, p = 0.097). Healthy control participants were not 
taking psychoactive drugs and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as 
determined by history. These sample sizes were chosen based on the previous neuropsychological 
study that examined BE (Mullally et al., 2012).  Participants gave informed consent in accordance 
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with the Bioethical Committee of the University of Bologna, the CEIIAV Ethical Committee of 
Emilia Romagna Regional Health Service, and the National Research Ethics Committee (London, 
Queen Square, UK), and in line with the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors, 1991).  
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Notes. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; M = male; F = female; Edu = education; SPM = Ravens Standard 
Progressive Matrices; ROCF = Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure. We report mean corrected scores (see Spinnler & 




 Table 11 shows the vmPFC and control patients’ neuropsychological profiles. In general the 
patients’ cognitive functioning was preserved, as indicated by their scores on the Raven Standard 
Progressive Matrices (see Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987, for normative data) and verbal fluency 
(Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), which were within the normal range in both groups. vmPFC and 
control patients also had intact verbal and spatial short-term memory, as assessed with the digit span 
and Corsi tests (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987) and verbal and spatial long-term memory, as assessed 
with prose recall and recall of the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). The 
copy of the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure was also normal (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987). Direct 
comparison of the vmPFC patients and control patients showed comparable scores in the above 
neuropsychological tests (p > 0.09 in all cases) with the exception of prose recall, which was poorer 
in vmPFC compared to control patients (t = -2.18, p = 0.045).  In some cases, control patients with 
posterior lesions had visual field deficits, including hemianopia (in six cases) and quadrantopia (in 
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one case). In these patients, however, detection of visual stimuli in standardized tests was not 
impaired when eye movements were allowed, and visual search performance was within the normal 
limits (see Supplementary Table S2). We therefore assumed they would be able to perform the BE 
task (see below). The hippocampal patients were high functioning and did not have any cognitive 
impairments other than severe memory deficits (see Supplementary Materials Table S1; Mullally et 
al., 2012). 
Lesion analysis 
 vmPFC and control patients’ individual lesions, derived from magnetic resonance imaging 
or computerized tomography images, were manually drawn by an expert neurologist (not involved 
in the present study, and blind to task performance), or by F.D.L, and then verified by the same 
neurologist, directly on each slice of the normalized T1-weighted template MRI scan from the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (Holmes et al., 1998). This template is approximately oriented to 
match Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and is distributed with MRIcro (Holmes et al., 
1998). This manual procedure combines segmentation (identification of lesion boundaries) and 
registration (to a standard template) into a single step, with no additional transformation required 
(Kimberg, Coslett, & Schwartz, 2007). MRIcro software was used to estimate lesion volumes (in 
cc) and generate lesion overlap images.  
 Figure 6 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in vmPFC patients. The Brodmann 
areas (BA) that were mainly affected were BA 10, BA 11, BA 24, BA 25, BA 32, with the region of 
maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 17.30 cc, SD = 9.85), BA 10 (M = 8.79 cc, SD = 6.65), 
and BA 32 (M = 6.06 cc, SD = 3.34). One vmPFC patient had a very large lesion that extended to 
dorsal prefrontal cortex (BA 6 and BA 8). Excluding this patient from the analyses, however, did 
not alter the results. For the control patients, the areas mainly affected were BAs 17-19 (M = 5.68 
cc, SD = 9.08), BAs 20-22 and BA 37 (M = 14.06 cc, SD = 20.81), and BAs 39-40 (M = 2.90 cc, 
SD = 5.58). There was no significant difference in lesion volume between vmPFC patients and 
control patients (42.61 vs. 40.38 cc, t = 0.12, p = 0.91). The hippocampal patients had selective 
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bilateral hippocampal damage as confirmed by manual segmentation of the hippocampi and 
automated whole-brain grey matter analyses as described in Mullally et al. (2012). 
Figure 6. Representative axial slices and cumulative midsagittal view of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute 
brain showing the extent of lesion overlap in the vmPFC patients. The white horizontal lines on the sagittal view are the 
positions of the axial slices, and the red numbers below the axial views are the z coordinates of each slice. The color bar 
indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurs in BA 10, 11, and 32. The left hemisphere is on 




Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task 
 BE was measured with the same Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task used by Mullally et 
al. (2012) (see Figure 7). Participants were informed that, on each trial, they would be viewing a 
picture of a simple scene twice in rapid succession, and upon the second presentation of the scene 
they would have to decide whether the scene was exactly the same as they had seen before, or if 
instead it was closer-up or farther-away.  They were told that the purpose of the experiment was to 
determine how well people can focus their attention. After having seen an example stimulus (e.g., a 
pink flower on a green background, in standard and closer-up view), participants completed 24 
randomly presented trials. In all cases, the initial picture comprised a single, centrally positioned 
object in a simple scene, presented on the computer screen for 250 ms and followed by a briefly 
presented (250 ms) visual noise mask. The second picture immediately followed the mask. The task 
was to rate the second picture relative to the first, choosing one of five options, i.e., “much closer-
up”, “a little closer-up”, “the same”, “a little farther-away” or “much farther-away”. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, the two pictures were always identical, and thus all picture pairs should have 
been rated as the same (the correct answer). 
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 The proportion of trials classified as either 'the same', 'closer-up' (collapsing across 'much 
closer-up' and 'a little closer-up' responses), or 'farther-away' responses (collapsing across 'much 
farther-away' and 'a little farther-away' responses) was calculated as the percentage of responses 
made in each category relative to the total number of responses made. BE is revealed by a 
disproportionally large number of incorrect “closer-up” responses. This is because when they 
initially view a scene, participants typically imagine the extended environment surrounding the 
scene.  When this more expansive representation is subsequently compared with the second ‘test’ 
picture, although it is identical to the initial picture viewed only 250ms previous, it is consistently 
believed to depict a closer-up scene. In addition, BE can be quantified by a mean BE score, 
calculated by averaging the numerical values across the 24 trials associated with the responses, i.e., 
“much closer-up” = -2; “a little closer-up” = -1; “the same” = 0; “a little farther-away” = +1; “much 
farther-away” = +2.  The BE score indicates the degree of bias towards one response over another, 
with a mean score of ‘0’ indicating no BE effect, and negative scores reflecting BE.  On each trial 
participants also reported how confident they were about their decision using a three-point scale (1 
= “not sure”, 2 = “fairly sure”, 3 = “very sure”), and mean confidence ratings were calculated for 
each of the three response categories (the same, closer-up, farther-away). Given the rapid 
presentation of the first scene on each trial, they were also given the option to press a button to 
indicate that they did not see the first picture at all (5 = “don’t remember”). The frequency with 
which this happened was very low (vmPFC patients: 4 trials; control patients: 5 trials; vmPFC 
healthy controls: 1 trial), as is typical in BE research, and this did not differ significantly across 
groups (H = 2.68; p = 0.26). These trials were discarded from subsequent analyses. 
 
Figure 7. Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task. Timeline of an example trial. First, a simple scene was presented for 
250 ms, followed by a brief mask which was also presented for 250 ms. The scene image was then presented again for 
1000 ms, after which a rating scale appeared underneath. The participants were asked to rate whether the two scenes 
were the same, or whether the second scene was a closer-up or farther-away view compared to the first scene.  




Scene Probe Task 
 Using a 'scene probe' task we attempted to ascertain what aspects of a scene representation 
might be affected by vmPFC damage. As with the hippocampal-lesioned patients in Mullally et al. 
(2012), a close-up photograph of a scene was displayed and remained on the screen for the duration 
of the task (see Figure 8). Participants were first asked to name the main components of the scene, 
namely, the central object (a bench), the background (trees and houses), the type of place where the 
photograph was taken (a park/garden), and the predominant colors (green and brown). A score of 1 
was awarded to each of the four elements of the scene correctly listed, and a score of 0 for missing 
elements (range 0-4). Participants were then asked to describe in as much detail as possible what the 
scene might be like beyond the boundaries of the current view, that is, what might come into view if 
they imagined taking a few steps back from the camera’s current position. Participants were 
encouraged to use their imagination. Verbal descriptions were recorded and later transcribed. Every 
statement was classified as belonging to one of four categories: entities present (EP, e.g., "there is a 
bench"), sensory descriptions (SD, e.g., “the chair is made of wood”), spatial references (SPA; e.g., 
“behind the tree”), and thoughts/emotions/actions (TEA, e.g., “I felt lonely”) (Mullally et al., 2012; 
see also Hassabis et al., 2007). Participants were also asked whether they were actually able to 
visualize the extended scene in their imagination and rate the vividness of the scene beyond the 
view using a 5-point scale (1 = not vivid at all…5 = very vivid). If they were unable to visualize 
anything, they were given a score of 0.  All descriptions were scored by author FDL (not blind to 
group membership), and a second rater (blind to group membership) scored 1/3 of the transcripts 
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independently. Inter-rater reliability (separately for SD, SPA, EP, TEA), assessed with intra-class 
correlations (Mcgraw & Wong, 1996), was high (coefficients > 0.76 in all cases).  
Figure 8. Scene probe task. The image depicts the scene stimulus used. Participants were instructed to describe this 
picture out loud, including the main object and background. They were then asked what would come into view if they 
stepped back from the current camera position.   
 
Data analyses 
 Given that in most cases the dependent variables were non-normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov d > 0.13, p < 0.05), behavioral data were analyzed with non-parametric 
tests. We compared vmPFC patients with vmPFC healthy controls and control patients. We also 
compared the three patient groups (vmPFC, hippocampal and control patients) directly. We did this 
by calculating z-scores for each patient with reference to their respective matched healthy control 
group (e.g., vmPFC healthy controls for vmPFC patients and control patients, and hippocampal 
healthy controls for hippocampal patients), and comparing z-scores across patient groups. This 
allowed us to control for age and education differences between the Italian and British patient 
cohorts. We analyzed comparisons involving the three participant groups with non-parametric 
Kruskall-Wallis analyses of variance (ANOVA) and conducted planned comparisons between 
vmPFC patients and brain-damaged and healthy controls with Mann-Whitney z tests - we report the 
exact, two-tailed, uncorrected p values. Where appropriate, we also report effect sizes (r) for non-
normal data (based on Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012) where a large effect is > 0.5, a medium effect 
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~ 0.3, and a small effect is ~ 0.1 (Coolican, 2009). All differences were considered statistically 
significant at p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
Results 
Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task  
 Accuracy. Figure 9A shows the boxplots of the percentage of each response type (closer-up, 
the same, farther-away), collapsing across the degrees of subjective distance (“much” or “a little” 
farther/closer), by participant group. Figure 10A shows the boxplots of the boundary extension (BE) 
score by participant group. BE was apparent in all groups, as evidenced by no group selecting the 
correct - ‘same’- response 100% of the time. However, whereas healthy controls and control 
patients rated more often the second presentation of pictures as closer-up, vmPFC patients (and 
hippocampal patients) rated more often the pictures correctly as being the same, and thus showed 
attenuated BE. Statistical tests confirmed these observations. Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs on the 
percentage of the same, closer-up, and farther-away responses across participant groups (vmPFC 
patients, control patients, vmPFC healthy controls) showed significant group differences for the 
same (H = 9.68, p = 0.01) and closer-up responses (H = 8.24, p = 0.02). Post hoc Mann-Whitney 
tests showed that vmPFC patients classified trials more often as the same compared to both vmPFC 
healthy controls (U = 9.00, Z = 2.75, p = 0.01, r = 0.65), and control patients (U = 10.00, Z = 2.66, 
p = 0.01, r = 0.63), and less often as closer-up compared to both vmPFC healthy controls (U = 
11.50, Z = -2.53, p = 0.01, r = 0.60) and control patients (U = 12.50, Z = -2.44, p = 0.01, r = 0.58). 
There were no differences in the percentage of trials classified as the same (p = 0.91, r = 0.03) or 
closer-up (p = 0.70, r =0.1) between vmPFC healthy controls and control patients. Similarly, there 
were significant group differences in the BE score (H = 6.11, p = 0.047), such that vmPFC patients 
showed a lower BE score than vmPFC healthy controls (U = 15.50, Z = 2.18, p = 0.03, r = 0.51) and 
control patients (U = 16.00, Z = 2.13, p = 0.03, r = 0.50), while there were no differences between 
the two control groups (p = 0.97, r = 0.01). This first set of analyses shows that vmPFC patients 
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have a significantly reduced BE compared to both healthy and brain-damaged controls. vmPFC 
performance was reminiscent of that of hippocampal patients, who also showed attenuated BE 
(Mullally et al., 2012). 
 To compare BE across vmPFC patients, hippocampal patients and control patients directly, 
we analyzed z-scores (see Figure 9B and Figure 10B). Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs on z-scores 
showed significant group differences in the percentage of the same (H = 8.14, p = 0.02), closer-up 
(H = 7.32, p = 0.03) and, a strong trend in the BE score (H = 5.66, p = 0.059). There were no 
differences in the percentage of farther-away responses (H = 2.06, p = 0.36). Mann-Whitney post 
hoc tests showed that, compared to control patients, both vmPFC and hippocampal patients more 
often gave the correct (the same) response (vmPFC vs. control patients: U = 10.00, Z = 2.62, p = 
0.01, r = 0.62; hippocampal vs. control patients: U = 14.00, Z = 2.00, p = 0.04, r = 0.49) and less 
often the closer-up responses (vmPFC vs. control patients: U = 12.50, Z = -2.40, p = 0.02, r = 0.57; 
hippocampal vs. control patients: U = 14.00, Z = -2.00, p = 0.04, r = 0.49). Importantly, there was 
no difference in the percentage of same, closer-up and farther-away responses between vmPFC and 
hippocampal patients (all p > 0.69, all r < 0.1), indicating that BE was reduced to a similar degree. 
Confirming these results, BE scores were similar between vmPFC and hippocampal patients (p = 
0.60, r = 0.13), and were lower in vmPFC patients (U = 16.00, Z = 2.09, p = 0.04, r = 0.49), and 
hippocampal patients (U = 17.00, Z = 1.71, p = 0.09, r = 0.41) compared to control patients, 
although only the difference between vmPFC and control patients reached statistical significance. 
Together, the z-score results confirmed that vmPFC patients, as well as hippocampal patients, 
showed a reduced BE effect compared to patients with brain lesions not involving vmPFC or the 
hippocampus.  
 
Figure 9. A: Box-plots of the percentage of trials classified as the same, closer-up and farther-away in the Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation Task by participant group. The data and significance levels contrasting patients with hippocampal 
damage and their controls are from Mullally et al. (2012). B: Box-plots of z-scores for the same, closer-up, and farther-
away responses for the three patient groups. Boxplots depict the median, first and third quartiles, and minimum and 




Figure 10. A: Box-plots of boundary extension (BE) scores by participant group. The data and significance levels 
contrasting patients with hippocampal damage and their controls are from Mullally et al. (2012). The more negative the 
score, the more BE. B: Box-plots of BE z-scores for the three patient groups. Boxplots depict the median, first and third 
quartiles, and minimum and maximum (whiskers) of the data sets. *p < 0.05. 
 
 
Confidence. Table 12 shows confidence ratings by participant group and type of response. 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs on confidence ratings associated with the same, closer-up, and farther-
away responses across participant groups (vmPFC patients, control patients, vmPFC healthy 
controls) showed significant group differences in confidence ratings for closer-up responses (H = 
6.84, p = 0.03), but not for the other response categories (p > 0.18 in both cases). Post hoc tests 
showed that vmPFC patients were less confident in their closer-up responses than vmPFC healthy 
controls (U = 12.00, Z = -2.24, p = 0.02, r = 0.54), but had similar confidence levels as the control 
patients (p = 0.22, r = 0.30). There was no significant difference in confidence for closer-up 
responses between control patients and vmPFC healthy controls (p = 0.07, r = 0.41). Comparing 
vmPFC patients, hippocampal patients, and control patients directly using z-scores showed there 
were no significant group differences in confidence associated with the same, closer-up, or farther-
away responses (p > 0.07 in all cases).  
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Table 12. Confidence ratings in the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task by participant group. 
 

























 -0.80  
(-1.69- -0.05) 
 -1.00  
(-1.70-0.71)  
































- - - 
Notes. Median and range (in parentheses) of confidence scores. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Z-scores refer 
to the difference between patients' scores and the average score of their healthy control group, divided by the standard 
deviation of the healthy control group. 1 = only one patient gave a farther-away response, therefore no range is reported. 
Confidence was rated on a three-point scale: 1 = “not sure”, 2 = “fairly sure”, 3 = “very sure”. 
 
As a side note, given that some of the control patients had visual field deficits, one may ask 
whether these deficits played a role in their (normal) performance on the BE task. For example, did 
these patients fail to appreciate that the pictures were the same across presentations because they 
did not scan them completely? We therefore inspected BE scores separately for control patients 
with and without visual field deficits. Control patients with (M = -0.47) and without visual deficits 
(M = -0.56) had comparable BE scores (Mann-Whitney U = 7.50, Z = 0.68, p = 0.49, r = 0.22), and 
these were similar to those of the healthy controls (M = -0.51; healthy controls vs. control patients 
with visual field deficits: U = 34.00, Z = -0.10, p = 0.92, r = 0.02; healthy controls vs. control 
patients without visual field deficits: U = 13.50, Z = 0.25, p = 0.80, r = 0.1). 
Scene Probe Task  
Contents. Upon presentation of the scene probe, all participants were able to list the main 
elements of the scene, with the exception of one vmPFC patient who failed to mention the location, 
two control patients who failed to mention, in one case the location, and in the other case the colors, 
and two healthy controls who failed to mention the colors. The description scores were 
consequently very high, and comparable across participant groups (vmPFC patients: 3.88; control 
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patients: 3.80; healthy controls: 3.80; H = 0.21, p = 0.90). All hippocampal patients and their 
controls named all of the elements (score = 4 in all cases). 
Figure 11A shows the boxplots of the number of details participants produced when 
requested to imagine what might be beyond the boundaries of the current view, by participant group 
and content category. Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs across participant groups (vmPFC patients, control 
patients, vmPFC healthy controls) showed significant group differences in the number of entities 
present (EP; H = 10.73, p = 0.01), sensory descriptions (SD; H = 6.97, p = 0.03), and spatial 
references (SPA; H = 8.46, p = 0.01), but not thoughts/actions/emotions (TEA; p = 0.17). Mann-
Whitney post-hoc tests showed that vmPFC patients produced fewer EP, SD, and SPA than both 
vmPFC healthy controls (EP: U = 11.00, Z = -2.58, p = 0.01, r = 0.61; SD: U = 14.00, Z = -2.31, p 
= 0.02, r = 0.54; SPA: U = 13.50, Z = -2.35, p = 0.02, r = 0.55) and control patients (EP: U = 6.50, 
Z = -2.98, p = 0.003, r = 0.70; SD: U = 15.00, Z = -2.22, p = 0.03, r = 0.52; SPA: U = 10.50, Z = -
2.62, p = 0.01, r = 0.62), whereas no differences emerged between vmPFC healthy controls and 
control patients across content categories (p > 0.45, r < 0.2 in all cases). Thus, consistent with 
evidence of reduced BE, vmPFC patients had difficulty imagining what might be beyond the scene 
they were currently perceiving. Their construction of the extended scene, however, differed from 
that of hippocampal patients, which was specifically devoid of spatial references compared to that 
of the hippocampal healthy controls, while EP, SD and TEA categories were intact (see Mullally et 
al. 2012). 
The analysis of z-scores (Figure 11B) confirms that deficits in imagining what would be 
beyond the view differed between vmPFC and hippocampal patients. Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs 
across participant groups (vmPFC patients, hippocampal patients, control patients) revealed 
significant group differences in the number of EP (H = 9.81, p = 0.01), SD (H = 7.50, p = 0.02), and 
SPA (H = 9.39, p = 0.01), but not TEA (p = 0.17). Both vmPFC patients (U = 10.50, Z = -2.58, p = 
0.01, r = 0.61) and hippocampal patients (U = 13.00, Z = -2.10, p = 0.04, r = 0.51) produced fewer 
SPA than controls patients. However, vmPFC patients' reports were also impoverished with regard 
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to EP (U = 6.50, Z = -2.93, p = 0.003, r = 0.69) and SD (U = 15.00, Z = -2.18, p = 0.03, r = 0.51) 
than those of controls patients, whereas hippocampal patients' reports were not (p > 0.13, r < 0.4 in 
both cases). In addition, vmPFC patients produced significantly fewer SD than hippocampal 
patients (U = 8.00, Z = -2.26, p = 0.02, r = 0.58), while SPA and EP were not significantly different 
between vmPFC and hippocampal patients (p > 0.12, r < 0.4 in both cases). 
Figure 11. A: Box-plots of the number of constructed details in the scene probe task, with SPA = spatial references; EP 
= entities present, SD = sensory descriptions; TEA = thoughts/emotions/actions. The data and significance levels 
contrasting patients with hippocampal damage and their controls are from Mullally et al. (2012). B: Box-plots of z-
scores for details produced in the scene probe task for the three patient groups. Bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. Boxplots depict the median, first and third quartiles, and minimum and maximum (whiskers) of the data sets. *p 
< 0.05. 
 
Vividness. Table 13 reports self-rated vividness for the imagined extended scene by patient 
group. A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA on vividness ratings revealed significant differences among 
vmPFC patients, control patients, and vmPFC healthy controls (H = 8.73, p = 0.01), such that 
vmPFC patients (U = 10.00, Z = -2.67, p = 0.01, r = 0.63) and control patients (U = 24.00, Z = 1.97, 
p = 0.049, r = 0.44) judged the extended scene as less vivid than did healthy controls, with no 
difference between vmPFC patients and control patients (p = 0.28, r = 0.25). Hippocampal patients, 
too, rated the extended scenes they had imagined as less vivid than their healthy controls (Mullally 
et al., 2012). When we compared the three patient groups directly using vividness z-scores, we 










































Notes. Median and range (in parentheses) of vividness scores. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Vividness was 
rated using a five-point scale: 1 = not vivid at all…5 = very vivid. 
 
Discussion 
 This study investigated whether vmPFC is involved in rapid, automatic and implicit visual 
scene construction. To examine this, we exploited BE, a cognitive phenomenon whereby, upon 
viewing a scene, individuals automatically construct an internal representation of the scene that 
extends beyond its given borders, which is revealed by the subsequent misremembering of the 
extended scene instead of the original (Intraub, 2012). We contrasted performance of patients with 
vmPFC damage to that of control patients with (mainly) occipital lesions, healthy controls, and the 
hippocampal patients described in Mullally et al. (2012). The results showed that vmPFC patients 
have significantly reduced BE compared to healthy individuals, and the attenuation of BE was 
comparable to that previously observed in hippocampal-damaged patients (Mullally et al., 2012). 
These findings extend previous evidence of impaired scene construction in hippocampal patients by 
showing that vmPFC, alongside the hippocampus, is necessary to automatically construct internal 
representations of (extended) scenes. Importantly, we show that it is not the case that brain damage 
per se disrupts BE. Control patients with lesions located mainly in the occipital cortex (including 
those with and without visual field defects) showed BE that was similar to that of healthy controls.  
 The reduced BE in vmPFC (as well as hippocampal) patients cannot be attributed to a failure 
of memory between study and test, because it indicates that patients were in fact less prone to the 
error of commission made by the healthy controls, and so paradoxically outperformed healthy 
controls in remembering the scenes accurately. Instead, our results suggest that vmPFC (and 
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hippocampal) patients may have a fundamental difficulty with the mental construction of scene 
representations. Before discussing this further, it is important to consider whether the adoption of a 
response heuristic or a tendency towards perseveration on the part of the vmPFC patients may have 
had an impact on our findings. We think it unlikely, because only one vmPFC patient always 
selected the 'same' response option across all trials, and the results do not change if we exclude his 
data from the analyses. Moreover, any tendency towards perseveration should be manifest across 
response types. However, the two vmPFC patients who started with a 'closer up' response did not 
perseverate in responding closer up on the subsequent trials, and instead switched soon to 'same' 
responses, as did the other vmPFC patients following their occasional 'closer up' responses. 
Moreover, vmPFC patients’ rare errors were not random, but were in the same direction as the 
controls’ - they mostly consisted of closer up responses, whereas farther away responses were rare 
in all groups.  
 We propose that reduced BE in the vmPFC patients indicates a problem in the mental 
construction of scenes, consistent with the fact that vmPFC is part of a distributed network of brain 
regions engaged during scene construction (Hassabis et al., 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). That 
vmPFC patients have reduced BE accords with previous evidence that vmPFC patients are impaired 
at constructing personal past and future events, and also future events that involve other people or 
atemporal fictitious events (Bertossi et al, 2016a,b). This is because the ability to mentally construct 
spatially coherent scenes is likely necessary to mentally represent and experience any complex 
event as an alternative to direct (perceptual) experience. In this regard, it is also notable that patients 
with vmPFC damage initiate fewer mind-wandering episodes compared to patients with other brain 
lesions or healthy controls (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016; see also McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & 
Maguire, 2018). Gathering additional convergent evidence for impaired scene construction in 
vmPFC patients from a BE paradigm, however, is particularly important. First, as we have 
demonstrated with the study 2 in the previous chapter, unlike hippocampal patients (Race et al., 
2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2015), vmPFC patients may 
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have impaired narrative skills (Bertossi et al., 2017). This can contribute to their poor descriptions 
of past and future events (Bertossi et al., 2017), but certainly not to their reduced BE, because BE 
does not depend on language. Second, whereas previous research has investigated the voluntary and 
explicit construction of past and novel events in vmPFC patients (Bertossi et al, 2016a,b; Kurczek 
et al., 2015), BE is an automatic phenomenon, and therefore hardly attributable to lack of 
motivation or cognitive resources in vmPFC patients.  
 An important question is whether the role played by vmPFC and hippocampus can be 
differentiated. The results from the scene probe task suggest that they can be. Both patient groups 
proved able to describe the relevant components of the scene in view, but failed when they were 
asked to imagine taking a step back from the current position and describe what might then come 
into view. However, the reports of vmPFC- and hippocampal-damaged patients were qualitatively 
different. Hippocampal patients' reports contained abnormally fewer spatial references but were not 
different from their controls in terms of other types of details. In contrast, vmPFC patients' reports 
were poor not only in terms of spatial references but also in the other types of details, including 
entities present and their sensory details. Thus, scenes lacked primarily spatial coherence in 
hippocampal patients, whereas they additionally lacked content in vmPFC patients, replicating 
previous findings of impoverished simulated future and fictitious experiences (Bertossi et al, 
2016a), and suggesting a more general role for vmPFC in scene construction. Of course, unlike the 
BE task, the scene probe task depends on language, and therefore one concern might be that a 
deficit in narrative ability or generally reduced verbal output may have contributed to a reduction in 
performance, especially in the case of vmPFC patients who produced fewer details of all types. We 
consider this possibility unlikely, however. First, vmPFC patients had normal verbal fluency, and 
no problem describing the scene that was in view. Note also that the number of different types of 
imagined details in the scene probe task (EP, SD, SPA, TEA) did not correlate with each other (p > 
0.35 in all cases) nor with phonemic or semantic fluency (p > 0.27 in both cases). Moreover, in our 
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previously reported study 2, we showed that impaired narrative skills do not explain poor episodic 
future thinking in vmPFC patients (Bertossi et al., 2017).  
 We propose that vmPFC and the hippocampus work in concert during scene construction, by 
playing different but complementary roles (McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2018). 
vmPFC initiates the scene construction process by predicting and then coordinating the activation of 
relevant schematic knowledge (e.g., the prototypical park) (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Ghosh, 
Moscovitch, Melo Colella, & Gilboa, 2014; Van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernandez, & Henson, 2012) 
which the hippocampus uses to build a first, rudimentary spatially coherent representation which 
includes the extended scene. The vmPFC then engages in iterations via feedback loops with 
neocortex and hippocampus, mediating the prediction, retrieval, monitoring, and integration of 
relevant elements from neocortical areas (e.g., what is typically in a park) (Moscovitch, 1992; 
Benoit, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2014; Moscovitch et al., 2016; McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018) 
to enrich the initial spatial sketch with appropriate details, resulting in a complex and content-rich 
scene. This hypothesis is in line with the finding that hippocampal patients can produce appropriate 
scene contents, but these appear to be "floating" in an ill-defined space, whereas vmPFC patients 
produce scenes poor in both spatial context and content. Of course, even though our results indicate 
that vmPFC is necessary to build even single scenes, its contribution is expected to be magnified 
during construction of complex unfolding events (McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018). This is 
because events additionally entail transitions between (and hence the construction of) multiple 
scenes, and the predictions about, and knowledge of, how common events typically unfold (e.g., a 
typical day in the park), which is also supported by medial prefrontal cortex regions (Krueger, 
Barbey, & Grafman, 2009). This may explain why vmPFC patients are particularly poor at 
processing extended mental events (Bertossi et al., 2016b).   
 To conclude, we have found that vmPFC patients show reduced BE, indicating that vmPFC 
is necessary for both explicit and implicit scene construction processes, along with the 
hippocampus. Scenes are the backbone of complex events such that events based on familiar 
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(compared to unfamiliar) scenes are experienced more vividly (de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 
2012; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014). Moreover, individuals who are asked to recall an event have 
been shown to initially set a spatial scene for the subsequent event to reside within (Robin, Wynn, 
& Moscovitch, 2015). Future studies will be needed to establish the precise contribution of the 
vmPFC, and whether it is necessary for all - prediction, retrieval, coordination, monitoring, 
integration of elements from neocortical areas - or just some of the processes involved in scene and 
event construction.  
In particular, if, as we proposed, vmPFC is necessary to initiate the scene construction 
process and to integrate relevant elements to create a content-rich representation of a scene, vmPFC 
patients would be impaired in any task requiring to self-initiate the construction of scenes, be they 
single, as in the present study, or multiple, as in the previous studies requiring to simulate extended 
mental events (Bertossi et al., 2016a,b; Bertossi et al., 2017). Therefore, we speculate that if this 
self-initiation process is supported or supplied by tasks providing structured cues, the scene 
construction impairment shown by vmPFC patients could be circumvented. We test this hypothesis 
in the next study 4, using a scene processing task, which minimizes the self-initiation component of 
scene construction. We will again compare the performance of vmPFC patients to that of 
hippocampal patients, to further understand the different contribution that these two regions provide 











Supplementary Table S1. Summary of hippocampal-damaged patients’ details. 
ID Sex Age 
(yrs) 





M.R. a  R.A. 
(yrs) 
C.F.b Recognition Recall 
A M 63 R University LE 6 99 11 10 10 Unimpaired Impaired  
B M 40 R A-Levels Anoxia 21 112 16 <1 2 Unimpaired Impaired                                                  
C M 37 R University LE 3.5 107 11 ~25 1 Impaired Impaired 
D F 32 R University LE 7 109 13 10 4 Borderline Impaired 
E M 38 R GCSE LE 3.5 99 8 1 1 Impaired Impaired 
F F 40 R University Unknown 22 105 14 18 5 Unimpaired Impaired  
G F 40 L University Unknown 24 105 13 16 5 Unimpaired Impaired  
H’ness = handedness; A-Levels = school examinations taken at the point of leaving secondary school ~18 years of age; 
GCSE = school examinations taken ~14-16 years of age; LE = limbic encephalitis; Chronicity = number of years since 
the illness/incident precipitating the hippocampal damage/memory loss; a = Scaled score, Matrix Reasoning subtest of 
the WAIS-III; b = Complex Figure (Rey-Osterrieth /BMIBP) delayed recall (percentile score); R.A. = Retrograde 






Supplementary Table S2. Mean percentage of accurate responses in visual detection and visual search tasks (Bolognini, 
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Control patients with 
left hemisphere 
lesions 
34* 92 86 97 100 100 
Control patients with 
right hemisphere 
lesions 
98 58* 98 92 89 100 








Supplementary Figure S1. 
 
Extent and overlap of brain lesions for the control patients. The figure represents the patients’ lesions projected on the 
same six axial slices of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The white horizontal lines on the sagittal 
view are the positions of the axial slices, and the red numbers below the axial views are the z coordinates of each slice. 
The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurred in BA 21-22, 37, 19. The left 
hemisphere is on the left side. 
Supplementary Figure S2. 
 
Lesion characterisation in the hippocampal-damaged patients. (A) An example high-resolution T2-weighted scan from a 
hippocampal patient and one of their matched controls. The outer boundary of the hippocampus is illustrated in red for 
the patient and blue for the control. (B) Volumetric measurements were extracted from the manually segmented medial 
temporal lobe regions. Significant reductions in hippocampal volume were observed in the patient group relative to the 
matched control group (***p < 0.001). By contrast, no significant volume differences were found in the 
parahippocampal or entorhinal/perirhinal cortices. (C) An automated VBM analysis was performed to identify regions, 
at a whole-brain level, where grey matter volume differed significantly between the control and patient groups. 
Selective reductions in grey matter volume were observed in the patients, relative to the control group, only in the left 
and right hippocampus (images are displayed at P < 0.05 uncorrected). 
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Supplementary Material - Example Descriptions. 
Example responses on the scene probe task ("If you were taking the picture and you took a few steps backwards, what 
do you think would come into view?").  
vmPFC patient n.6: “If it [the picture] expands enough, there will be some people, children playing, there are some 
branches, quite big, I am not sure if it is possible to see whether it has any fruit, but I do not think it does.” 
Control patient n.7: “I imagine that if I get farther, there could be a small artificial lake in front of the bench, where 
there might be small colored carps, or some water lilies or some water hyacinths, anybody can sit on the bench to relax, 
watching the water. On one side there could be a fountain, which would delimit this lake, and on the other side there 
could be a small flatter and a free area where kids play and parents, seated on the bench, watch them. Farther away, you 
can see better the roof of the house, the visible part seems like a skylight, I imagine the high part as quite pointy, tilted, 
similar to a Nordic environment, and the attic windows and another chimney on the left are also visible.” 
Healthy control n.7: “I could see a trash can on one side, a lamppost, it's a lamppost working also as a trash can. I could 
also see a Coke can on the ground. Maybe the border of a pavement, cobbled with bricks, like cement covered with 
stones. If I went farther, I would see a bigger portion of the house, maybe one more window. On this side there could be 


















Study 4. Constructive and semantic scene processing following damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex or hippocampus. 
Co-authored with Cornelia McCormick, Clive R. Rosenthal, Thomas D. Miller, Elisa Ciaramelli, 
and Eleanor A. Maguire. 
(De Luca F, McCormick C, Rosenthal CR, Miller TD, Ciaramelli E, Maguire EA. Under revision, Hippocampus) 
Introduction 
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the hippocampus are interconnected brain 
regions that form part of a wider network that supports key cognitive functions including 
autobiographical memory, future-thinking and spatial navigation (Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 
2006; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). 
Patients with either bilateral vmPFC or hippocampal damage exhibit significant impairments across 
all of these domains (Maguire, Nannery, & Spiers, 2006; Ciaramelli, 2008; McCormick, Ciaramelli, 
De Luca, & Maguire, 2018). Given that the vmPFC and hippocampus seem to be critical for many 
of the same cognitive functions, this begs the question as to the nature of their specific 
contributions. This is important to establish if we are to gain a full understanding of how functions 
such as memory and future-thinking are instantiated in the brain. McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al. 
(2018) recently reviewed the neuropsychological literature with a specific focus on the effects of 
either bilateral vmPFC or hippocampal lesions. While they documented the impairment parallels, 
they also noted that the reasons for the deficits appeared to be different for the two types of patients.   
Hippocampal-damaged patients (‘hippocampal patients’) have problems recalling the past 
and imagining the future, but they also cannot imagine even a single static scene. A scene is defined 
as a naturalistic three-dimensional spatially coherent representation of the world typically populated 
by objects and viewed from an egocentric perspective (Maguire & Mullally, 2013; Dalton, 
Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2018). This inability to construct scene imagery has been 
proposed to be a primary function of the hippocampus, and a vital ingredient for the proper 
operation of autobiographical memory, future-thinking and spatial navigation (Hassabis & Maguire, 
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2007; Maguire & Mullally, 2013; Zeidman & Maguire, 2016). Given that scene imagery is 
deployed widely across cognition, hippocampal patients should show deficits wherever scene 
imagery is required or is advantageous. Indeed, this is what has been found, with altered decision-
making (McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2016), mind-wandering (McCormick, 
Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2018) and scene perception (Lee et al., 2005; Mullally, Intraub, & 
Maguire, 2012) compared to healthy controls. Of note, while able to describe pictures of scenes 
accurately (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013), when asked to 
imagine what might be beyond the view in a scene, hippocampal patients could generate 
appropriate details, but their descriptions lacked spatial references and they could not visualise what 
was beyond the borders of the scene image (Mullally et al., 2012). 
On the face of it, patients with vmPFC damage (‘vmPFC patients’) seem to have highly 
similar problems as hippocampal patients, even down to apparently poor scores on a scene 
construction test (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016). However, some points of 
divergence are notable. For example, unlike hippocampal patients, those with vmPFC lesions may 
show confabulation – the unintentional production of false memories (Whitlock, 1981; Moscovitch, 
1995; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Johnson, O’Connor, & Cantor, 1997; Ciaramelli, Ghetti, 
Frattarelli, & Làdavas, 2006). vmPFC patients also fail to generate as many autobiographical event 
memories as healthy controls during free recall tasks (Della Sala, Laiacona, Spinnler, & Trivelli, 
1993; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016). 
However, again, in contrast to hippocampal patients, vmPFC patients could accurately recall and 
describe specific individual scenes from autobiographical events if cued (Jake Kurczek et al., 2015). 
This suggests that they may retain a basic capacity for generating scene imagery when sufficiently 
cued (given their intact hippocampi). By contrast, we have shown in previous study 3 that when 
they were provided with a scene photograph and had to imagine what might be beyond the view, 
they were impaired at generating appropriate details of any kind (De Luca et al., 2018). In 
considering this and other evidence from across cognition, McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al. (2018) 
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concluded that while vmPFC lesions seem to leave patients able to react to external stimuli, they are 
impaired at initiating the endogenous processing needed for selecting and curating the appropriate 
content required for memory recall and scene construction.  
A recently-developed task could provide further insights into the roles played by the vmPFC 
and hippocampus. McCormick et al.’s (2017) paradigm involves detecting either semantic (e.g., an 
elephant with butterflies for ears) or constructive (e.g., an endless staircase) violations in realistic 
scene images. Therefore, scene images can be semantically or constructively ‘possible’ or 
‘impossible’.  Of note, the perceptual and general requirements of the tasks are comparable for the 
two types of scene. Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage were unimpaired when compared 
with control participants at judging whether scenes were semantically possible or impossible.  
However, they were significantly impaired at deciding if scenes were constructively possible or 
impossible. Control participants indicated during a post-task debriefing that they constructed 
flexible mental representations of the scenes in order to make constructive judgements.  In contrast, 
the focus of the hippocampal patients was typically on specific fragments of the scenes, and there 
was little to suggest they constructed internal scene models. This finding adds further credence to 
the idea that the specific aspect of scene processing that is hippocampal-dependent appears to be the 
internal construction of scene imagery. 
 In the current study, we used the same possible/impossible scenes task to determine how 
patients with bilateral vmPFC damage would perform. If McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al.’s (2018) 
suggestion is correct, then with all of the information in front of them, and with an intact ability to 
construct scene imagery when heavily cued (i.e. by the scene stimuli), vmPFC patients should be 
able to detect impossibilities, be they constructive or semantic. This would be in clear contrast to 





Twenty-four patients took part in the experiment. Eight patients had vmPFC damage (six 
males, mean age = 59.25 years, range = 46-74; see Table 14 for demographic and clinical 
information), and ten ‘control patients’ had brain damage that did not involve vmPFC or the 
hippocampus (eight males, mean age = 59.10 years, range = 45–77 years; Table 14). We also 
considered data from six patients who had hippocampal damage (all males, mean age = 57.00 years, 
range = 27–70 years). vmPFC and control patients were Italian and were recruited at the Centre for 
Studies and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy. Hippocampal patients were British 
and were tested at the Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, 
UK. The background details of the hippocampal patients and their scores on the possible/impossible 
scenes task have already been reported in McCormick et al. (2017) (for convenience, background 
details are summarized in Table 15).  
Brain damage in vmPFC patients was bilateral in all cases and resulted from the rupture of 
an anterior communicating artery (ACoA) aneurysm. In control patients, brain damage (left 
hemisphere: five cases; right hemisphere: five cases) was due to stroke (six cases), arteriovenous 
malformations (one case), intraparenchymal bleeding (one case), cerebral abscess (one case) or 
meningioma (one case). Lesion sites in control patients included the occipital cortex, occipital-
temporal and occipital-parietal area, and lateral aspects of prefrontal cortex (see Supplementary 
Information Figure S3, and more on this below). The hippocampal-damaged patients’ lesions were 
focal and bilateral (see Table 15 and McCormick et al., 2017). All patients were in a stable phase of 
health (see Tables 14 and 15 for information about chronicity), and had no other diagnoses likely to 
affect cognition or interfere with participation in the study (e.g., significant psychiatric disease, 
alcohol abuse, history of cerebrovascular disease).  
Ten Italian healthy individuals (vmPFC healthy controls; all males; mean age = 57.90 years, 
range = 44-62; see Table 14) were matched to the vmPFC and control patients on age (F(2,25) = 0.07, 
p = 0.94), education (F(2,25) = 0.00, p = 1.00), and gender balance (vmPFC: χ² = 2.81, p = 0.09; 
control patients: χ² = 2.22, p = 0.14). The hippocampal patients were matched with twelve British 
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healthy individuals (hippocampal healthy controls; all males, mean age = 57.17 years, range = 31–
77; see Table 15 and McCormick et al., 2017) on age (t = -0.02, p = 0.98), IQ (t = -0.75, p = 0.46) 
and gender balance (χ² = 0.00, p = 1.00). Healthy control participants were not taking psychoactive 
drugs and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history.  
Participants gave informed consent in accordance with the Bioethical Committee of the 
University of Bologna, the CEIIAV Ethical Committee of Emilia Romagna Regional Health 
Service, and the National Research Ethics Committee (London, Queen Square, UK), and in line 
with the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991). 
Table 14. Demographic and clinical data of vmPFC patients, control patients, and vmPFC healthy controls. 
 
vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; M = male; F = female; SPM = Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices; ROCF 
= Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure. Mean corrected scores (in all cases within normal limits), with the standard deviation 
of the mean in parentheses.  
 
Table 15. Background summary of hippocampal patients and healthy controls from McCormick et al. (2017). 
Full details are provided in McCormick et al. (2017). Mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses. *Significant 
difference between the groups. M = male; LHE = left hippocampal volume; RHC = right hippocampal volume; WASI-
M = Matrix Reasoning and WASI-S = Similarities subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999). z-scores = individual tests have been transformed into z-scores and averaged across patients and 
controls within specific neuropsychological domain. Therefore, a mean z-score of zero indicates that both groups had 
the same mean. IRM = immediate recall memory: Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997), logical 
memory 1 units and thematic scores, wordlist 1 total recall, and Rey-Osterrieth complex figure immediate recall 
(Osterrieth, 1944). DRM = delayed recall memory: WMS-III logical memory 2 units and thematic scores, and Rey-
Osterrieth complex figure delayed recall. RM = recognition memory: Warrington Recognition Memory Test for words 





































































































































































Table 14 shows the vmPFC and control patients’ neuropsychological profile. In general the 
vmPFC and control patients’ cognitive functioning was preserved, as indicated by their scores on 
the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices (see Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987, for normative data) and 
verbal fluency (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), which were within the average range for both groups. 
vmPFC and control patients also had intact verbal and spatial short-term memory, as assessed with 
the digit span and Corsi tests (Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), and verbal and spatial long-term 
memory, as assessed with prose recall and recall of the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (Spinnler and 
Tognoni, 1987). The copy of the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure was also normal (Spinnler and 
Tognoni, 1987). Direct comparison of the vmPFC patients and control patients showed comparable 
scores in the above neuropsychological tests (p’s > 0.10 in all cases). In some cases, control patients 
with posterior lesions had visual field deficits, including hemianopia (in six cases), quadrantopia (in 
one case) and neglect (in one case). In these patients, however, the detection of visual stimuli in 
standardized tests was not impaired when eye movements were allowed (as was the case in the 
present experiment), and visual search performance was within normal limits (see Supplementary 
Table S3). We were, therefore, confident that they would be able to perform the possible/impossible 
scenes task.  
 As detailed in McCormick et al. (2017; see also Table 15), the hippocampal patients 
displayed an impairment in immediate and delayed memory recall, and they recollected 
significantly fewer episodic, but not semantic, details on the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et 
al., 2002). There were no significant differences between patients and controls on general cognitive 
ability – which was above average as measured by tasks such as the Matrix Reasoning subtest of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) – and on a range of 





vmPFC and control patients’ individual lesions, derived from magnetic resonance imaging 
or computerized tomography images, were manually drawn by an expert neurologist (not involved 
in the present study, and blind to task performance), or by F.D.L, and then verified by the same 
neurologist, directly on each slice of the normalized T1-weighted template MRI scan from the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (Holmes et al., 1998). This template is approximately oriented to 
match Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and is distributed with MRIcro (Rorden & 
Brett, 2000). This manual procedure combines segmentation (identification of lesion boundaries) 
and registration (to a standard template) into a single step, with no additional transformation 
required (Kimberg et al., 2007). MRIcro software was used to estimate lesion volumes (in cc) and 
generate lesion overlap images. Figure 12 shows the extent and overlap of brain lesions in the 
vmPFC patients. The Brodmann's areas (BA) that were mainly affected were BA 10, BA 11, BA 
24, BA 25, BA 32, with the region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 11 (M = 16.22 cc, SD = 
10.23), BA 10 (M = 9.42 cc, SD = 7.80), and BA 32 (M = 6.71 cc, SD = 5.22). One vmPFC patient 
had a very large lesion that extended to dorsal prefrontal cortex (BA 6 and BA 8). Excluding this 
patient from the analyses, however, did not alter the results. For the control patients, the areas 
mainly affected were BAs 17-19 (M = 13.77 cc, SD = 19.42), BAs 20-22 and BA 37 (M = 4.49 cc, 
SD = 10.21) (see Supplementary Figure S3). There was no significant difference in lesion volume 
between vmPFC patients and control patients (46.27 vs. 24.22 cc, t = 1.74, p = 0.10).  
The hippocampal patients had selective bilateral hippocampal damage as confirmed by 
manual segmentation of the hippocampi and whole-brain grey matter analyses as described in 
McCormick et al. (2017) and summarized in Table 15. 
Figure 12. Lesion overlap in the vmPFC patients. Representative axial slices and cumulative midsagittal views of the 
standard Montreal Neurological Institute brain showing the extent of lesion overlap in the vmPFC patients. The white 
horizontal lines on the sagittal view are the positions of the axial slices, and the red numbers below the axial views are 
the x coordinates of each slice. The colour bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurred 






The stimuli were those used in McCormick et al. (2017) – see Figure 13. The images for the 
main experiment were closely matched between the semantic and the constructive conditions in 
their format (horizontal: 450 pixels (high) X 600 pixels (wide), vertical: 600 X 450 pixels; on 
average 10 vertical images per condition, range 8 to 12) and type (e.g., whether they were 
photographs or paintings; on average 13.5 paintings per condition, range 12 to 14). All images were 
in color, except one semantic possible scene and one semantic impossible scene. The content of the 
images was carefully matched across the semantic and constructive conditions (e.g., a possible and 
an impossible semantic landscape or a possible and an impossible constructive tower).  
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be viewing pictures of scenes on a computer screen 
one at a time and that they should examine these pictures carefully because some of the scenes 
would depict something impossible that they should detect. First, examples of semantic and 
constructive violations were shown to the participants, ensuring that they understood what was 
meant by these errors, with experimenters using various synonyms of the word “impossible” (e.g., 
“not quite right,” “odd,” “highly unlikely”). For the semantic violations, the content of an image 
was wrong in some way (e.g., an elephant with butterfly ears, flying on clouds, breathing under 
water). For constructive violations, an image depicted a spatially implausible scene (e.g., wrong 
perspectives, endless staircases). During the task, participants were presented with one scene image 
at a time and were simply asked to decide whether they thought the current scene depicted 
something that was possible or impossible in the real world and to indicate their response via a key 
press. They were not explicitly told whether a picture belonged to the semantic or constructive 
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condition. Before the main experiment, participants underwent a practice session, comprising eight 
images (two per condition). Each image was presented for three seconds at the center of the screen, 
then the question “Is this scene possible or impossible?” appeared underneath it. Participants had up 
to an additional 20 s to look at the scene image and question, and indicated their decision by 
pressing either key number 1 (possible) or 3 (impossible). Following each possible/impossible 
decision, participants were asked to rate how difficult they found it to decide whether a scene was 
possible or impossible (1 = not difficult at all, 2 = somewhat difficult, 3 = very difficult), and how 
confident they were in their decision on a rating scale (1 = not confident at all, 2 = somewhat 
confident, 3 = very confident). They were then prompted to press the space bar to proceed to the 
next scene image. For both difficulty and confidence ratings, participants had a maximum of 15 
seconds to respond. During this practice session, the experimenter provided verbal feedback for 
each image, explaining the difference between stimuli categories if there were any mistakes in 
assigning an image to either the possible or impossible category, until the participant comprehended 
the task instructions.  
After the completion of the practice session, participants performed the main task, which 
was identical to the practice session, but consisted of two blocks each containing 50 images (25 
semantic and 25 constructive). The images were presented in pseudo random order so that no more 
than two images of the same condition were presented consecutively. The experiment was run using 
Cogent 2000 version 125 (Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, and Institute of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK). Completion of the practice and main experiment took 
participants about 50 minutes, including breaks. 
Figure 13. Example stimuli from the possible/impossible scenes task. Semantic scenes are presented in the upper two 
panels. The possible semantic scene depicts a woman hanging up some laundry, whereas the impossible semantic scene 
below shows a woman vacuuming the leaves from a tree, which would not happen in the real world. The lower two 
panels depict examples of constructive scenes. On the left side of the panel, a possible constructive scene includes a 
typical pavilion, whereas an impossible constructive scene beneath shows arches that would not be possible to build in 
the real world. Specifically, the top connecting structure suggests a flat architecture yet the columns of the arches are 
located at different depths within the scene. 












Given that in all cases the dependent variables were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov d > 0.10, p > 0.05), behavioral data were analyzed with parametric tests. We first 
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compared vmPFC patients with vmPFC healthy controls and control patients. We also compared 
the three patient groups directly.  In this regard, we were cognizant of the fact that while the vmPFC 
participants (patients, control patients, healthy controls) were matched on education level and 
performed within the average range on tests such as the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices 
(Spinnler and Tognoni, 1987), the performance of hippocampal patients and their controls was 
above average on similar tests (e.g. Matrix Reasoning; Wechsler, 1999). Therefore, we made direct 
comparisons between the three patient groups using z-scores. These were obtained by subtracting 
each patient's score from the average score of their respective healthy control group (vmPFC 
healthy controls for vmPFC patients and control patients, and hippocampal healthy controls for 
hippocampal patients), divided by the standard deviation of the healthy control group. By 
comparing the z-scores across patient groups in this way, we controlled for differences in general 
intellectual level.  
Comparisons involving three participant groups were analyzed with separate two-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with participant group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (vmPFC patients, control patients, vmPFC healthy controls; or vmPFC, 
hippocampal and control patients, depending on the analysis), and scene category as a within-
subjects factor with two levels (semantic, constructive). Post-hoc comparisons were analyzed with 
Newman-Keuls tests. All tests were two-tailed, and differences were considered statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. 
Results 
For each of the variables we measured, we first present the results of the comparison 
between the vmPFC patients, the control patients and their healthy controls. We then report the 
direct comparison of the vmPFC patients, the control patients and McCormick et al.’s (2017) 





We first examined the accuracy data for the vmPFC patients, the control patients and their 
healthy controls (Figure 14; see also Supplementary Figure S4). The ANOVA run on the frequency 
of correct responses for the two scene categories (semantic, constructive) did not show a significant 
main effect of group [F(2,25) = 0.68, p = 0.52] or an interaction between participant group and scene 
category [F(2,25) = 0.93, p = 0.41]. We observed a significant main effect of scene category [F(1,25) = 
16.78, p < 0.001], reflecting higher accuracy for semantic compared to constructive scenes across 
groups (p < 0.001). Overall, these results indicate that vmPFC patients were not impaired at 
detecting semantic or constructive violations compared to their healthy controls. This was also the 
case for control patients who had damage outside of the vmPFC. Thus, brain damage per se is not 
sufficient to cause a deficit in identifying impossibilities in scenes. However, as reported by 
McCormick et al. (2017), hippocampal damaged patients were impaired on this task (also shown in 
Figure 14 for convenience), specifically in terms of detecting constructive impossibilities. 
Figure 14. Accuracy results for all participants groups. Mean accuracy raw scores by participant group for the two scene 
conditions (semantic, constructive). The data and significance levels contrasting patients with hippocampal damage and 
their healthy controls are from McCormick et al. (2017). Bars represent standard errors of the mean. *p < 0.05.  
 
To compare accuracy directly across vmPFC patients, control patients and hippocampal 
patients, we conducted an ANOVA on the transformed (z-scores) correct responses, with participant 
group (vmPFC patients, control patients and hippocampal patients) and scene category (semantic, 
constructive) as factors (Figure 15; see also Supplementary Figure S5). This showed no significant 
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effect of participant group [F(2,21) = 0.56, p = 0.58], but a significant effect of scene category [F(1,21) 
= 15.81, p < 0.001], which was qualified by a significant interaction between participant group and 
scene category [F(2,21) = 4.17, p = 0.03]. Post-hoc tests revealed that hippocampal patients had lower 
accuracy for constructive scenes compared to vmPFC patients (p = 0.04) and, marginally, control 
patients (p = 0.06), whereas there was no difference between vmPFC and control patients (p = 
0.81). In contrast, accuracy for semantic scenes was comparable across the three patient groups (p’s 
> 0.59 in all comparisons). Furthermore, hippocampal patients exhibited a lower accuracy for 
constructive compared to semantic scenes (p < 0.01), whereas vmPFC and control patients reported 
a comparable level of accuracy across scene categories (p = 0.63 and p = 0.49, respectively). 
Figure 15. Accuracy – comparison of the three patient groups. Mean accuracy z-scores for the three patient groups for 
the two scene conditions. Bars represent standard errors of the mean. *p < 0.05. 
 
Reaction times  
Table 16 (see also Supplementary Table S4) shows mean reaction times (RTs) by participant 
group. The ANOVA on RTs with participant group (vmPFC patients, control patients and vmPFC 
healthy controls) and scene category (semantic, constructive) as factors did not show a significant 
main effect of group [F(2,25) = 0.56, p = 0.58] or a significant interaction between participant group 
and scene category [F(2,25) = 0.92, p = 0.41]. We found a significant main effect of scene category 
[F(1,25) = 44.68, p < 0.0001], with all participants being faster at judging semantic compared to 




Table 16. Reaction times, difficulty and confidence ratings on the possible/impossible scenes task by participant group 
and scene category (semantic, constructive). 
 



























































































Notes. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. For all groups, means are displayed with standard deviations in 
parentheses. RT = reaction times, calculated from the onset of the ‘possible/impossible’ question; sec = seconds. 
Difficulty and confidence ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 3 (very difficult/confident). Z-scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean score of their respective healthy control group from each patient's score, divided by the standard 
deviation of the respective healthy control group. 
 
Direct comparison of the three patients groups using an ANOVA on z-scores for RTs (Table 
16) with participant group (vmPFC patients, control patients, hippocampal patients) and scene 
category (semantic, constructive) as factors did not show any significant effect of group [F(2,21) = 
0.38, p = 0.69], scene category [F(1,21) = 1.42, p = 0.25] or participant group x scene category 
interaction [F(2,21) = 1.16, p = 0.33].  
Difficulty  
Mean difficulty ratings are shown on Table 16 (see also Supplementary Table S4). The 
ANOVA conducted on difficulty scores with participant group (vmPFC patients, control patients 
and vmPFC healthy controls) and scene category (semantic, constructive) did not show a significant 
main effect of group [F(2,25) = 0.06, p = 0.94] or a significant interaction between participant group 
and scene category [F(2,25) = 2.13, p = 0.14]. We found a significant main effect of scene category 
[F(1,25) = 33.81, p < 0.0001], with all participants judging processing semantic (versus constructive) 
scenes as less difficult (p < 0.001). 
Direct comparison of the three patients groups using an ANOVA on z-scores for the 
difficulty rating with participant group (vmPFC patients, control patients, hippocampal patients) 
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and scene category (semantic, constructive) as factors did not show any significant effect of group 
[F(2,20) = 0.68, p = 0.52], scene category [F(1,20) = 0.00, p = 1.00] or participant group x scene 
category interaction [F(2,20) = 1.04, p = 0.37]. 
Confidence  
Mean confidence ratings are shown on Table 16 (see also Supplementary Table S4). The 
ANOVA conducted on confidence scores with group (vmPFC patients, control patients and vmPFC 
healthy controls) and scene category (semantic, constructive) as factors showed significant main 
effects of group [F(2,25) = 3.95, p = 0.03] and scene category [F(1,25) = 42.20, p < 0.0001], qualified 
by a significant participant group x scene category interaction [F(2,25) = 3.59, p = 0.04]. Post-hoc 
tests revealed that vmPFC patients (p = 0.03) and, marginally, control patients (p = 0.06) were less 
confident than vmPFC healthy controls in their decisions for constructive scenes, but not for 
semantic scenes (p’s > 0.19 in both cases). There were no differences between vmPFC patients and 
control patients in confidence for either semantic or constructive scenes (all p’s > 0.39). 
Furthermore, both vmPFC and control patients were less confident in their decisions for 
constructive compared to semantic scenes (in both cases, p < 0.001), whereas vmPFC healthy 
controls reported a comparable level of confidence across the two categories (p = 0.08). 
Comparing the three patient groups directly using an ANOVA on z-scores for the 
confidence ratings with participant group (vmPFC patients, control patients, hippocampal patients) 
and scene category (semantic, constructive) as factors did not show any significant effect of group 
[F(2,20) = 2.14, p = 0.14], scene category [F(1,20) = 0.03, p = 0.87] or participant group x scene 
category interaction [F(2,20) = 1.03, p = 0.38]. 
Discussion 
In this study we investigated the contribution of the vmPFC to different aspects of scene processing 
by asking patients with bilateral vmPFC lesions to detect either semantic or constructive violations 
(‘impossibilities’) in naturalistic scenes. We found no evidence for statistically significant 
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differences between the vmPFC patients, brain damaged control patients and healthy controls in the 
accuracy of their performance, their reaction times or the perceived difficulty of the tasks. This 
suggests that, as predicted, vmPFC patients could process these scenes, even where an internal 
scene model is thought to be required, as in the case of the constructive scenes. The similar 
performance of the vmPFC patients for semantic and constructive scenes, and the analogous data 
from the brain-damaged control patients, suggests that the vmPFC may not play a specific role in 
scene processing, at least as it was tested here. This result is in contrast to the hippocampal patients 
reported by McCormick et al. (2017) on the same task, who could detect semantic violations but 
had a deficit in detecting constructive violations relative to their healthy controls. This suggests an 
imbalance in semantic and constructive scene processing in such patients that speaks to a specific 
role for the hippocampus in scene construction.  
 Before discussing these results further, it is prudent to consider some methodological points. 
The vmPFC patients, their patient controls and healthy controls were all closely matched to each 
other in terms of demographic variables. This was also true for the hippocampal patients and their 
healthy controls. However, while being matched in terms of age, the three vmPFC-related groups 
were not comparable to the two hippocampal-related groups in terms of general intellectual 
functioning, with the hippocampal groups scoring above average. The fact that the three vmPFC-
related groups scored similarly on all of the tasks but overall scored lower than the two 
hippocampal-related groups may be associated with this point, suggesting that the 
possible/impossible scenes task is affected by factors such as education. Indeed, an example of this 
is when one vmPFC healthy control participant was suspicious when he was shown a picture of the 
northern lights. He (wrongly) concluded that the scene was impossible because he reasoned that in 
nature one never sees a green sky. While we acknowledge that it would be preferable to match all 
patients and controls in terms of education and general intellectual level, the patients in question are 
so rare that one has to test whatever patients are available. It is therefore important, as we have done 
here, to examine each patient group versus the relevant healthy control group first, and then use 
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these transformed scores when comparing the patient groups directly. In this context, we found that 
there were no differences between vmPFC, control and hippocampal patients in their accuracy in 
detecting semantic violations in scenes, reaction times, perceived task difficulty, and confidence. 
The only difference was the hippocampal patients being impaired at detecting constructive 
violations in scenes. This was not the case for the other patient groups, even the control patients 
who had occipital lesions and hemianopias.  
Although apparently at odds with extant studies that reported a scene construction 
impairment in patients with vmPFC damage (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, 
& Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017; De Luca et al., 2018), in fact 
our finding of vmPFC patients' preserved detection of semantic and constructive violations in 
scenes helps to specify more precisely the role of the vmPFC in scene imagery. Moreover, these 
results highlight differences in the respective contributions of the vmPFC and hippocampus to scene 
processing. The standard scene construction task requires the imagination of scenes (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007), and although cues are provided, it is still relatively 
unconstrained, much as is imagining what might be beyond the view in scenes (Mullally, Intraub, & 
Maguire, 2012; De Luca et al., 2018) and the free recall of autobiographical memories (Bertossi, 
Tesini, et al., 2016). vmPFC patients are impaired on all of these tasks. However, they can describe 
specifically cued snapshot scenes from autobiographical memories (Kurczek et al., 2015). As we 
have shown here, vmPFC patients can detect constructive violations in scenes, which is known to 
provoke the formation of internal scene models in healthy controls (McCormick et al., 2017). This 
is because in order to detect a constructive violation, one has to visualise how the correct scene 
would look, and then use this internal scene model to compare to the scene stimulus. This is not 
necessary for detecting semantic violations in scenes, which involves instead the retrieval of 
congruent abstract knowledge of the world, necessary to understand semantic relationships between 
elements of the scene and infer its meaning, rather than the construction of an internal model of the 
scene (McCormick et al., 2017). Our findings are, therefore, concordant with the idea that vmPFC 
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patients have an intact ability to construct scene imagery when everything they need to perform a 
task is in front of them, and any requirement for endogenous, self-initiating processing (such as the 
need to construct an internal scene model) is cued (McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 
2018).   
Hippocampal patients, on the other hand, seem to have a fundamental deficit in the 
formation of scene imagery (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Race, Keane, & 
Verfaellie, 2011; Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012; Kurczek et al., 2015; De Luca et al., 2018). 
For example, in the scene construction task, they could generate appropriate details that would be 
associated with a scene, but they were unable to incorporate this information into spatially coherent 
scene imagery of the type required to detect constructive violations in the task we report here.    
 The contrasting problems faced by vmPFC and hippocampal patients are evident not just in 
the current tasks and in a mnemonic context, but are manifest across cognition. In our review 
(McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018), we discuss this in detail, but one example illustrates this 
point clearly. We all engage in mind-wandering, where we mentally decouple from the external 
world and focus on endogenous processing (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). vmPFC patients have been found to mind-wander 
much less than matched healthy controls (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016), and seemed to have 
difficulty directing their attention inwards. Hippocampal patients mind-wandered as much as 
matched healthy controls, so had no difficulty focusing their attention inwards (McCormick, 
Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2018). However, whereas controls thought about the past, present 
and future, imagining vivid visual scenes, hippocampal damage resulted in thoughts primarily about 
the present comprising verbally-mediated semantic knowledge. Thus, while vmPFC and 
hippocampal patients seem to share many of the same deficits, the underlying reasons may be 
different. Unlike hippocampal patients, vmPFC patients do not seem to initiate endogenous 
processing related to the accessing, filtering and curating of the contents of cognition. However, 
when the need for such processing is circumvented, because the presentation of a test item provides 
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a highly specific cue as to which internal model of a scene to activate, as in our possible/impossible 
scenes task here, then a deficit is no longer apparent. 
While we have largely focussed so far on the constructive scene task, it also interesting that 
the vmPFC patients correctly and quickly identified semantic impossibilities in scenes. The vmPFC 
has been linked with retrieval (Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000) or selection 
(Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997) of information from semantic memory. BA 
11 and 47 are active during categorisation (Jennings, McIntosh, Kapur, Tulving, & Houle, 1997) 
and generation (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995) of words, lexical decisions 
about abstract versus concrete words (Binder, Westbury, & McKiernan, 2005), processing of 
famous faces and names (Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998; Woodard et al., 2007) and the semantic recall 
of object representations (Assaf et al., 2006). Therefore, vmPFC is considered one of the three main 
brain areas specialised for storage and retrieval of semantic knowledge, along with posterior 
heteromodal association cortex (angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus) and 
lateral temporal cortices (Binder et al., 2009; Chadwick et al., 2016; McAndrews, Girard, Wilkins, 
& McCormick, 2016).  
In line with these findings, it has been proposed that the vmPFC might instantiate 
superordinate knowledge structures that reflect abstracted commonalities across multiple 
experiences – so called schemas (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017). The vmPFC is 
thought to activate context-relevant schemas that are used to guide memory retrieval or store new 
information (Gilboa et al., 2006; Warren, Jones, Duff, & Tranel, 2014; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017), 
playing a crucial role in memory formation and integration (Van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernandez, & 
Henson, 2012; Schlichting & Preston, 2015). The discrimination between possible and impossible 
semantic scenes could require the re-activation of memory schemas congruent with the observed 
scene in order to understand what is typical in a given scenario. However, the vmPFC patients in 
the present study easily distinguished between possible and impossible semantic scenes, and 
correctly felt what was right or wrong in a scene. This may speak against a schema account of 
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vmPFC, or at least call for a specification of what aspect of a schema is supported by vmPFC (the 
knowledge of schema-congruent elements, or of the 'scripts' that prescribe the appropriate 
transitions between different aspects of experiences, etc.) to be investigated in future studies. It is 
also possible, however, that the semantic scene impossibilities were sufficiently obvious to be 
identified without requiring reinstatement of detailed knowledge-based schemas, or that schema-
related (Ghosh et al., 2009) and feeling of rightness deficits (Gilboa et al., 2006) are only 
observable in vmPFC patients with confabulation, which was not present in the vmPFC patients 
tested here.  
In conclusion, we have shown that patients with damage to the vmPFC can identify both 
constructive and semantic violations in scenes, in contrast to patients with focal hippocampal 
lesions, who were selectively impaired at detecting constructive scene impossibilities. These 
findings suggest that vmPFC patients can accurately perceive scenes, appreciate their spatial-
constructive nature, extract meaning and make semantic judgements about them in the presence of 
very specific cues (in this case the scene stimuli themselves). However, they might be particularly 
impaired during unconstrained tasks that have the requirement for selecting appropriate mental 
representations or responses, inhibiting those that are competing but irrelevant, using schematic 















Supplementary Table S3. Mean percentage of accurate responses in visual detection and visual search tasks (Bolognini, 
Rasi, Coccia, & Làdavas, 2005; Passamonti, Bertini, & Làdavas, 2009) for control patients with hemianopia (N = 8). 
Test 
Visual detection: 









 R L R L 
  
Control patients with 
left hemisphere lesions 
(N = 4) 
64* 92 88 97 100 100 
Control patients with 
right hemisphere 
lesions 
(N = 3) § 
97 81 99 89 96 100 
Notes. R = right hemifield, L = left hemifield. The visual detection and search tasks are from Bolognini et al., 2005. 
Asterisks highlight a pathological performance. The performance is considered within the normal range if it reaches 






Supplementary Table S4. Reaction times, difficulty and confidence ratings on the possible/impossible scenes task by 
participant group decomposed into four scene categories. 
 




















































































1.1 (0.1)  
















Possible semantic  
Impossible semantic 
Possible constructive 
























































Notes. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. For all groups, means are displayed with standard deviations in 
parentheses. RT = reaction times, calculated from the onset of the ‘possible/impossible’ question; sec = seconds. 
Difficulty and confidence ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 3 (very difficult/confident). Z-scores were calculated by 
subtracting the mean score of their respective healthy control group from each patient's score, divided by the standard 






Supplementary Figure S3 
 
Extent and overlap of brain lesions for the control patients. The figure represents the patients’ lesions projected on the 
same six axial slices of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute brain as shown in Figure 1. The white horizontal 
lines on the sagittal view are the positions of the axial slices, and the red numbers below the axial views are the z 
coordinates of each slice. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. Maximal overlap occurred in BA’s 
17-19, 37. The left hemisphere is on the left side. 
 
Supplementary Figure S4 
 
Mean accuracy raw scores by participant group for the tasks when decomposed into four scene categories (semantic 
possible, semantic impossible, constructive possible, and constructive impossible). The data and significance level (*p < 
0.05) contrasting patients with hippocampal damage and their controls are from on McCormick et al. (2017). Bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Supplementary Figure S5 
 
Mean accuracy z-scores for the three patient groups for the tasks when decomposed into four scene categories (semantic 







Episodic future thinking reduces delay 
discounting in patients with vmPFC damage 
 
In this chapter, I will come back to one specific form of mental event construction, episodic 
future thinking, and study its relation and possible contribution to decision making. I will 
investigate whether promoting episodic future thinking in vmPFC patients reduces their delay 
discounting rates, and suggest a role for vmPFC in guiding future-oriented choice.  
 
Study 5. Episodic cueing decreases delay discounting in patients with vmPFC 
damage. 
co-authored with Elisa Ciaramelli, Donna Kwan, Francesca Bianconi, Violetta Knyagnytska, Carl 
Craver, Leonard Green, Joel Myerson, R. Shayna Rosenbaum (in preparation). 
Introduction 
 Choices are often intertemporal, requiring a tradeoff of short-term and long-term outcomes 
(e.g., should I smoke this cigarette or think about my health instead?). Humans, and even non-
human animals (Ainslie, 1975; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007), tend to prefer immediate 
over delayed rewards, even when waiting would yield larger payoffs. This phenomenon reflects the 
decrease in subjective value of a reward as the delay until its receipt increases, known as delay 
discounting (DD) (Ainslie, 1975; Myerson & Green, 1995). A range of clinical conditions (e.g., 
drug addiction, compulsive gambling, obesity) are associated with increased DD, reflecting the 
inability to forgo immediate gratification to pursue long-term goals of larger value (see Bickel, 
Koffarnus, Moody, & Wilson, 2014 for a review).  
 The vmPFC is engaged during intertemporal choices (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & 
Cohen, 2004; Kable & Glimcher, 2007), and plays a necessary role in the valuation of future 
rewards. Patients with damage to vmPFC (Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2010; Peters & 
D’Esposito, 2016), as well as animals with lesions in homologous regions (Winstanley, Theobald, 
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Cardinal, & Robbins, 2004; Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006), indeed 
show increased DD, a disproportionate prioritization of smaller, immediate rewards over larger, 
future rewards, which is associated with poor self-control and impulsivity. Additional aspects of 
vmPFC patients' clinical presentation are indicative of 'myopia for the future' (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994): vmPFC patients conceive future events that are closer in time 
(Fellows & Farah, 2005) and poorer in detail compared to those imagined by healthy and brain-
damaged controls (Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & 
Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017), and tend not to think about their 
future spontaneously (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016). 
 Here we test the possibility that individuals who show atypical DD as a result of focal 
lesions to vmPFC recover performance if provided with structure in the form of specific, personally 
meaningful event cues. Recent research has shown that episodic future thinking (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997; Atance & O’Neill, 2001), the mental simulation of events relevant to one's own 
future, can reduce DD. Peters and Büchel (2010) compared a standard DD task with an modified 
task in which personally future events imagined at given delays were provided as cues during 
choices involving rewards available at those delays. In the episodic cueing (compared to the 
standard) task, individuals' preferences shifted towards future rewards, and the strength of this 
effect was associated with the vividness of the imagined future event, and with increased functional 
coupling between the hippocampus and medial prefrontal regions typically associated with reward 
processing (Peters & Büchel, 2010; Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011). The effect of episodic 
cueing on DD is consistently found in healthy adults (Peters & Büchel, 2010; Benoit, Gilbert, & 
Burgess, 2011; Liu, Feng, Chen, & Li, 2013; Lin & Epstein, 2014), as well as in patients with 
substance abuse disorders (Daniel, Stanton, & Epstein, 2013; Snider, LaConte, & Bickel, 2016), in 
whom it extends to real-world indices of impulsive choice, such as impulsive drinking or eating.  
The present study investigates whether episodic cueing can reduce DD in patients with 
vmPFC damage. Such a finding would be important for both theoretical and practical reasons. 
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vmPFC patients have impaired episodic future thinking (as well as episodic remembering) 
(Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016), just as amnesic patients with medial temporal lobe (MTL) lesions, 
including the hippocampus (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013), 
consistent with the finding that vmPFC and the MTL are both part of a core network of brain 
regions mediating episodic simulation (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & 
Manning, 2008). The fact that vmPFC patients have an episodic future thinking impairment 
(Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016) 
that is similar to that observed in patients with MTL lesions may, in itself, limit the efficacy of 
episodic cueing, because patients may fail to create vivid episodic details to guide DD. Indeed, 
Palombo et al. (2015) found no effect of episodic cueing on DD in amnesic patients with MTL 
damage, who also have impaired episodic future thinking. In a similar study, Kwan et al. (2015) 
found that amnesic patients with impaired episodic future thinking can modulate DD through 
episodic cueing, though not as much as controls, and that amnesic patients with severe memory 
problems benefited the least from episodic memory cueing. Considering the similarity of the 
episodic future thinking impairment between vmPFC and MTL patients, one could expect similar 
findings in vmPFC patients regarding their ability to benefit from the episodic cueing.  
Another possibility, however, is that, unlike in MTL amnesics, episodic future thinking 
deficit in vmPFC patients is due to impaired strategic retrieval processes, e.g., the instantiation of 
schemas within which to anchor details for event construction or monitoring of the content of 
retrieval (Ghosh, Moscovitch, Melo Colella, & Gilboa, 2014; Hebscher & Gilboa, 2016; 
McCormick, Ciaramelli, De Luca, & Maguire, 2018). If vmPFC patients’ difficulty in imagining 
future episodes, unlike the one observed in hippocampal patients, is due to an inability to initiate 
endogenous processing necessary to retrieve and monitor the information used to make decisions, 
then abnormal DD should become less steep with the provision of structure cueing to concrete 
future events. Lastly, that episodic cues may have modulatory, and possibly remedial, effects on 
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delay discounting is of clinical importance in understanding future decision-making and in 
managing its consequences in vmPFC patients.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Thirteen individuals with damage to the vmPFC and 41 age-matched healthy individuals 
participated in the study. Patients were recruited at the Centre for Studies and Research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Cesena, Italy (5 cases), and at the Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest Health 
Sciences, Toronto, Canada (8 cases). Patients were selected on the basis of the location of their 
lesion evident on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) or computed tomography (CT) scans. 
Included patients had a lesion in vmPFC, and no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or 
interfere with the participation in the study (e.g., psychiatric or cerebrovascular disease, alcohol 
abuse). In all cases, the lesion was the result of the rupture of an aneurysm of the anterior 
communicating artery (ACoA), and bilateral. All patients were in the stable phase of recovery (at 
least 12 months post-lesion).  
 The boundary of the lesion was manually delineated on each MRI/CT scan using the 
software MRIcro (Holmes et al., 1998). Figure 16 shows the extent of damage for each patient. The 
Brodmann's areas (BA) that were mainly affected were BAs 10, 11, and 32. A vmPFC patient had a 
very large lesion that extended to dorsal prefrontal cortex (BA 6 and BA 8). Excluding these 
patients from the analyses, however, did not alter the results. vmPFC patients' general cognitive 
functioning was generally preserved, as indicated by their scores on the Raven Standard Progressive 
Matrices (see  Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987, for normative data). vmPFC performance on standardized 
tests of attention, executive functions, verbal and spatial short-term memory, and verbal and spatial 
long-term memory were within the normal range as well (see Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987; 
Culbertson & Zillmer, 2000; only one out of five Italian vmPFC patients reported a pathological 
score on this last test).  
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 The eight Canadian patients (4 males, mean age: 59, range 49-76; mean years of education: 
15, range: 10-20) were matched to fourteen Canadian healthy individuals (8 males; mean age: 67, 
range: 55-78; mean years of education: 15, range: 12-20) on education (t = 0.02, p = 0.99) and 
gender balance (χ² = 0.10, p = 0.75). The five Italian patients (all males, mean age: 57, range 46-73; 
mean years of education: 9, range: 5-13) were matched to 27 healthy Italian individuals (all males; 
mean age: 58, range: 49-64; mean years of education: 12, range: 8-13) on age (t = 0.27, p = 0.79) 
and gender balance (χ² = 0.00, p = 1.00). In the Italian sample, education was slightly higher in 
controls than in patients. Participants were screened for clinically significant depression, alcohol 
and drug abuse, epilepsy, and any other known neurological conditions. The ratio of patients to 
healthy controls was similar for the Italian and Canadian sample, χ² = 3.07, p = 0.08. For analysis 
purposes, we collapsed Italian and Canadian participants into one group of thirteen vmPFC patients 
(9 males), with a mean age of 59 years (range 46-76) and a mean education of 13 years (range 5-
20), and one group of 41 healthy controls (35 males), with a mean age of 61 years (range 49-78) 
and a mean education of 13 years (range 8-20). vmPFC patients and controls did not differ in age (t 
= 1.08, p = 0.28), education (t = 0.51, p = 0.61), and gender balance (χ² = 1.70, p = 0.19). All 
participants gave informed consent, and the study procedures were approved by the ethics 
committees of the University of Bologna, Baycrest Hospital, and York University, in line with the 
Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991). 
Figure 16. Location and overlap of brain lesions. The panel shows the lesions of 10 out of 13 patients with vmPFC 
damage projected on the same seven axial slices and on the mesial view of the standard Montreal Neurological Institute 
brain. The level of the axial slices has been marked by white horizontal lines on the mesial view of the brain. z-
coordinates of each axial slice are given. The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions. In each axial slice, 




Delay discounting task 
 Participants completed a computerized intertemporal choice task used in previous studies 
(Kwan et al., 2012; Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, & Rosenbaum, 2013; Kwan et al., 2015) in two 
experimental conditions (see Figure 17). In the Standard condition, participants made a series of 
choices between two hypothetical monetary rewards - a smaller, immediate amount and a larger, 
future amount. For each of two future amounts of different magnitude (for the Italian sample: 80€ 
and 1500€; for the Canadian sample: $100 and $2000), participants made six choices for each of 
seven delays (1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, and 10 years), with delays 
presented in random order. The first choice at each delay was between the future amount and half 
that amount to be received immediately. For each of the subsequent choices at each delay, the 
amount of the immediate reward was adjusted based on the participant’s previous choice. If the 
participant chose the immediate reward, then the amount of the immediate reward was decreased on 
the next trial; if the participant chose the delayed reward, then the amount of the immediate reward 
was increased on the next trial. After the first choice, the size of the adjustment to the immediate 
reward was half of the smaller amount. Subsequently, the size of the adjustment to the immediate 
reward decreased with each successive choice and was always equal to half of the previous 
adjustment, rounded to the nearest euro/dollar. This iterative procedure converged rapidly on an 
estimate of the amount of an immediate reward equivalent in (subjective) value to the delayed 
reward (see Green & Myerson, 2004 for further task details).  
 In the episodic cueing condition, participants first identified plausible personal future events 
(e.g., appointments, anniversaries, outings) for each of the seven delays in the discounting task. 
Participants were asked to include only emotionally neutral or positive future events. When 
participants encountered difficulties providing an event, the experimenter probed with the following 
questions: “Might there be any events with family or friends that may take place in <insert delay>?” 
and/or “Is there something you could possibly see yourself doing in <insert delay> or want to do in 
<insert delay>?”. Participants were also allowed to refer to personal calendars and electronic 
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devices. The DD task then proceeded as in the standard condition, except that each delay-interval 
block was preceded by the prospective cue associated with that delay (Fig. 2). Thus, for each delay, 
participants were cued to imagine the personal event they had associated with that delay in as much 
detail as possible. They pressed a button indicating they had the event in mind, which triggered a 
screen prompting them to make a choice involving a reward at that delay. The event cue remained 
at the top of the screen until the end of the delay block to reduce demands on memory. 
 For all participants, the episodic cueing condition was run approximately one month after 
the standard condition. The experiment was blocked in this fashion to prevent any benefit from 
future event cueing from carrying over into participants’ baseline discounting rates. Although carry-
over effects from this design cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely: we have observed that repeated 
testing does not systematically change rates of discounting in amnesic cases or controls (Kwan et 
al., 2012; Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, & Rosenbaum, 2013; Kwan et al., 2015). 
Figure 17. Experimental paradigm for the episodic cueing condition. Participants were presented with an episodic cue 
and imagined a personal future experience occurring at a specific delay (e.g., 3 years). They were then presented with 
two hypothetical rewards and indicated their decision between the smaller immediate reward and the larger reward to be 
received at the same delay. 
 
Data analysis 
 The rate at which the subjective value of a reward decays with delay (DD rate) is generally 
assessed through two indices: the delay discounting parameter k (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; 
Green & Myerson, 2004), and the area under the empirical discounting curve (AUC) (Myerson, 
Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). First, the hyperbolic function SV = 1/(1 + kD), where SV is the 
subjective value (expressed as a fraction of the delayed amount), and D is the delay (in days), was 
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fit to the data to determine the k constant of the best fitting delay discounting function, using a 
nonlinear, least-squares algorithm (as implemented in Statistica; Statsoft). The larger the value of k, 
the steeper the discounting function, the more participants were inclined to choose small-immediate 
rewards over larger-delayed rewards. We then checked whether the exponential model proved 
equally able to capture DD behavior in patients and controls, and found this was not the case. The 
ANOVA on R2 hyperbolic values with Group (vmPFC patients, healthy controls), Condition 
(standard, episodic cueing), and Reward magnitude (€80/$100, €1500/$2000) as factors, revealed a 
significant effect of Condition (F1,52 = 8.84, p = 0.004), and a significant Condition X Group 
interaction (F1,52 = 5.13, p = 0.03). Post-hoc Newman–Keuls comparisons showed that R
2 values 
were comparable in vmPFC patients and controls in the standard condition (0.71 vs. 0.62; p = 0.35), 
but they were significantly lower in patients than in controls in the episodic cueing condition (0.38 
vs 0.58; p = 0.04). Furthermore, whereas controls had comparable R2 values in the standard (0.62) 
and episodic cueing condition (0.58, p = 0.62), vmPFC patients reported significantly higher R2 
values in the standard than in the episodic cueing condition (0.71 vs 0.38, p = 0.003). No other 
effects were significant (all p > 0.34). Thus, in the episodic cueing condition, the hyperbolic model 
did not fit vmPFC patients' delay discounting function as it did for controls. Considering that DD 
behavior generally obeys a hyperbolic function in vmPFC patients, as shown by normal R2 values in 
the Standard condition (see also Sellitto et al., 2010), we think that this finding reflects vmPFC 
patients' episodic future thinking impairment: vmPFC patients were inconsistently able to imagine 
future events across different delays, and therefore choices relative to some delays benefited 
disproportionately more than others from episodic cueing more, altering the shape of the DD 
function in a non systematic fashion. A corollary analysis showed indeed that although in the 
Standard condition vmPFC patients made a number of inconsistent choices (i.e., the subjective 
value of the future outcome at a given delay is greater than that at the preceding) comparable to the 
controls (see also Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2010), they made more inconsistent choices 
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than healthy controls in the episodic cueing condition, as expected if the success of episodic cueing 
fluctuated non systematically across delays (see Supplementary materials for more detail). 
We elected the AUC as a measure of DD rate in our groups, as it is a normalized measure of 
the degree of reward discounting that is independent of any theoretical hypothesis concerning the 
precise shape of the discounting curve (AUC; Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). First, 
delays and subjective values were normalized. Each delay was expressed as a proportion of 
maximum delay (120 months) and subjective values were expressed as a proportion of the delayed 
values (€80/$100, €1500/$2000). The normalized delays were then plotted on the x axis and the 
normalized subjective values on the y axis as a function of delay to construct a discounting curve. 
Vertical lines were drawn from each x value to the curve, subdividing the area under the curve into 
a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid was calculated as (x2 - x1)( y1 + y2)/2, where x1 
and x2 are successive delays, and y1 and y2 are the subjective values associated with those delays 
(Myerson et al., 2001). The AUC is the sum of the areas of all the trapezoids. The AUC varies 
between 0 (maximally steep discounting) and 1 (no discounting). The smaller the AUC, the steeper 
the TD, and the more participants were inclined to choose small immediate rewards over larger 
delayed rewards.  
Results 
 Figure 18 shows AUC values by participant group, condition, and reward magnitude. AUC 
scores were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov d < 0.20, p > 0.20 in all cases), and 
therefore, comparisons were performed using parametric statistical tests. An ANOVA on AUC 
scores with Group, Condition, and Reward magnitude as factors revealed a main effect of Reward 
magnitude (F(1,52) = 14.78, p < 0.001), a marginally significant effect of Group (p = 0.06), and a 
significant Group X Reward interaction (F(1,52) = 9.84, p = 0.003). Newman-Keuls post hoc 
comparisons revealed that vmPFC patients had steeper DD than healthy controls for large rewards 
(p = 0.01) but not for small rewards (p = 0.79). Interestingly, healthy individuals discounted smaller 
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rewards more steeply than larger rewards (p < 0.001), replicating the magnitude effect (Thaler, 
1981; Green, Myerson, & Mcfadden, 1997; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999), whereas 
vmPFC patients showed comparable delay discounting for both reward magnitudes (p = 0. 62). 
Crucially, there was a significant main effect of Condition (F(1,52) = 62.23, p < 0.0001), such that 
future rewards were discounted less steeply in the episodic cueing condition compared to the 
standard condition in both groups. No other effect or interaction was significant (p > 0.26 in all 
cases). To quantify directly the benefit from episodic cueing, we also calculated for each participant 
and reward magnitude the difference in AUC between the Standard and the Episodic cueing 
condition. The ANOVA on AUC difference scores with Group and Reward magnitude as factors 
revealed no significant effects (p > 0.26 in all cases), further confirming that vmPFC patients 
benefited from episodic cueing as much as controls. 
Figure 18. Area under the empirical discounting curve by participant group (vmPFC patients, healthy controls), task 




This study investigated the effect of episodic future thinking (EFT) on intertemporal choices 
in a population of patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a brain 
region known to play a necessary role in both EFT and the valuation of future rewards during 
intertemporal choices. To this aim, we tested vmPFC patients and matched healthy controls on a 
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delay discounting (DD) task, involving choices between smaller, immediate monetary rewards and 
larger, delayed rewards of two different magnitudes available at each of seven specified delays, 
both with and without episodic cueing. In the episodic cueing condition, participants were cued to 
imagine a personal event to occur at one of the delays immediately before a choice involving a 
reward at that delay. The main finding of the present study is that vmPFC patients had a reduced 
DD in the episodic cueing condition compared to the standard condition, showing a cueing effect 
similar to that observed in healthy controls. Furthermore, vmPFC patients had steeper DD than 
healthy controls only for large rewards, related to the fact that they discounted small and large 
reward magnitudes to the same extent, thus not showing the same magnitude effect observed in 
healthy controls, who discounted larger rewards less steeply than smaller rewards.  
The finding that vmPFC patients reduce their tendency to discount future rewards when they 
are cued to imagine personal future events is intriguing, considering that neuroimaging findings in 
healthy individuals show that the episodic future thought reduces delay discounting via activation of 
the vmPFC (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011), and that the strength of episodic cueing effect is 
associated with increased functional coupling between the hippocampus and medial prefrontal 
regions (Peters & Büchel, 2010), areas typically associated with reward processing (McClure et al., 
2004; Kable & Glimcher, 2007) and future thinking (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, 
Denkova, & Manning, 2008). However, the presence of an episodic cueing effect in vmPFC 
patients is consistent with a similar reduction of delay discounting through episodic future thinking 
found in people suffering from different forms of addiction, like alcohol (Snider, LaConte, & 
Bickel, 2016), food (Daniel et al., 2013; O’Neill, Daniel, & Epstein, 2016) or drugs (Dennhardt et 
al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016) abuse, and in young healthy people, like adolescents (Bromberg, 
Lobatcheva, & Peters, 2017). Interestingly, individuals in such clinical conditions as well as those 
in the early stage of life share with frontal patients many cognitive and behavioral features. The first 
feature they have in common is a poor decision-making and impulse control ability. Indeed, 
individuals with alcohol dependence (Petry, 2001), affected by obesity (Weller, Cook III, Avsar, & 
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Cox, 2008; Davis, Patte, Curtis, & Reid, 2010) or drugs addiction (Madden, Petry, Badger, & 
Bickel, 1997; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003), and 
adolescents (Olson, Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 2007; De Water, Cillessen, & Scheres, 2014), 
show an inability to delay gratification, indexed by steeper discount rates compared to healthy/older 
individuals. The second feature that addicts, young healthy people and vmPFC patients have in 
common is poor long-term memory and future thinking abilities. Individuals with alcohol 
dependence or drugs abuse show difficulties in the recollection of personal past episodes (Rogers & 
Robbins, 2001; Verdejo-Garcia, Lopez-Torrecillas, Orozco Gimenez, & Perez-Garcia, 2004; 
D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, Verbanck, & Noe, 2006; Pitel et al., 2007; Solowij et al., 2011; 
Noël et al., 2012; Schuster, Crane, Mermelstein, & Gonzalez, 2015; Nandrino et al., 2016), and in 
the imagination of novel future scenarios (Griffiths et al., 2012; Mercuri et al., 2014; Mercuri et al., 
2016). A similar change in episodic memory and future thinking occurs across life span, with 
younger children telling less coherent and less rich events than older children, irrespective of 
temporal direction (Bohn & Berntsen, 2013; Gott & Lah, 2013).  
An effect of episodic future thinking on delay discounting seems to be surprising in clinical 
populations with difficulties in imagining the future. Studies on people with different forms of 
substances abuse (Daniel et al., 2013; Snider et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2016) or on adolescents 
(Bromberg et al., 2017) have attributed the reduction of future rewards discounting to a shifting in 
time perspective and a widening of individual’s temporal window induced by episodic future 
thinking, resulting in an easier valuation of future consequences, that leads to increased self-control 
and likelihood of acting in one’s long-term best interest (Bickel, Quisenberry, Moody, & Wilson, 
2015; Snider et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2016). However, the strength of the episodic effect in healthy 
individuals is usually associated with the vividness of the imagined future events (Peters & Büchel, 
2010), whereas studies on alcohol addicts (Snider et al., 2016) and adolescents (Bromberg, 
Lobatcheva, & Peters, 2017) did not find such an association, leading to wonder which quality of 
the future scenarios triggered the effect and to question the actual participants’ engagement in the 
137 
 
simulation of future events in an episodic way. Although we did not measure the vividness of the 
imagined future episodes in the current study, a similar doubt arises for the strategy used by vmPFC 
patients during the episodic cueing condition. These patients are indeed known to be impaired at 
constructing and visualizing future events (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016; 
Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017).  
To explain which type of strategy vmPFC patients used during the episodic condition of the 
task, it may be useful to call into question their spared cognitive abilities. Semantic memory is one 
of them. Indeed, vmPFC patients can provide a number of external (non episodic) details, which 
include semantic information, comparable to that of healthy controls (Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016; 
Bertossi, Candela, De Luca, & Ciaramelli, 2017), when asked to recall past episodes or imagine 
future events. Similarly, vmPFC patients are capable to make judgements about the semantic 
content of single scenes to detect semantic impossibilities (e.g., an elephant with butterflies for ears; 
De Luca et al., under revision). Thus, one possibility is that vmPFC patients exploited their spared 
personal semantic knowledge (Tanguay et al., 2018) as a less demanding, shortcut-strategy to 
supply an impaired episodic future thinking, and that their 'semanticized' anticipation of the future 
was enough to improve delay discounting. On this account, semantic memory would be sufficient to 
engage in a collateral form of future simulation and, consequently, to modify own’ choices 
accordingly. If this was the case, however, amnesic patients with MTLs damage should benefit 
from episodic cueing to the same extent than vmPFC patients. 
Another possibility is that episodic cueing in vmPFC (but not in MTLs) patients had an 
effect on DD because, as my previous experiments 3 and 4 suggest, vmPFC patients are particularly 
impaired during unconstrained tasks, like simulation of past, future or fictitious scenarios (Bertossi, 
Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016; Bertossi et al., 2017), because they find it difficult 
to initiate endogenous processing related to access, filter and collect the contents of cognition. 
However, when such processing is circumvented with the provision of structured cueing to concrete 
future events, like in the current task, then a deficit may be no longer apparent, consistent with 
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evidence of an effect of EFT on delay discounting (McCormick et al., 2018; De Luca et al., under 
revision). On the other hand, the finding that patients with the most widespread and bilateral 
damage within the MTL (including the hippocampus) were the least responsive to the episodic 
cueing (Kwan et al., 2015; Palombo, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2015) leads to think that MTL structures 
play a role during the construction of episodic future scenarios that cannot be circumvented by 
providing a scaffold for future imagining. Thus, vmPFC patients are impaired at self-initiating the 
event construction process, but if they are provided with structured cueing, which acts as an 
external construction “inducer”, they become able to simulate future scenarios, and to factor them 
into intertemporal choice, whereas MTLs patients are unable to mentally construct specific events 
no matter how much construction was externally prompted, and therefore cannot benefit from EFT 
during decision making. This interpretation is in line with the proposal that vmPFC and the 
hippocampus may work in concert during the construction of scenes, playing different 
complementary roles  (McCormick, Ciaramelli, et al., 2018).  
This study also replicates the finding of an increased devaluation of future rewards during 
intertemporal choices after vmPFC damage (Sellitto et al., 2010), but it adds new information about 
the valuation of the magnitude of future rewards to be discounted. Indeed, vmPFC patients had a 
steeper DD than healthy controls only for large rewards, related to the fact that, unlike healthy 
controls, they discounted in a similar way rewards of different magnitudes. The lack of a magnitude 
effect (Thaler, 1981; Green et al., 1997; Chapman & Winquist, 1998; Green, Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski, 1999) in vmPFC patients is in line with extant studies in animals (van Duuren, 
Lankelma, & Pennartz, 2008; da Costa Araújo et al., 2010; Ostrander et al., 2011) and humans 
(Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; Ballard & Knutson, 2009), showing that 
medial prefrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens are associated with the valuation of the size of 
future rewards. fMRI studies in humans found that activation in medial prefrontal cortex correlates 
with increasing magnitudes of future rewards and, of note, more impulsive individuals show 
diminished neural activation to larger future rewards (Ballard & Knutson, 2009).  
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Indeed, prefrontal areas necessary for executive control are more strongly engaged in 
choices involving high-magnitude options (Ballard et al., 2017), which have been deemed to entail 
higher levels of self-control. Self-control is considered a determinant factor of the magnitude effect 
in intertemporal choice: being self-control effortful, it is flexibly allocated according to the 
perceived importance of the decision (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2013). It is reasonable to think that larger rewards are deemed to deserve more effort than smaller 
rewards. As mentioned above, self-control is associated to the activity of the frontal lobes (Menon, 
Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001; Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014) and vmPFC patients have poor 
decision-making and self/impulse control (Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004; Bechara, 2004; Cato, 
Delis, Abildskov, & Bigler, 2004; see Bechara & Van Der Linden, 2005 for a review). Therefore, it 
is possible that poor self-control led vmPFC patients not only to discount inconveniently larger 
future rewards more steeply than the smaller immediate ones, but also to neglect the advantage of 
choosing future rewards of larger magnitude. 
The lack of magnitude effect in vmPFC patients seems to be successfully explained by the 
self-control hypothesis, but it could be also accounted for by the discounted utility model of rational 
choices, which posits that individuals assess rewards with a utility function that has increasing 
proportional sensitivity (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). According to 
this model, the magnitude effect is believed to be an anomaly of decision-making process, because 
it leads individuals to assume that the ratio between the utilities of $20 and $10 is smaller than the 
ratio between the utilities of $2,000 and $1,000, and so that the larger reward in the high-magnitude 
condition is relatively more valuable than the larger reward in the low-magnitude condition 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). As an irrational form of thought occurring during economic choices, 
the magnitude effect is comparable to other anomalies of the decision-making process involving 
time delay or uncertainty, like the “certainty effect” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) or the “Allais 
paradox” (Allais, 1953), the tendency to overweight outcomes that are certain relative to those that 
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are probable, even when the certain are less convenient. These effects have been explained as a 
mechanism to anticipate and avoid the feeling of regret associated to the acknowledgment of having 
lost a more desirable option than the chosen one (Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Bourgeois-Gironde, 
2010). It is possible that the tendency to discount less steeply larger than smaller rewards follows 
the similar need to avoid the regret that would arise if a smaller, less advantageous future reward 
had chosen over a larger, more advantageous one. If it is the case, an inability to experience regret 
would prevent to show the magnitude effect. The orbitofrontal cortex has been found to represent 
the impact of potentially negative consequences of choices during the comparison between actual 
outcomes and counterfactual ones (Ursu & Carter, 2005) and vmPFC patients are, indeed, incapable 
to modify their behavior in response to negative consequences (Rolls, 2000) and to take regret into 
account during decision-making (Camille et al., 2004). Therefore, it is possible that vmPFC 
patients, not being able to pre-experience the future disappointment associated with a less 
convenient choice, fail to appreciate the difference between the two reward magnitudes, ending up 
discounting the two magnitudes in a comparable way. 
To conclude, we have showed that vmPFC patients had steeper DD than healthy controls, 
though this was mainly apparent with large future rewards. Crucially, cueing personal future events 
proved normally effective in decreasing discounting of future rewards in vmPFC participants as 
well as healthy controls, reducing the difference in DD behavior between groups. This finding 
shows that, although vmPFC patients' future thinking is poor in episodic detail, it may be sufficient 
to modulate the value assigned to future rewards, perhaps by externally activating personal semantic 








The present thesis has addressed the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the 
complex act of constructing mental events. I have mainly focussed on one specific form of mental 
event construction, episodic future thinking. The important cognitive and neural similarities 
between episodic future thinking and remembering the past have raised several hypotheses about 
the core component processes shared by these abilities. One account has emphasized the 
constructive nature of both abilities, suggesting that elements of episodic memory are extracted and 
flexibly recombined to construct novel events; another account has instead focussed on the common 
process of self-projection into alternative situations that episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking share with other forms of mental simulations, as theory of mind and spatial navigation; in 
contrast with this last approach, it has been suggested that scene construction, i.e., the generation, 
visualization and maintenance of mental scenes, is the fundamental process underlying the 
construction of any mental event, not only future, but also past, atemporal experiences, and even 
experiences not related to the self.  
The first chapter of the present thesis has addressed the nature of the cognitive relationship 
between episodic memory, episodic future thinking and future-based decision making and 
cognition, through a single case of retrograde amnesia, which causes a severe impairment of 
episodic – autobiographical memory, leaving partially spared the semantic memory component. 
Study 1 showed that episodic – autobiographical memory is necessary to envision personal future 
events, but not to construct fictitious, atemporal experiences, to make future-oriented decisions, or 
to conceive the concept of time, and that semantic memory can be sufficient for some forms of 
mental event construction. The second chapter of the thesis has begun to explore the neural bases of 
the mental construction of future events, investigating component processes of episodic future 
thinking and the role of vmPFC in this ability, through the study of patients with damage to the 
vmPFC. Study 2 confirmed that vmPFC is necessary for the construction of personal future events, 
and showed that vmPFC is also involved in narrative and working memory abilities. Importantly, 
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however, poor narrative and working memory abilities have not been found to explain the episodic 
future thinking impairment that follows a vmPFC damage. 
The third chapter has deepened the investigation of the role of vmPFC in event construction, 
narrowing the focus on a core component process of event construction, namely, the construction of 
scenes, and on the role of vmPFC and hippocampus in this process. vmPFC and hippocampus are 
key nodes of the construction system and both necessary to construct mental scenes; thereby, this 
chapter has tried to differentiate their distinct contribution to the scene construction process. Study 
3 has addressed explicit and implicit scene construction processes, whereas study 4 has probed the 
constructive and semantic components of the scene construction process. Findings showed that 
vmPFC and hippocampus are both necessary for explicit and implicit scene construction processes; 
however, the different profile of impairment of vmPFC and hippocampal patients led us to suggest 
that vmPFC is critical to initiate endogenous processes related to the construction of content-rich 
scenes, whereas the hippocampus is specifically involved in assembling scenes in a coherent spatial 
context.  
The last chapter comes back to examining one specific form of mental event construction, 
episodic future thinking, focusing on its effect on decision making, in patients with damage to the 
vmPFC. Study 5 showed that although vmPFC patients have impaired episodic simulation and 
delay discounting behavior, they show reduced delay discounting when cued to imagine the future 
before making intertemporal choices. We have argued that vmPFC patients' main problem is at self-
initiating event construction, and that providing structured cues to construct a (albeit semanticized) 
representation of the future improves future-oriented choice in these patients. This study, therefore, 
confirmed that vmPFC is involved in the self-initiation of the mental event construction, and that 
decision-making abilities can benefit from the externally induced simulation of future events.   
To conclude, the present thesis has discussed the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying the complex act of constructing mental events, focussing on the core process of scene 
construction and on the different roles played by vmPFC and the hippocampus in this process. The 
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reported findings provide further support to the scene construction theory, by showing the necessary 
roles played by vmPFC and hippocampus during the construction of mental scenes, and proposing a 
hierarchical model of their interaction during scene/event construction. Scenes are the backbones of 
any simulated extended event, necessary to construct past, future and atemporal experiences and 
involved in some aspects of decision making. The construction of mental events is a vital feature of 
human mental activity, allowing individuals to engage in high-order forms of cognition, as 
remembering personal past, imagining personal future, or mind-wandering, abilities highly related 
to self-identity and self-consciousness, and that are claimed to distinguish humans from other 
species. Therefore, it seems of particular interest to understand how and where in the brain such 
complex experiences are constructed and used. Further research is needed to continue the 
investigation of the component processes and the neural underpinnings of such a complex human 
mental faculty. 
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